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ABSTRACT 
Although forgetfulness is a common and naturally occurring phenomenon, 
research suggests that it can be intentionally induced using several experimental 
paradigms. For some individuals, the ability to forget negative thoughts, images, 
or memories is problematic. That is, the inability to forget may be a source of 
significant psychological distress (e.g., post-traumatic stress, obsessive-
compulsiveness, and depressed mood) that contributes to the maintenance of 
symptoms of various mental health disorders. The schema-activation hypothesis from 
Beck’s (1987) Cognitive Theory of Depression suggest that memories should be 
more readily brought to mind because they are more readily available through 
associated activation. Thus, negative memories may be difficult to inhibit (forget), 
for individuals who are depressed compared to non-depressed counterparts.  
Indeed, suppression effort (the intentional mental effort to not think about 
something) often leads to an increase in the very cognitive content targeted for 
forgetting. For individuals who experience depression or dysphoria, suppression 
is not effective because the negative cognitive content, which is the hallmark the 
depressed mood state only serves to maintain or exacerbate the mood state. This 
raises the question of whether there are alternatives to suppression-like paradigms 
that may be more efficacious for those who are dysphoric or depressed. 
Investigating the efficacy of induced-forgetting of negative memories may provide 
researchers and clinicians with additional avenues to explore the therapeutic 
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potential of induced forgetting as an intervention or preventive strategy in 
combating depressed mood states.  
The purpose of the present study was threefold: first, this study examined 
whether individual differences (e.g., mood state) in a person’s ability to call to 
mind (remember) negative self-relevant memories would affect memory 
generation time. Second, the implications of differences in mood for the efficacy of 
two experimental forgetting paradigms – Directed Forgetting (DF) and Retrieval 
Induced Forgetting (RIF) were explored. Finally, individual differences in mental 
control (i.e., perceived mental controllability, mental control strategies, and 
rumination as a coping response) were examined in terms of their ability to predict 
who would be better at remembering and forgetting.  
University students (N = 103) with high and low levels of symptoms of 
dysphoria were asked to generate a set of 32 negative memories using cue words. 
After rating their memories for clarity and negative valance, each set of memories 
was subject to either a Directed Forgetting or Retrieval-Induced Forgetting 
procedure. Participants also completed self-report measures of mental control and 
rumination.  
Individuals who were dysphoric were similar to those who were non-
dysphoric in the amount of time it took to generate a set of 32 negative memories. 
These results failed to support the tenets of the Schema Activation Hypothesis of 
Beck’s (1967) Cognitive Theory of Depression. Subsequent analysis revealed that 
the act of generating negative memories was mood-inducing, which may have 
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negated the effect of mood on generation time. In terms of the effect of mood on 
induced-forgetting paradigm efficacy, the analysis yielded several null findings. 
The insufficient power prohibited the ability to detect small effects.  
Dysphoric individuals evidenced deficits in forgetting for the directed-
forgetting but not the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm, but only when 
separate analysis of individual paradigms was undertaken. In this case, the effect 
of mood on forgetting approached significance for the directed-forgetting 
paradigm but not the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm. This suggests that 
inducing forgetting for those who are dysphoric is more likely to be successful if 
there is no instruction to “forget.” Finally, it was predicted that poor perceived 
mental control, a tendency to ruminate, and the use of mental control strategies 
would correlate with induced-forgetting. Results suggest that individuals who 
perceive themselves as poor at controlling mental content, and ruminate about 
their internal experience of sadness are impaired on recall of negative 
autobiographic memories when asked to forget them. In contrast, mental control 
variables were not related to the degree of forgetting using retrieval-practice 
methodology. 
The results of this study have implications for future research designed to 
further explore the therapeutic value of induced-forgetting, particularly for the RIF 
paradigm. That is, the presence of a retrieval-induced forgetting effect for those 
who are dysphoric could prove to be a beneficial coping strategy to combat 
unwanted negative memories. It may be important to study the longitudinal value, 
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as well as explore the potential benefits for other psychologically distressing 
phenomena in which negative memories are a part (e.g., post-traumatic stress). 
That cognitive factors, such as mental control and ruminative coping, do not 
share a relationship with degree of forgetting in the RIF paradigm also bodes well 
in demonstrating a possible therapeutic advantage for RIF compared to DF. 
Researchers are advised to consider mood and mental control variables in terms of 
their potential effects on forgetting paradigm efficacy when selecting their 
methodology in studies of intentional forgetting. This is particularly important 
when using a university sample of participants. It is often the case with 
experimental research, that a university sample is used. Given the higher rates of 
dysphoria and self-reported depressive symptoms that tend to typify university 
students and therefore, may be higher than in community-based samples, 
researchers are cautioned to consider the implications of dysphoria on research 
outcomes when testing induced-forgetting paradigms. 
vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The fruition of this research stands as a testament to the unfailing support 
of many people who were a part of my life while pursuing my graduate work. 
First, I would like to personally acknowledge and thank my supervisor, Dr. 
Tammy Marche. Her knowledge, gentle guidance, collegiality, and unending 
availability, especially in those moments where challenges seemed 
insurmountable, did not go unnoticed. Second, I would like to acknowledge the 
generous support and meaningful contributions of the members of my graduate 
committee; Dr. Carl von Baeyer, Dr. Margaret Crossley, and Dr. Laurie Hellsten. 
Their unique personal qualities of genuineness, humour, and forthrightness 
coupled with their academic prowess have provided me with a solid research 
experience on which to build my future career. Third, I would like to thank my 
external examiner Dr. David Dozois, for his patience during the weeks leading up 
to my defense and the collegial style with which he approached the oral 
examination. He is clearly an expert in his field of which I have reaped the benefit 
of his insightful comments and suggestions. 
 
I would also like to thank my family, colleagues, and friends. In particular, I 
thank Dr. Bette Brazier for her enduring patience and unwavering belief in my 
abilities as I navigated through my academic program. To my friend, Robin 
Hardman, I want to say thank you for reflecting back to me that “friendship is not 
at my convenience.” I also wish to thank my research assistants Andy Barber, and 
Jennifer Briere for their assistance with data collection, eagerness to learn, and 
dedication to the project. Further, I wish to thank Dr. Jennifer LaForce for her brief 
but important contribution to my understanding of useful power analysis tools. 
 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada for their generous financial support without which 
this research would not have been possible. 
 
vii 
DEDICATION 
This thesis is dedicated to Dr. David A. Clark at the University of New Brunswick. 
As the individual who introduced me to graduate research, Dr. Clark’s guidance, 
mentorship, and willingness to provide a host of opportunities have helped to 
develop my skills as a scientist-practitioner. His mentorship has formed the 
foundation on which I have been able to successfully pursue my academic goals. I 
thank Dr. Clark for igniting the spark that has become an enduring passion for 
research and particularly, research focused on the cognitive aspects of dysphoria 
and depression. 
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PERMISSION TO USE………………………………………………………… i 
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………….. ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………. vi 
DEDICATION………………………………………………………………….. vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………….. viii 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………….. xi 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………… xii 
CHAPTER 1: IN THE MOOD TO FORGET: PARADIGMATIC AND 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING 
NEGATIVE SELF-RELEVANT MEMORIES………………………………….. 1 
   
 1.1 When Dysphoria Becomes Depression………………………... 5 
 1.2 Depression and Dysphoria……………………………………… 10 
1.2.1 Phenomenology and Conceptualisation…………………. 11 
 1.3 Beck’s Cognitive Theory of Depression………………………... 17 
1.3.1 Selective Processing Hypothesis…………………………... 21 
1.3.2 Schema Activation Hypothesis…………………………….. 23 
1.3.3 Autobiographic Memory Tasks…………………………… 26 
 1.4 Forgetting………………………………………………………… 29 
1.4.1 Potential Causes of Induced-Forgetting………………….. 31 
 1.5 Paradigms of Induced-Forgetting……………………..……….. 36 
1.5.1 The Directed-Forgetting Paradigm……………………….. 36 
1.5.2 The Retrieval-Induced-Forgetting Paradigm……………. 40 
1.5.3 Forgetting, Emotion Valence, and Self-Relevance………. 41 
1.5.4 Suppression and Forgetting……………………………….. 44 
1.6 The Importance of Studying Induced-forgetting of Negative 
Memories………………………...................................................... 47 
 1.7 Cognitive Factors Associated with Depression…………..…… 49 
1.7.1 Cognitive Risk Factors in Depression…………………….. 51 
 1.8 Mental Control and Depression…………..……………………. 53 
1.8.1 Perceived Mental Control………………………………….. 58 
1.8.2 Rumination………………………………………………….. 60 
 1.9 Rumination and Memory…………………..…………………… 64 
ix 
1.10 Rationale for the Present Study……………………………….. 68 
1.10.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses……………………. 72 
 
CHAPTER 2: METHOD………………………………………………………… 77 
  
 2.1 Participants…………………………..…………………………… 77 
 2.2 Design………………………………..……………………………. 79 
  2.2.1 Analytic Strategy……………………………………………. 82 
 2.3 Materials…………………………..……………………………… 83 
2.3.1 Mood State…………………………………………………… 84 
 2.3.1.1 Dysphoria…………………………………………….. 84 
2.3.1.2 Sadness……………………………………………….. 85 
2.3.1.3 Positive and Negative Affect……………………….. 85 
2.3.2 Memory Generation Cues…………………………………. 86 
2.3.3 Memory and Cue-word Characteristics………………….. 87 
2.3.4 Memory Generation Time…………………………………. 87 
2.3.5 Mental Control……………………………………………… 88 
2.3.5.1 Perceived Mental Control…………………………… 88 
2.3.5.2 Mental Control Strategy…………………………….. 88 
2.3.5.3 Rumination…………………………………………… 89 
 2.4 Procedure……..………………………………………………….. 90 
2.4.1 Memory Generation Phase………………………………… 90 
2.4.2 Induced-forgetting Phase………………………………….. 93 
 
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS…………………………………………………………. 99 
  
 3.1 Data Preparation…..…………………………………………….. 90 
 3.2 Preliminary Analyses…………………..……………………….. 99 
 3.3 Memory Generation……………………………………..………. 104 
 3.3.1 Mood Inducing Effects of the Memory Generation 
Task……………………………………………………………….. 105 
 3.4 Evaluating the Effects of Mood on Paradigm Efficacy…..…… 106 
 3.4.1 Exploratory Analysis of Mood and 
 Individual Paradigms…………………………………... 113 
 3.5 Examining RIF Practice Effects……………………………….… 114 
 3.6 Relationships among Mental Control  
 Variables and Forgetting………………………..………………. 117 
 
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION……………………………………………..………. 123 
  
 4.1 Mood and Memory Accessibility………………………………. 123 
 4.1.1 Limitations of the Memory Generation Task…………… 129 
  
x 
 4.1.2 General Limitations of Phase 1…………………………… 132 
 4.1.3 Summary of Findings for Phase 1: 
 Memory Generation………………………………………135 
 4.2 Induced-forgetting and Mood…………………..……………… 138 
 4.2.1 Dysphoria and Induced-forgetting Effects……………… 138 
 4.2.2 Limitations…………………………………………………. 140 
 4.2.3 Summary of Induced-forgetting Findings……………… 145 
 4.3 Mental Control Factors as a Source of Individual  
 Differences in Remembering and Forgetting……………. 147 
 4.3.1 Limitations and 
Implications………………………………………………………. 149 
 4.4 Gender Differences in Dysphoria………………………..…….. 153 
 4.5 Implications and Future Directions………………………..….. 154 
 
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………. 164 
APPENDIX A: Consent to Participate in Research…………………………… 201 
APPENDIX B: Demographic Questionnaire………………………………….. 204 
APPENDIX C: Control of Unwanted Thoughts Scale……………………….. 205 
APPENDIX D: Thought Control Questionnaire……………………………… 209 
APPENDIX E: Rumination on Sadness Scale…………………………………. 211 
APPENDIX F: Sadness Single Item Scale…………………………………….. 213 
APPENDIX G: Positive and Negative Affect Scales…………………………. 214 
APPENDIX H: Memory Elicitation Cue Word List…………………………. 215 
APPENDIX I: Memory Record Form………………………………………….. 216 
APPENDIX J: Subjective Ratings of Valence, Clarity, and Age…………… 217 
APPENDIX K: Cue Word Rating Scales………………………………………. 218 
APPENDIX L: Visual Search Task……………………………………………. 220 
APPENDIX M: Debriefing Form……………………………………………….. 221 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table           Page 
  
1   Diagrammatic representation of the research design  
 for Phase 2.        81 
 
2  Gender difference in measures of mood state.   101 
 
 3  Group differences on memory characteristics.   102 
 
4  Group differences in study variables.    103 
 
5 Means and standard deviations for total time to generate  
a negative memory set.      105 
 
6  Means and standard deviations for the  
2 by 3 by 2 ANOVA.      108 
 
7  Means and standard deviations for each paradigm by  
Instruction condition      111 
 
8  Means and standard deviations for each paradigm using  
  the practice effect components of RIF    116 
 
9  Descriptive data for mental control variables   117 
 
10  Correlations among mental control variables and  
generation time       119 
 
11 Correlations among mental control variables and the degree of 
forgetting in the DF paradigm     120 
 
12  Correlations among mental control variables and degree of  
  forgetting in RIF       121 
 
13  Correlations among mental control variables and the RIF  
  practice effect components      122 
 
xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure           Page 
 
1   Causal chain of Beck’s Cognitive Theory of    19 
Depressive symptom onset. 
 
2   The mood by instruction interaction.    111 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1: IN THE MOOD TO FORGET: PARADIGMATIC AND 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING 
NEGATIVE SELF-RELEVANT MEMORIES 
Is forgetfulness a bad thing? Forgetting is a common and naturally 
occurring phenomenon, which is generally viewed as a negative cognitive event. 
However, research has suggested that it can be intentionally induced in 
laboratory settings (see MacLeod, 1998 for a review) and this raises an interesting 
question as to why one would want to intentionally induce a cognitive 
phenomenon perceived as negative. Some individuals may be unable to forget 
negative thoughts, images, or memories. This inability can become problematic, 
and may actually maintain or exacerbate the resulting psychological distress 
(e.g., post-traumatic stress, obsessive-compulsiveness, and depressed mood). 
Indeed, the American Psychiatric Association (APA; 2000) recognizes negative 
thoughts, images, and memories at the symptom level of many mental health 
disorders (e.g., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
and Major Depressive Disorder). Thus it would seem that for some individuals, 
ridding the mind of distressful negative cognitions may prove important to the 
reduction of psychological distress. 
Depression and dysphoria are particular psychological issues in which 
negative cognitions often hallmark the flow of conscious thought (Clark & 
Rhyno, 2005). Because negative thoughts, images, and memories are associated 
with a decline in mood (Wenzlaff, 2005), an individual who experiences 
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depression or dysphoria is more likely to need to exert greater mental control in 
an effort to inhibit or suppress negative cognitions. Wegner (1994) theorized that 
trying hard not to think about something serves, paradoxically, to increase the 
accessibility and frequency of thoughts targeted for suppression. Wegner called 
this process the Ironic Process Theory (1994).  
Subsequent research has found that greater effort to suppress is more 
likely than not to lead to an increase in the very cognitions one is trying to 
suppress (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000) – a phenomenon called rebound effect. The 
result then, of the ironic processes of thought suppression, is the exacerbation of 
depressive symptoms (Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002) and the 
possibility of a resulting clinically depressed state (Rude, Valdez, Odom, & 
Ebrahimi, 2003). This raises the interesting question of whether there is a way to 
rid the mind of negative cognitive content that does not involve an explicit 
instruction to “not think about it.” 
 There is a plethora of research on the risk and vulnerability factors 
associated with a depressed mood state. Numerous studies have been conducted 
addressing assessment issues (e.g., Reynolds & Kobak, 1998) and treatment 
outcomes (see Hollon, Haman, & Brown, 2002 and Weissman & Markowitz, 2002 
for complete reviews of treatment efficacy issues). Further, theoretical models of 
depression assert various mechanisms of the causes, course, and outcomes. 
Research on the nosology and phenomenology of depression over the last half a 
century has been contradictory, suggesting disagreement among researchers on 
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the relevance of specific symptoms that constitute the disorder. This 
disagreement has given rise to a host of therapeutic interventions (e.g., 
pharmacological, cognitive, behavioural, and interpersonal) that target different 
aspects of depression. However, most researchers and practitioners agree that 
although somatic symptoms (e.g., sleep disturbance, loss of energy, and appetite 
disturbance) are an important part of the depressed individual’s experience, so 
too are the psychological or subjective aspects of the disorder (e.g., inability to 
concentrate or focus; negative thinking, and feelings of worthlessness) (Clark, 
Beck, & Alford, 1999). Indeed, Clark, Beck, and Alford (1999) admonished that 
cognitive phenomena have been largely neglected in the study of depression and 
dysphoria. 
A great deal of research has highlighted the important role of cognition in 
the onset and maintenance of mood disturbance (see Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999 
for a review). Among this research is the Cognitive Theory of Depression (Beck, 
1967). Thus, the present study employed this theory with a specific focus on the 
schema activation hypothesis and the mood-congruent memory bias (both of which are 
discussed in subsequent sections of the present chapter) as a theoretical 
foundation. With this in mind the present study aimed to elucidate relationships 
among dysphoric mood, individual cognitive differences in mental control, and 
aspects of memory (e.g., remembering, and forgetting). 
The primary purpose of the present study was to evaluate the effect of 
dysphoric mood on two aspects of memory: 1) the differential ability of 
4 
individuals who are dysphoric versus those who are non-dysphoric to generate 
negative memories and 2) the subsequent ability of these same individuals to 
then be induced to forget. This was done by directly comparing two different 
experimental forgetting paradigms in terms of the ability to induce successful 
forgetting of a specific type of cognition – negative autobiographic memories. 
Specifically, this study examined the relative efficacy of a forgetting paradigm in 
which individuals receive explicit instructions to either forget or remember a 
portion of their memories compared to a forgetting paradigm that does not rely 
on explicit instruction to forget. In addition, several key cognitive factors known 
to be associated with depression and dysphoria were also examined to determine 
which factors, if any, would best predict aspects of induced-forgetting and 
generation of negative memories.  
The organisation of the first chapter contextualizes the present study 
within the phenomenology of depression in terms of the nature of the problem of 
depression and how it is conceptualized. Consequently, the chapter begins with 
a review of depression and dysphoria, which provides the context for an 
operational definition of dysphoria. Next, Beck’s (1967) Cognitive Theory of 
Depression is described and the elements of the theory most significant to 
aspects of memory function are examined in light of what might be predicted 
about aspects of the act of remembering and forgetting. The literature on 
induced-forgetting is then examined, with particular attention paid to forgetting 
self-relevant memories. Once the aforementioned contexts have been established, 
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an overview of the importance of studying forgetting in the context of dysphoria 
follows. Attention is then given to some of the cognitive factors related to 
depression in order to examine how they might relate and thus, help to predict 
successful remembering and forgetting. The chapter concludes with a description 
of the rationale for the present study, the research questions that this study 
addressed, and the specific hypotheses that have been evaluated.  
1.1 When Dysphoria Becomes Depression 
Prolonged sadness may lead to the onset of increasingly more severe 
symptoms of dysphoria, which then could ultimately lead to clinical depression. 
Studying the affect of dysphoria on induced-forgetting may be an important 
addition to our current knowledge on depression for several reasons. First, the 
reported rates of depressive symptoms and major depression have risen over the 
past several years (Statistics Canada, 2003). Thus, it is essential to find ways to 
ameliorate mild to moderate symptoms of dysphoric mood before they become 
severe.  Second, we now recognize depressive deficits and disorders in children 
and thus, the age of onset may be earlier than previously thought. Perhaps the 
earlier preventive strategies can be identified and implemented, the less 
vulnerable individuals may be to depression through adulthood. Third, 
depressed mood and major mood disorders results in many economic and 
psychosocial costs. Finally, relapse rates for depressive episodes are high despite 
the apparent efficacy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and 
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pharmacological intervention. Induced-forgetting may provide researchers with 
an additional avenue to explore possible techniques to aid in treatment. 
Statistics Canada (2003) reported that over 4 percent of the population age 
12 and over have experienced symptoms associated with depression in the past 
year. Thus, there is a fairly high rate of dysphoria. An additional 7.1 percent of 
the population is likely to experience a depressive episode at some point in their 
lives (Statistics Canada, 2003). This is a significant increase in the percentage of 
individuals at risk for depression from the 5.2 percent reported in 1995. The 
World Health Organization (2004) predicted that depression will become the 
second leading cause of disability, next to work-related accidents, worldwide 
over the next 2 decades.  
While the prevalence rate of clinical depression in preschool children is 
reportedly less than 1 percent (Kashani & Carlson, 1987), for school age children 
the rate is estimated to be between 2 and 8 percent (Costello, Angold, Burns, 
Stangl, Tweed, et al. 1996). At the onset of adolescence, the prevalence rate 
increases dramatically (8.3 to 18.5%: Birmaher, Ryan, Williamson, Brent, 
Kaufman, Dahl, et al. 1996). In addition, it is at the onset of puberty that the 
gender ratio of 2:1 in rates of depression for females and males, respectively, 
begins to emerge and carries through to adulthood (Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 
1994). The Canadian 12 month prevalence rate for major depressive disorder 
(MDD) in adults ranges from 5.5 to 13.2 percent for women, and 3.4 to 7.5 
percent for men (Beaudet, 1996; DeMarco, 2000). 
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Kolvin and Sadowski (2001) reported that 15 to 40 percent of adolescents 
experience mild (dysphoria) to moderate depressed mood. Similarly, parent 
reports suggested that 20, 40, and 50 percent of pre-school, primary school-aged, 
and secondary school-aged children, respectively, experience mild to moderate 
levels of dysphoria (Kolvin & Sadowski, 2001). In one study, 27 percent of a 
university–aged student sample was found to experience mild to moderate levels 
of depressed symptoms (Rhyno, Clark, & Purdon, 2003). These rates, 
contextualized in the view of the dysphoria - depression continuum (this concept 
explained on p. 10), highlight the growing concern about the projected increases 
in reported rates of depression and dysphoria over the next 20 years.  
The economic impact of these staggering rates to the healthcare system is 
estimated in the billions of dollars (Statistics Canada, 2003). In addition, 
psychosocial outcomes for early onset depression are particularly grim. The 
outcomes include a higher rate of suicide attempts, recurrence of depression, 
alcohol and substance abuse, lower educational and career achievements, and 
various other psychological and social impairments (Weissman, Wolk, Goldstein, 
Moreau, Adams, et al. 1999). The increasing rate of reported depression coupled 
with decreasing age at which we recognize the presence of depression, make the 
study of depression a timely and important endeavour. 
Treatment efficacy and high relapse rates are also of paramount concern 
in depressive disorders. Gitlin (2002) reported that 35 to 40 percent of depressed 
individuals fail to respond to pharmacological intervention. In contrast to 
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pharmacological interventions, Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and 
Interpersonal Therapies (IPT) have also demonstrated comparable treatment 
efficacy to medication (e.g., Blackburn & Moore, 1997; Gaffan, Tsaousis, & Kemp-
Wheeler, 1995; Jarrett, Basco, Riser, et al. 1999). The combination of 
pharmacological and psychological intervention often produces efficacious 
treatment outcomes. While up to 60 percent of individuals seeking treatment for 
depression benefit from current interventions, some individuals do not. 
Response to treatment may depend in part on whether symptoms are mild, 
moderate, or severe. Further, the relapse and recurrence rate for clinical 
depression, as reported by Boland and Keller (2002) from the Collaborative 
Depression Study conducted in 1973, are staggering in terms of the short-term 
and long-term recurrence rates. For example, after 2 years the rate of recurrence 
was 25 to 40 percent; after 5 years, the recurrence rate was 60 percent; after 10 
years, 75 percent; and after a period of 15 years the reported recurrence rate was 
87 percent. 
Although statistics Canada reports an increase in rate of depression, there 
is some question about whether this reflects a true increase (i.e., more people are 
depressed today than were depressed in years past). It is possible that the 
increase is due to the normalization of a dysphoric state. Specifically, perhaps 
more people are willing to report their mood state and depressive symptoms. 
Such willingness to report may be due to the influence of a recent influx of drug 
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commercials and other media that “normalize” dysphoric mood, making it a 
more socially acceptable phenomenon today compared to 10 to 20 years ago.  
Alternatively, an increase in reported rates may reflect the growing trend 
in society today towards pathologising what may otherwise be normal sadness. 
There appears to be a growing message that individuals need to be happy, that 
happiness is normal, that feeling sad is bad, and thus, advertising appears to be 
oriented towards the elimination of negative affect (including sadness).  One 
particular therapeutic model, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT: 
Hayes & Strosahl, 2004) differs from traditional cognitive therapeutic approaches 
in an important way. As an alternative to teaching an individual to better control 
thoughts, feelings, sensations, memories and other private events, ACT schools 
individuals in how to notice, without negative evaluation, accept, and even 
embrace private experiences, including emotional experiences that are unwanted 
(e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson, 2003; Hayes & Spencer, 2005). The tone of ACT 
sets a new precedent that is counter intuitive to the obvious “feel good” agenda 
that appears to be promoted within the main stream culture (that negative 
emotions are a normal part of experience and do not need to lead to mental 
health issues). This raises the distinct possibility that rather than normalize 
dysphoria as the common cold of mental health, society has in turn, sent a strong 
message that sadness is abnormal. 
It is also important to note that the rise in reported rates of depression and 
depressive symptoms does not necessarily mean “clinical depression.” Rather, it 
10 
likely reflects the varying degrees of dysphoria, because statistics come from 
census self-reports and are not based on clinical interviews or other standardized 
tests that assess clinical depression. This highlights the importance of 
operationalising the construct of depression (an operational definition is 
provided in a subsequent section). It is to the issue of what the definition of 
depression and dysphoria is that attention is now turned. 
1.2 Depression and Dysphoria 
What do we mean when we say “depression”? The answer to this 
question has been the focus of much debate and influences how depression is 
understood and studied. Clarification of the definitional properties of depression 
aid in understanding the perception that reported rates of depression and 
depressive symptoms are on the rise in the general population. The impact of 
depression in terms of its overall economic and psycho-social costs depends, in 
part, on how it is defined.  
Sadness is a normal and common emotional experience for most 
individuals across the lifespan. When sadness is prolonged and accompanied by 
a specified set of somatic, cognitive, and subjective symptoms, such as those 
specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Text 
Revision (DSM-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000), it becomes a more 
serious mental health problem. In fact, over the past decade or so, depression has 
become the most common cause of disability facing Canadians (Patten & Ruby, 
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2008). Whether it is the experience of a few symptoms of depression or the 
manifestation of a full blown clinical depressive disorder, depression results in 
significant costs to an individual’s personal and social world (Weissman et al., 
1999), and to the economy (Statistics Canada, 2003). Because of these costs, it is 
important to conduct research that may contribute to an understanding of this 
disorder, and to help offset the negative effects of depression. An increased 
understanding has the potential to contribute to the efficacy of assessment and 
treatment for those who experience depression. Thus, to understand the 
phenomenology, the next section begins with a brief examination of what is 
meant when using the word “depression” in empirical investigations.  
1.2.1 Phenomenology and Conceptualisation 
Depression and dysphoria can be described as an affective state marked 
by persistent feelings of sadness and hopelessness, loss of interest, fatigue, a 
disturbance in appetite and, for many individuals, suicidal thoughts (APA, 2000). 
In children, irritability, aggression, and psychomotor retardation may also be 
indicative of a depressed state (Kolvin & Sadowski, 2001). In its clinical form, 
depression is diagnosed when five or more of nine depressive symptoms 
(including either depressed mood or loss of interest) have been present for a 2-
week period, representing a significant change from the way in which an 
individual usually functions (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Thus, the 
absence of any single symptom (e.g., clients evidence 4 of the 9 symptoms) from 
the list of symptoms that must be present in order for clinical depression to be 
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diagnosed, by definition, implies that it is not clinical depression but rather sub-
clinical depressed mood. But is depression really an all or nothing phenomenon?  
Studies of depression typically take one of two conceptual views. The first 
of these defines depression by categorizing individuals as either depressed or 
non-depressed in terms of their scores on self-report symptom checklists (e.g., 
Beck Depression Inventory-II; BDI-II). Alternatively, mood-induction is 
sometimes used with non-clinical samples to induce a depressed mood state 
analogous to the mood of a clinically depressed individual. The second 
conceptual approach restricts the sample population to those individuals who 
meet the full diagnostic criteria for depression as defined in the DSM IV - TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) as evidenced through appropriate 
diagnostic interviewing and measurement techniques by a qualified 
diagnostician (e.g., Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Diagnosis, SCID; 
Spitzer, Robert, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997).  
The first of these two conceptual approaches typifies the view that clinical 
depression lies at one end of a continuum of severity, with mild depressed mood 
or sub-clinical depression, often referred to as dysphoria, at one end and Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD; clinical depression) at the other. This dimensional 
conceptualisation suggests that there is continuity between dysphoria (whether it 
is determined by symptom checklists or mood-induction procedures) and the 
clinically diagnosable disorder, MDD. The second conceptual approach suggests 
that clinical depression is qualitatively and thus, categorically, different from 
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manifestations of dysphoria. That is, there is discontinuity between dysphoria 
and “true” depression; you are either depressed or you are not. The researcher 
must choose between these two conceptualisations, and this choice determines 
how research in the area of depression unfolds. Taking a categorical versus a 
dimensional view has implications for sample selection, measurement, and 
generalisability of research findings. Therefore, a brief review of the research in 
support of each of these discrepant conceptualisations is worthwhile. 
Several arguments for a discontinuous view of dysphoria and clinical 
depression have been postulated over the years. For example, Gotlib and 
Hammen (1992) suggested that findings from studies of dysphoric individuals 
are not relevant to a clinically depressed population because individuals who 
show mild to moderate symptoms of depression, as evidenced on a depressive 
symptom scale such as the Beck Depression Inventory, do not go on to meet the 
diagnostic criteria for clinical depression (see also Coyne, 1994). Similarly, it has 
been suggested that the same risk factors associated with clinical depression do 
not correlate with dysphoric mood (e.g., Coyne & Downey, 1991). For example, 
poverty, chronic stress, and minor life events correlate more strongly with 
dysphoria than clinical depression (Coyne & Downey, 1991). Coyne (1994) also 
argued that incidence and prevalence rates of mild depressed mood and 
dysphoria are drastically different than rates of clinical depression. In addition, 
the symptoms manifested in clinical depression are said to be distinctively 
different from the symptoms of dysphoria (e.g., Buchwald & Rudick-Davis, 1993; 
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Clark & Watson, 1991). For a more complete review of the arguments and 
empirical support for a discontinuity view of depression see Clark, Beck, and 
Alford (1999). 
Flett, Vredenburg, and Krames (1997) reviewed several studies purported 
to support a categorical view of depression and found methodological and 
statistical issues (e.g., correlational comparisons between dichotomous and 
continuous variables). Where differences between depressed and dysphoric 
groups were found, one explanation is that differences between dysphoria and 
clinical depression are differences in kind rather than degree. There are however, 
alternative explanations and interpretations for those differences. For example, in 
their review of two studies cited in support of a discontinuity view of depression 
and dysphoria, Flett and colleagues noted that differences in correlates between 
continuous (e.g., scores on a depression inventory) and dichotomous variables 
could be the result of low statistical power resulting in restriction of range or 
measurement error. They concluded that no definitive conclusions could be 
drawn from some of the research presented as support for a discontinuous 
conceptualisation of depression and dysphoria.  
 The DSM has historically taken a categorical approach to the classification 
of mood disorders, however, in looking across symptoms within each category it 
is clear that there is homogeneity in symptoms among various depressive 
syndromes (for a full critique of the classification of depressive disorder in the 
DSM see Clark, Watson, & Reynolds, 1995). Mood disorders within the DSM 
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may be less distinct than their categorical representation would imply. Indeed, in 
the latest edition of the DSM (APA, 2000), the authors acknowledge the 
limitation of a categorical approach, which has been a DSM tradition. The DSM 
text revision clearly states that there is more often than not, heterogeneity among 
client symptom presentation and clinicians are admonished to exercise a 
sufficient degree of clinical judgment when more difficult diagnostic cases fall 
outside the boundaries of stated symptoms. In addition, the text revision of the 
DSM recognizes the existence of symptoms that may be insufficient to meet the 
full diagnostic criteria for the presence of clinical depression but may warrant 
clinical attention. The pursuit of a dimensional approach to the classification of 
mental disorders is ongoing and the American Psychiatric Association 
encourages the pursuit of research oriented towards a common language of 
continuity that could be used in future revisions of the DSM to aid in a 
dimensional representation of mental disorders: one that will neither hinder 
communication among professionals nor stymie the research process that aids in 
advancing our knowledge and understanding of psychiatric problems. 
 In addition to symptom homogeneity, the empirical research comparing 
severity of depressive symptoms combined with comparative studies of 
clinically and non-clinically depressed individuals clearly supports a 
dimensional conceptualisation of depression. For example, Gotlib et al. (1995) 
used a longitudinal approach to determine if the severity of depressive 
symptoms could distinguish non-clinical from clinical samples in psychosocial 
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functioning. Gotlib et al. found that adolescents with elevated depressive 
symptoms, who failed to meet diagnostic criteria for depression, were not 
significantly different in aspects of psychosocial functioning than clinically 
depressed teens. In addition, Clark, Cook, and Snow (1998) reported a pattern of 
linear progression of symptomatology in their study comparing the severity of 
symptoms across samples of depressed psychiatric in and outpatients, patients 
with sub-clinical depressive symptoms, and healthy controls. These results 
highlight the importance of symptom severity and intensity in depression and 
further support the dimensional approach to conceptualizing depression.  
At the phenomenological level, depression and dysphoria are believed to 
“represent extreme or excessive forms of normal cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral functioning” (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999, p. 22). The study of 
depression at the level of dysphoria then may provide valuable insight into the 
phenomenon of depression in terms of the onset, maintenance, and treatment of 
the clinical disorder. But is dysphoria really a milder sub-clinical form of 
depression? 
Since 1987 several authors have raised concern over methodological 
approaches to the study of depression (see Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, & 
Ingram, 1987). Specifically, it has been argued that measures used to assess 
depression at the symptom level are tapping into more than just sub-clinical 
levels of depression (Haaga & Solomon, 1993). Haaga and Solomon suggested 
that measures of depressive symptoms used in research to group individuals 
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into mood categories often lack the specificity necessary to draw direct 
conclusions about MDD. Thus, researchers are admonished to not only use the 
broader term dysphoria but instead to acknowledge that dysphoria by definition, 
while correlated with aspects of MDD, also taps into other constructs such as 
anxiety and general distress (Clark & Watson, 1991). 
As the debate over conceptualisation continues, what can be concluded is 
that clinical depression and dysphoria have some shared dimensional features 
(e.g., Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000). Indeed, Ingram and Siegle (2002) suggested that 
there is utility in investigating depression at the symptom level (e.g., negative 
affect). For the purposes of the present study, the term dysphoria is used with an 
understanding that it is the broader construct of negative mood state (with 
shared features of the nosology of depression, anxiety, and distress). With this in 
mind then, Beck’s (1987) Cognitive Theory of Depression is now reviewed. 
1.3 Beck’s Cognitive Theory of Depression 
From its original conception in 1967, Beck’s Cognitive Theory of 
Depression is subsumed under the umbrella of information processing 
approaches to understanding psychological disorders. Beck’s theory incorporates 
the structure of cognition, the process of cognition, and the products that result 
from the interplay between structure and process, as dictated by personal 
experience. Thus, the Cognitive Theory of Depression (Beck, 1967, 1987) reflects a 
more dynamic and malleable cognitive system than the static system an 
information-processing model might imply. At its core, the Cognitive Theory of 
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Depression proposed by Beck is predicated on the idea that dysfunctional or 
faulty cognitions (Ingram & Holle, 1992) lead to mood disturbances.  
Beck (1967; 1987) proposed that the origins of depressive symptoms are 
rooted in what he called an activating event (i.e., a life event that signifies the loss 
of a personal resource(s) such as the loss of a relationship or a job). That is, 
dysfunctional beliefs lie dormant until some stressful life event activates them 
(see Figure 1). As Segal and Shaw (1986) argued, a stressful life event activates a 
system in which a negatively biased pattern of processing information begins the 
cycle of depressive symptoms. Unique to each individual is a set of orienting 
schemas, which are “relatively enduring internal structures of stored generic or 
prototypical features of stimuli, ideas, or experiences that are used to organize 
new information in a meaningful way thereby determining how phenomena are 
perceived and conceptualized” (Clark et al., 1999, p. 79). Once an activating event 
occurs, individuals try to make sense of its meaning using the orienting schema. 
For some individuals, orienting schemas consist of a heightened sensitivity to 
negative stimuli and an over-inclusive focus on the self. It is the value that 
individuals place on the experience that determines whether or not negative 
cognitive schemata are activated and the extent to which they will subsequently 
influence processing (Beck, 1987). Cognitive structures (or the ways in which we are 
organized) refers to the schema driven “cluster of interrelated cognitive-
conceptual, affective, physiological, behavioural, and motivational schemas 
organized to deal with particular demands placed on the organism” (Clark et al., 
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1999; p.88) that share a reciprocal relationship with the cognitive products they 
produce.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Causal chain of Beck’s cognitive model of depressive symptom onset 
 
For example, an individual who is depressed is likely to have a pre-
dispositional orientation toward the negative and negative self-relevant 
schemata (i.e., the cognitive structures). These cognitive structures give rise to 
negative appraisal, perspectives, and negative automatic thoughts (i.e., the 
cognitive products). Consistent production of negative cognitive products serves 
to reinforce cognitive structures. The outcome of this reciprocity is depressive 
symptoms, which also reinforce the negative cognitive products. Thus, the goal 
of cognitive therapy is to reduce symptoms by breaking the cycle of negative 
thinking (for a comprehensive review of the Cognitive Therapy of Depression 
see Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999).  
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According to Beck’s (1987) Cognitive Theory of Depression, faulty 
cognitive processes are the hallmark of the depressed mood state, both at the 
dysphoric and clinically depressed levels. As Clark et al. (1999) reported, the 
Cognitive Theory of Depression supports the idea that depression is a continuum 
on which cognitive processes vary in degree rather than kind and as such, the 
faulty cognitive processes associated with dysphoria are the same as those 
associated with clinical depression, although perhaps faulty to a lesser degree. 
Thus, the Cognitive Theory of Depression is subsumed under a dimensional 
conceptualization and much of the research in support of this theory has come 
from studies that have examined dysphoria, used mood-induction analogous to 
a depressed mood state, and clinical populations.  
From Beck’s (1967) Cognitive Theory of Depression come nine descriptive 
hypotheses. They are briefly reviewed here. First, the negativity, exclusivity, and 
content-specificity hypotheses stipulate that negative self-referent thinking 
characterize all forms of depression at the expense of positive self-referent 
thought (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Second, the primacy, universality, and 
severity/persistence hypotheses specify that negative cognition will influence 
behaviour regardless of the specific type of depressive disorder and will vary in 
degree in accordance with the severity of the depressive episode (Clark, Beck, & 
Alford, 1999). Finally, the selective processing, schema activation, and primal 
mode hypotheses suggest that negative self-referent thinking will be evident in 
attention, encoding, retrieval, and evaluation of stimuli (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 
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1999). Because the focus of this present research is mood and memory, the 
selective processing hypothesis and the schema activation hypothesis are of 
primary importance and thus, they are more extensively reviewed.  
1.3.1 Selective Processing Hypothesis 
The Cognitive Theory of Depression (Beck, 1987) stipulates that 
individuals who are vulnerable to depressed mood selectively attend to negative 
information and thus, there is an increase in the accessibility of negative schema 
about the self, world, and future (Beck, 1987). Specifically, the selective 
processing hypothesis is defined as the automatic tendency for individuals who 
are depressed to attend to the negative aspects of an experience at the expense of 
any positive features (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). It has also been suggested 
that this bias is only evident when individuals are processing highly self-relevant 
information (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999).  
Selective processing of information has a direct impact on both encoding 
and retrieval aspects of memory. That is, if depressed individuals are prone to 
attend to the negative, then the negative aspects of a given experience are more 
likely to be the ones most strongly encoded and thus, more readily retrieved 
from memory. One of the fundamental assumptions of cognitive psychology is 
the link among cognitions. Therefore, it is not surprising that the preferential 
recall of negative mental content (see Delgleish & Watts, 1990, Mineka & Nugent, 
1995 for reviews) likely triggers the activation of associated negative cognitions 
not directly related to a particular experience (Wenzlaff, 2005) but associated by 
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virtue of meaning (e.g., negativity) and emotion (Bargh & Tota, 1988; Blaney, 
1986). 
In general, individuals who are in a depressed mood state are likely to pay 
more attention to things that are negative (see Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998 for 
a review). This includes thought content. When experiencing negative cognitions 
that capture attention, individuals are more likely to make negative attributions 
or judgments about these thoughts (e.g., Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Because 
thoughts are interconnected it is highly likely that negative cognitions will 
activate other associated cognitive content (Wenzlaff, 2005), which inevitably will 
be negative (Dozois & Dobson, 2001).  
There is a strong relationship between depression and chronic thought 
suppression (e.g., Rhyno et al., 2003; Wenzlaff, Meier, & Salas, 2002; Wenzlaff, 
Rude, & West, 2002). That is to say that many individuals who are depressed 
engage in an ongoing struggle to inhibit thoughts, images, and memories that 
ultimately result in the unintended effect of intensifying these thoughts. The 
preferential retrieval of negative thoughts, images, and memories by individuals 
who are depressed or dysphoric is an example of the mood congruent memory bias 
(MCMB) (e.g., Bargh & Tota, 1988; Blaney, 1986, Fogarty & Hemsley, 1983; 
Teasdale & Taylor, 1981). Watkins (2002) provided a specific definition, stating 
that, “the tendency for depressed individuals to recall more negative or 
unpleasant material than non-depressed controls” constitutes a MCMB (p. 381). 
Parrott and Spackman (2000) suggested that in MCMB, non-dysphoric or non-
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depressed individuals preferentially recall more positively-valenced cognitions 
than negative ones. While a MCMB has been produced in analogous 
experimental situations (e.g., mood-induction of non-depressed participants; 
Mayer, McCormick, & Strong, 1995), Parrott and Spackman (2000) suggest that a 
mild to moderate pre-existing level of depression or dysphoria must be evident 
in order for the MCMB to be sustained. 
Evidence also suggests that personal meaning is an important component 
in the MCMB phenomenon. For example, Bradley and Matthews (1983) 
demonstrated a MCMB using personally–relevant adjectives in which dysphoric 
participants recalled more negative self-descriptors than neutral or positive ones. 
Along similar lines, a preferential recall of past negative events was 
demonstrated for individuals who were depressed or dysphoric (Teasdale & 
Russell, 1983). These studies provide evidence in support of the select attention 
hypothesis and the MCMB specific to depressed mood state. What then, explains 
this occurrence? One possible explanation lies in the accessibility of negative 
cognitions as a result of the MCMB. Beck (1987) predicted the heightened 
accessibility of negative cognitive content during depressed mood states and it is 
to this aspect of the Cognitive Theory of Depression that attention is now turned. 
1.3.2 Schema Activation Hypothesis 
The schema activation hypothesis refers to that which characterizes 
disorders of affect and is defined as an increase in an individual’s ability to 
access negative information, particularly, when in a depressed mood state and 
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when the information is relevant to the self (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Results 
from studies on mood suggest that negative mood states, such as depression, are 
associated with poor performance on executive function tasks (mental flexibility 
and control); particularly on the ability to inhibit responses (see Veiel, 1997 for a 
review). Indeed, the most commonly reported symptoms of depression are 
deficits in memory function, attentional processes, and inhibitory control (Clark, 
Beck, & Alford, 1999). 
Although many clinically depressed individuals report problems in 
concentration and memory, neuropsychological assessment sometimes reveals 
no significant impairment in attention (e.g., Bornstein, Baker, & Douglass, 1991; 
Brown, Scott, Bench, & Dolen, 1994; Grant, Thase, & Sweeney, 2001; Nelson, 
Sachs, & Strakowski, 1998); or executive functions (e.g., Fossati, Amar, Raoux, 
Ergis, & Allilaire, 1999; Ilsley, Moffoot, & O’Carroll, 1995; Smith, Brebion, & 
Allilaire, 1994) that are due to the effect of dysphoric or depressed mood. In 
contrast, there are many methodologically comparable studies that provide 
evidence for deficient executive and attentional functioning (see Ottowitz, Darin, 
Dougherty, & Savage, 2001, for a review) related to a depressed mood state. 
Clearly the findings from the empirical literature on the neuropsychological 
deficits in depression (e.g., memory, attention, and inhibition) are mixed. 
Despite the contradictory findings from neuropsychological research, the 
previous section provided evidence to indicate that depressed individuals 
consistently demonstrate a propensity to attend to the negative aspects of their 
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experience (e.g., Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; Hertel, 2002) and 
thus, generate the mood-congruent memory bias for negative thoughts and 
memories (Watkins, 2002). If individuals in a depressed mood state selectively 
attend to negative thoughts, memories, or external stimuli (e.g., words), 
particularly when such information is perceived as highly self-relevant (Watkins, 
2002), then increased accessibility to these negative cognitions should be 
evidenced. Indeed, several studies have demonstrated that when compared to 
controls, there is an increase in accessibility (i.e., the speed or ease with which 
negative information can be retrieved) to negative material in the context of a 
depressed mood state, including clinical depression, naturally occurring 
depression, and experimentally induced-mood (e.g., Fitzgerald, Slade, & 
Lawrence, 1988; Parrott, 1991; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981; Strauman, 1992). 
Several studies have provided preliminary support for the schema 
activation hypothesis. These include studies asking participants to rate trait-
adjectives (e.g., Segal & Gemar, 1997) and complete sentence stems (Teasdale, 
Taylor, Cooper, Hayhurst, & Paykel, 1995). However, several criticisms of this 
body of research suggest that rating trait-adjectives is not an accurate indication 
of the content that constitutes schema (Segal, 1988; Segal & Vella, 1990). In 
addition, studies that adopt word-list methodology may be somewhat artificial 
to the actual mental processes likely experienced. That is, the reality of mental 
activity is not found in word lists or sentence stems. Thus, this body of research, 
while somewhat supportive of Beck’s (1967, 1987) Cognitive Theory of 
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Depression, appears to lack serious ecological validity to the mental experiences 
of those who are dysphoric or depressed.  
1.3.3 Autobiographic Memory Tasks 
It has been argued that autobiographic content is a more analogous 
representation of the schema that is purported to hallmark meaningful cognitive 
content of depressed and dysphoric individuals (e.g., Reiser, Black, & Abelson, 
1985; Williams, 1996). Thus, using autobiographic memories to assess the 
assertions of the Cognitive Theory of Depression (Beck, 1967, 1987) potentially 
addresses the issue of ecological validity.  
Rubin and Wenzel (2005) reviewed the literature on the use of 
autobiographic memories in research. They suggested that the word-cue method 
(using cue words to elicit a memory) is the best way to evaluate memories in 
terms of memory specificity, retrieval latency, affective tone, and its relation to 
psychopathology. Subsequent research found that reaction times for the word-
cue method is not confounded by age differences (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997), 
gender differences (Rubin, Schulkind, & Rahhal, 1999), nor vividness, 
pleasantness, and emotional significance (Conway & Haque, 1999; Jansari & 
Parkin, 1996). Thus, the word-cue method has been a popular choice among 
clinical researchers (Wenzel, 2005).  
In one of the first known studies of retrieval of personal memories, Lloyd 
and Lishman (1975) demonstrated that depressed individuals took less time to 
generate negative memories in response to neutral cue words than the time taken 
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to produce positive memories. In fact, these authors reported that the more 
severe the self-reported depressive symptoms, the less time it took for recall of 
negative content. However, an evaluation of studies using autobiographic 
content can be criticized for methodological limitations such as the inability to 
show cause and effect. 
Because of the correlational nature of Lloyd and Lishman’s (1975) 
groundbreaking study, subsequent research adopted a more quasi-experimental 
approach using mood induction procedures that produced similar results. 
However, these studies have also been criticized for methodological concerns 
relating to the use of an all female sample and the neglect of a true clinical 
population (Ingram & Holle, 1992).  In addition, Williams (1997) suggested that 
depressed individuals tend to recall more general and less specific 
autobiographic events than non-depressed individuals raising the question of 
whether the results from autobiographic studies reflect true differences in 
accessibility or are an artifact of an unequal comparison.  
In the depressed state, mental content is likely to be mostly negative 
(Blaney, 1986; Renaud & McConnell, 2002).  Further, Fitzgerald, Slade, and 
Lawrence (1988) argued that the primary difference between dysphoric and non-
dysphoric memory recall was not necessarily in the accessibility of negative 
memories but rather in the number of positive memories recalled (with 
dysphoric individuals recalling fewer positive memories than non-dysphorics). 
This argument is interesting in the context of depression if individuals who are 
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depressed are primed to the negative and thus are likely to have significantly 
more negative mental content. Interestingly, previous studies on forgetting using 
autobiographic memory have adopted a methodology that includes positive, 
neutral, and negative memories. In the absence of testing the effects of depressed 
mood on forgetting, this strategy makes sense. However, given the heightened 
accessibility of negative mental content during dysphoria and likely, the general 
lack of available positive mental content, the present study is the first to adopt a 
methodology that includes only the generation and forgetting of negative 
memories. 
As Fogerty and Hemsley (1983) suggested, there is a positive correlation 
between the recall of negative memories and the intensity of the depressed 
mood. This finding is consistent with a continuity view of depression and 
dysphoria. In addition, time to generate memories was operationalised in terms 
of the speed of generating a single memory averaged over multiple trials. That is, 
the natural flow of associated cognitions was interrupted with the starting and 
stopping of a single thought in order to capture generation time. The stream of 
conscious thought is continuous (James, 1950) and thus, intentional interruption 
of the flow of thought during a memory generation task hinders the ability to 
understand the implications of such studies for theory. What can be concluded 
from these findings then, is that the studies investigating the schema activation 
hypothesis are somewhat hampered by methodological concerns. The 
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underlying theme that runs through these studies is the potentially harmful 
effects that negative mood plays in the retrieval aspect of memory function.  
The focus thus far has been on the role of the retrieval aspect of memory 
that is relevant to the Cognitive Theory of Depression (Beck, 1987). However, as 
Dalgleish and Watts (1990) suggested, the heightened availability of negative 
autobiographic content, as demonstrated through memory retrieval experiments, 
may be necessary to understanding depression. They also argue that that 
demonstrating the heightened accessibility of negative thoughts, images, and 
memories, is not a sufficient index of the nature of memory disturbance that is so 
often associated with the depressive experience. That is, depressed patients do 
not typically present with complaints that their negative memories are readily 
available. More often, it is reported that negative memories and thoughts intrude 
on consciousness and depressed individuals are unable to rid their minds of this 
troublesome material (Delgleish & Watts, 1990). It is at this juncture that 
attention is redirected to a subsumed aspect of memory function believed to be 
fundamental to understanding the relationship between mood and memory: the 
function of forgetting. 
1.4 Forgetting 
Every day people of all ages experience instances of forgetfulness; 
children forget their books for school or to brush their teeth before bed, and 
adults forget where they put their keys or a close friend’s birthday. Ponds, 
Commissaris and Jolles (1997) reported that in a sample of 1971 individuals aged 
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25 to 85 years, 39% reported being forgetful. In the absence of identifiable 
neurological impairment, everyday forgetfulness in children might be attributed 
to the yet-to-be developed cognitive capacity for memory storage, encoding 
difficulties, or the efficiency in using retrieval strategies (Dempster, 1978, 1981). 
In contrast, everyday forgetfulness in the elderly might be attributable to the 
natural diminishing cognitive processes such as diminished working memory 
capacity (Salthouse, 1992) and processing speed that tend to typify the aging 
process (Smith & Earles, 1996). Regardless of age then, everyday occurrences of 
forgetting represent unintentional yet normal memory failure that is to be 
expected as a natural occurrence in normal information processing for all ages. 
Over four decades of investigation into forgetting suggests that forgetting 
can be induced through experimental paradigms. For example, forgetting has 
been induced by the active retrieval practice of competing information (e.g., 
Anderson & McCulloch, 1999; Anderson & Spellman, 1995) and by explicit 
instructions to forget versus to remember target material (Macleod, 1989; 
Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). These paradigms are referred to as 
the retrieval-induced-forgetting paradigm (RIF; Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994), 
and the directed-forgetting paradigm (DF; MacLeod, 1989), respectively. In RIF, 
retrieving some things can actually facilitate the forgetting of other material 
stored in memory. Comparably, directing individuals to forget some items and 
remember others also induces forgetting (DF). For the purpose of the present 
study then, everyday instances of forgetting (unintentional) are distinguished 
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from what will be called induced-forgetting (that which is intentionally 
produced.) 
Research on induced-forgetting has produced a plethora of findings 
demonstrating consistency of experimenter induced-forgetting effects. This is 
especially true with regard to forgetting word list items (e.g., MacLeod, 2002; 
MacLeod & Macrae, 2001; Smith & Hunt, 2000). In RIF, repeated retrieval 
practice of some words from a list induces significantly more forgetting of 
unpracticed words from the same list when compared to a baseline control 
condition (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; 2000). Similarly, in DF an explicit 
instruction to forget the targeted to-be–forgotten words from a list produced 
better recall of targeted to-be-remembered words compared to a control group 
that does not receive a “forget” instruction (e.g., Anderson & Green, 2001; 
Anderson & Neely, 1996; Bjork & Bjork, 1996). The consistency in these findings 
is robust and contributes to the validity and reliability of the methodology under 
which the induced-forgetting effect occurs. Before exploring induced-forgetting 
paradigms in more detail, attention is drawn to a brief review of potential causes 
of intentional forgetting. 
1.4.1 Potential Causes of Induced Forgetting 
Although it is not the central focus of the present study, it is helpful to 
contextualize the research on forgetting within a framework of underlying 
causes of this phenomenon. Increasingly, interest in induced-forgetting has 
focused on understanding the causal mechanisms that underlie induced-
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forgetting and the possible conditions under which the forgetting effect is 
reduced (e.g., inattention to the target; relative strength of targets; inhibitory 
mechanisms). Is induced-forgetting simply the result of attentional resources 
being directed to certain targets and not others at the encoding phase, which 
therefore results in items not being encoded in the first place?  
Evidence suggests that individuals do indeed encode words that were 
targets of a forget instruction, as demonstrated on tests of recognition following a 
forgetting induction experiment (e.g., Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993; Davis & 
Okada, 1971; MacLeod, 1989; Zoellner, Sacks, & Foe, 2003). These experiments 
support the idea that the words were, in fact, encoded because participants in 
these studies had substantially higher rates of recognition than controls. While 
induced-forgetting effects do not appear to be the result of a lack of encoding, 
what remains unclear is whether the level at which individuals process material 
(e.g., more elaborate meaningful rehearsal strategies during encoding), called a 
level of processing approach, accounts for differences among individuals. What 
can be said is that encoding has likely occurred because of statistically significant 
recognition test scores. Whether deeper more meaningful encoding influences 
the amount of induced forgetting that occurs has not been studied. 
Is induced-forgetting the result of the relative strength of some items on a 
list compared to other items?  Relative strength in the context of memory refers 
to the durability of specific memory traces in the brain. The stronger the 
memory, the longer it can be remembered. Similarly, the more elaborate a 
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rehearsal strategy used, the stronger the memory. In addition, typical graphs of 
the forgetting curve show that humans tend to halve their memory of newly 
learned knowledge in a matter of days or weeks unless they consciously review 
the learned material. If relative strength accounts for induced-forgetting effects, 
then we would expect that stronger items (e.g., items that are more familiar and 
more strongly associated in with other items in the memory network) would be 
recalled before weaker items. However, several studies using forgetting 
paradigms with output order as a dependent variable have found the opposite 
effect (e.g., Brainerd, 1995; Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, & Kevershan, 1991). Thus, a 
less likely candidate for explaining induced-forgetting is the relative-strength 
argument.  
Another theoretical perspective attributes induced-forgetting to inhibitory 
mechanisms (see Neath & Surprenant, 2003 for a review of several theoretical 
perspectives). Indeed, Anderson (2003) argued that forgetting is an adaptive 
evolutionary process because it makes use of inhibition to facilitate the selective 
retrieval of information – often a necessary process to enhance our survival (e.g., 
needing to selectively retrieve threatening information about a past experience at 
the expense of other information related to the same situation). Much of the 
empirical evidence appears to support this view (see Anderson, 2003 for a review 
of experimental evidence; see also Groome & Grant, 2005). This raises the 
question of what happens to our ability to forget when inhibitory control is 
under developed or compromised in some way, as is evidenced in some 
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psychological disorders (e.g., Depression, Anxiety, and Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder). Further, it is of interest to understand what cognitive factors may 
contribute to poor inhibitory control over thoughts that one would rather not 
think about or remember.  
Some studies suggest that individuals who engage in passive self-focus 
(rumination) during a depressed or dysphoric mood evidence poor performance 
on tasks assessing cognitive flexibility and mental control (e.g., Davis & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; E. Watkins & Brown, 2002). Indeed, poor inhibition and 
cognitive inflexibility associated with depressive states might lead one to 
speculate that induced-forgetting will be poorer for depressed individuals than 
for controls, a point elaborated further in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
This may be particularly important when we consider that for depressed 
individuals, being able to forget some things might prove therapeutic. In 
addition, poor mental control and ineffective cognitive coping responses to mood 
may represent specific cognitive vulnerability factors that exacerbate negative 
mood states and prohibit effective cognitive inhibition. 
Relatively little attention has been given to understanding how individual 
differences facilitate or limit the application of forgetting paradigms to 
psychological disturbances in which emotional valence is of central importance. 
In addition, few studies have explored the potential practical and applied 
significance of forgetting for thought disorders such as depression. If science and 
practice are to converge, it is important to develop a more comprehensive 
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understanding of the phenomenon of forgetting. Whether mood-congruent 
memories (MCMs) are subject to induced-forgetting is not known. However, 
what is clear from the Cognitive Theory of Depression is that issues of appraisal 
and mental control associated with depressed mood may also be individual 
difference factors that affect an individual’s ability to forget MCMs.  
To this end, researchers have begun to explore the application of the 
forgetting paradigms to more complex cognitions such as impression formation 
(Macrae & MacLeod, 1999) and memories for naturally occurring eyewitness 
accounts (MacLeod, 2002). In addition, researchers have expanded forgetting 
paradigms to include more complex materials (see Levy & Anderson, 2002, for 
an overview). For example, Barnier, Hung, and Conway (2004) demonstrated a 
RIF effect for autobiographic memories. Further, a handful of studies 
investigated the relationship among mood states, rumination, and possible 
deficits in forgetting negatively valenced words (e.g., Hertel & Gerstle, 2003) but 
failed to consider the aspect of self-relevance of material. Finally, one study has 
produced evidence for the application of RIF to other populations (e.g., children; 
Ford, Keating, & Patel, 2004). However, these initial investigations are limited in 
their failure to take into account the interrelation among emotional valence, self-
relevance, and individual differences. As well, the current body of literature is 
plagued with mixed results. Thus, the contributions of the present study add to 
the knowledge of induced-forgetting in several ways, as follows: by focusing on 
self-relevant negative memories, using different paradigms, and considering the 
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context of mood. In addition, this is the first study to consider a number of other 
cognitive factors associated with what paradigm works, for whom it works best, 
and what other factors may contribute to degree of impairment. 
Taken together, the results of previous studies that attempt to extend 
forgetting paradigms beyond the confines of simple word lists do not provide an 
understanding of under what real life circumstances induced-forgetting provides 
potential benefits. It is important to gain insight into the effects of mood state 
and individual differences in induced-forgetting if we are to further evaluate the 
utility of forgetting for disorders such as depression, where forgetting might 
prove more difficult but beneficial.  
1.5 Paradigms of Induced-Forgetting 
1.5.1 The Directed-Forgetting Paradigm 
The Directed Forgetting (DF) paradigm has its roots in the experimental 
work investigating short-term memory (Brown, 1954). In directed forgetting, 
participants are given instruction to either remember or forget a target item from 
a list of items. That is, some items are selected as to-be-remembered (R items) 
and an equal number are designated as to-be-forgotten (F items) (MacLeod, 
1998). Two distinct methods for directed-forgetting induction have emerged; the 
list-method and item-method (see Golding, 2005 for more complete 
descriptions).  
In the standard list method of directed forgetting, participants are 
provided with a list of words followed by instruction to forget the list. Several 
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researchers have argued that the specific instruction given immediately after the 
first list has been shown is important to inducing the forgetting effect for this 
paradigm (e.g.,  Golding & Hauselt, 1994; Golding, Sego, Hauselt, & Long, 1994; 
Golding Ellis, Hauselt, & Sego, 1998). Participants must believe that F items are 
of no value and thus, treat these items as to-be-forgotten items (Golding, 2005). 
That is, participants must be convinced by the experimenter’s instruction that the 
stimuli designated as to-be-forgotten, as indicated by a forget instruction will not 
be asked for during a future recall task. Without a convincing instruction a DF 
effect is less likely to be demonstrated. 
In the item-method of directed forgetting, the instruction to remember or 
forget is introduced after each word (usually as the words “remember and 
forget” or as symbolic letters “RRRR and FFFF”) as oppose to each list of words. 
Again equal numbers of items are deemed R items and F items.  In addition, 
prior research suggests that an unrelated task follow the presented words as a 
delay before recall to eliminate the effects of short-term memory (Golding, 2005).  
MacLeod (1998) explains that there are basically two ways to examine the 
directed forgetting effect. One way is what MacLeod refers to as a cost/benefit 
analysis. In cost/benefit analysis, R items are compared to both F items and an 
additional R list with no “forget” instruction (usually a baseline control group). 
The cost/benefit analysis only takes into consideration the R items from the list 
(MacLeod, 1998). The other way to evaluate the directed-forgetting effect is what 
the author refers to as the remember-forget (R-F) difference. This method 
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examines the difference in performance between the to-be-remembered (R) and 
to-be-forgotten (F) items. According to MacLeod, this is a common method when 
the baseline control group is not methodologically feasible. The R-F difference 
has become the preferred measure of the directed-forgetting effect. A forgetting 
effect then, is evidenced when recall or recognition for to-be-remembered items 
(R) is better than for to-be-forgotten items (F) when participants serve as their 
own controls.  
Investigation into the differences in efficacy of either method of a directed-
forgetting paradigm suggested that for word stimuli both list and item methods 
produced the directed-forgetting effect for recall (Badsen, Badsen, & Gargano, 
1993). Badsen and Badsen (1996) studied the effects of list versus item method for 
different types of material subjected to a directed forgetting paradigm. For 
general knowledge, the item-method yielded more forgetting. Further, 
participants in their study were asked to judge whether a particular item was 
part of the study list, and to indicate whether they knew this for sure or were 
basing their judgment on word familiarity. Directed-forgetting was observed 
with the use of the item-method but not the list-method for judgments based on 
familiarity. Interestingly, Badsen and Badsen found no DF effect for judgments 
based on assured knowledge. They concluded that the efficacy of one method 
over another may largely depend on the material used in the DF paradigm. This 
finding has particular implications for the present study on self-relevant 
memories associated with depressed mood. Specifically, mood-congruent 
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memories have not been the subject of induced-forgetting and thus, it is 
important to explore the differences between the list versus item-method of DF. 
The mechanisms believed to underlie the DF item- versus list-method are 
presumed to be somewhat different. For the item method, differential rehearsal 
has been cited as the underlying mechanism for the DF effect (e.g., Allen & 
Vokey, 1998). For example, in the item-method, participants are aware that they 
will receive either a forget instruction or a remember instruction. Therefore, until 
the instruction is given, it may be that participants do not invest effort in 
encoding, pending instruction to forget. In contrast, encoding in the list-method 
is presumed to begin at the outset because participants will not be aware of the 
instruction until after many words have been presented. Thus, inhibition remains 
the prevailing explanation for the DF effect using the list method (Bjork, Bjork, & 
Anderson, 1998; Kimball & Bjork, 2002; MacLeod, 1999). It is important to note 
that more recent studies of forgetting have suggested that inhibition may be too 
simple an explanation for induced-forgetting than has been suggested here (see 
Anderson, 2005 for alternative points of view). Since underlying mechanisms 
may be different, the present study compared both methods in terms of the effect 
dysphoria might have on each. 
The implication from the preceding discussion is that we might expect 
that mood state may not influence performance on the DF task that uses the 
item-method in the same way or to the same degree compared to the effects of 
dysphoric mood using the list-method. That is, underlying mechanisms for 
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induced-forgetting paradigms may contribute to performance because of the 
associations between depression and poor cognitive inhibition. If inhibition is the 
causal mechanisms for a DF effect, then a group of individuals with known 
deficits in inhibitory control are likely to perform more poorly than they might 
on a task in which the causal mechanism is not inhibition. That being said, the 
causal mechanisms of induced-forget paradigms are beyond the scope of the 
present study. Thus, attention is turned to an alternative forgetting paradigm - 
RIF. 
1.5.2 The Retrieval-Induced-Forgetting Paradigm 
 The RIF paradigm (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994) induces forgetting 
using the act of remembering. That is, remembering some things actually 
facilitates the forgetting of other material stored in memory. This occurs 
particularly in the context of repeated rehearsal and recall of target words-pairs 
(e.g., Anderson & Bell, 2001; Macleod, 2002). Specifically, the retrieval-induced 
paradigm consists of three phases and produces three components. First, 
participants are presented with a set of category-exemplar word pairs (e.g., fruit-
apple and fruit-banana or flower-rose and flower-daisy) and are given time to 
study the pairs. A second phase is introduced where participants practice 
retrieving (Rp+ component) some of the exemplars from a related category but 
not others (Rp- component). Finally, individuals are tested on their cued-recall or 
recognition of practiced, unpractised but related, and unpracticed exemplars 
(NRP component).  
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Two difference scores exemplify the RIF effect, a retrieval practice effect, 
and a forgetting effect. The practice effect is demonstrated when Rp+ is greater 
than NRP (the within subjects baseline). The forgetting effect of RIF is 
demonstrated when what was recalled from Rp- falls substantially below what 
was recalled from NRP. Thus, a direct statistical comparison of RIF to DF 
necessitates the RR/NRP components and RF/Rp- components become 
synonymous with each other. These component effects have been demonstrated 
using a separate control group for comparison or by using a within subjects 
design where participants serve as their own control group. Because others have 
argued that the underlying mechanisms of induced-forgetting may differ 
(Anderson, 2005) depending on the paradigm used (e.g., in DF-item it is argued 
that rehearsal may explain the effect), it may also prove interesting to compare 
DF effects and RIF using RIFs practice effect components, in addition to directly 
comparing the forgetting effect components.  
The consistency of findings in the literature that support an induced-
forgetting effect for word lists raises the questions of whether other material, 
such as emotional material, would yield similar results using induced-forgetting. 
It is to this issue that attention is now turned. 
1.5.3 Forgetting, Emotion Valence, and Self-Relevance 
The DF paradigm has been generalised to other material such as 
situational stories (Radvansky, 1999) and stereotypes (Macrae, Bodenhausen, 
Milne, & Ford, 1997). More recently, the DF paradigm has been extended to 
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emotionally valence material (words) (e.g., Dumont, 2000) and mood state (e.g., 
Power, Dalgleish, Claudio, Tata, & Kentish, 2000). For example, Power et al. 
(2000) conducted a series of experiments to understand the forgetting ability of 
depressed and non-depressed individuals for positive and negative words. 
Depression was operationalised in terms of scores on a self-report measure. 
Using the list-method, results suggested that although directed-forgetting 
occurred the differential effects of emotional valence and mood state were 
negligible. Power et al. (2000) questioned the findings in terms of the role of self-
relevance in emotional states. Their subsequent study required that participants 
process the words to make them self-relevant. Results suggested that non-
depressed controls recalled more positive than negative items despite being 
instructed to forget. The depressed group, however, demonstrated no bias for the 
recall of negative words, recalling them equally as well as positive words even 
when self-relevant. Thus, Power et al. concluded that although emotional valence 
and mood had minimal effects on directed forgetting, the degree of self-
relevance of the material might be important. However, the degree to which 
these findings represent a cause and effect relationship is currently unknown 
because the mood groups were defined using self-report continuous measures. 
Finally, Power et al. (2000) extended DF to clinically depressed samples. In 
this case, both emotional valence and mood state impacted the efficacy of DF. 
Specifically, they found that depressed patients recalled more negative than 
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positive words when instructed to forget. Thus, it would appear that at the 
clinical level of depression, DF became ineffective. 
 Other studies highlight the potential importance of self-relevance of 
material in terms of its forget-ability. For example, Macrae and Roseveare (2002) 
demonstrated that when material is self-relevant, it is resistant to forgetting. In 
their study they asked participants to imagine the purchases of a gift by 
themselves, a friend, or an unspecified other. Retrieval-induced-forgetting was 
found for the “friend” and “other” condition but not for the “self” condition. 
Macrae and Roseveare suggested that self-relevance then, may hinder forgetting. 
However, it is important to point out that in the aforementioned studies, the 
imagined or induced self-relevance as defined in these studies is not necessarily 
analogous to the self-relevance of negative mood congruent memories associated 
with depression and dysphoria. Indeed, it is suggested here that autobiographic 
memories, particularly those of negative emotional valence, provide the most 
stringent test of the utility of forgetting paradigms to depressed individuals.  
 Barnier, Hung, and Conway (2004) provided the first test of whether truly 
self-relevant material (autobiographic memories) is subject to RIF. Forty 
participants generated their own memories (positive, negative, and neutral) to 
experimenter-presented memory cues. These memories were then subjected to a 
RIF paradigm. Results support the RIF effect for autobiographic memories. That 
is, more practiced memories (Rp+) were recalled than unpracticed memories 
from the same category (Rp-) and when compared to a category of unpracticed 
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memories not directly related (NRP), the number of memories recalled from Rp- 
was significantly less. Of notable importance here is the highly self-relevant 
nature of autobiographic memories. Whether or not mood state, particularly in 
relation to the MCMB for negative memories, would yield similar results remain 
an important question and a specific aim of the present study.  
1.5.4 Suppression and Forgetting 
What is the significance of thought suppression to induced-forgetting? 
The idea that individuals could be prompted to rid their minds of distressing 
thoughts and memories seems quite plausible based on the work of cognitive 
psychologists. However, from the “white bear" studies conducted in the mid to 
late 1980’s researchers found that participants who were instructed to forget 
thoughts about a “White Bear” had a higher frequency of white bear thought 
intrusions when later asked to express their thinking, than they did before pre-
suppression instructions were given (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). 
This finding seems to contradict the findings just reviewed on forgetting.  
In an attempt to understand the cognitive mechanisms that contribute to 
the maintenance and exacerbation of a depressed mood, clinical psychology has 
focused on the mental control efforts individuals employ when depressed (e.g., 
Wegner & Smart, 1997; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). According to the ironic process 
theory, suppression involves two processes: one that diverts attention away from 
the mental activity that an individual wishes not to focus on – in other words a 
process that distracts by trying to think about something else, and a second 
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system that monitors mental activity, that is a system that vigilantly searches for 
any trace of the thought or thoughts (Wegner, 1994). Individuals who are 
depressed are more likely to engage in chronic thought suppression efforts 
(Wenzlaff, 2005), the result of which is the rebound effect. While some 
researchers found no rebound effect for depressive thoughts (see Purdon, 1999 
for a review), others have demonstrated consistent rebound effects, particularly 
for depressed and dysphoric individuals (e.g., Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; Wegner 
& Gold, 1995; Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988; Wegner & Smart, 1997; Wenzlaff 
& Wegner, 2000). 
One explanation given for the apparent inconsistency in findings is that 
the instruction used in different studies may have influenced the outcome of 
suppression efforts (e.g., “do not think about” versus “think about anything you 
like”). In addition, evidence also suggests that rebound effects after instructions 
to suppress are more likely when participants are under a more substantial 
cognitive load (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992). Lavy and van den Hout (1990) found 
that suppression tends to cause an increase in the number of occurrences of the 
very thought the individual is trying to suppress. As was previously mentioned, 
this resurgence of unwanted intrusive thought is supported by a considerable 
amount of evidence (e.g., Wegner & Gold, 1995; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & 
White, 1987; Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). In the first meta-analysis of the 
rebound effect in suppression, Abramowitz, Tolin, and Street (2001) concluded 
that rebound does occur. However, the degree of rebound was found to be 
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contingent on whether the target suppression material was familiar to the 
individual. What then, are the implications of thought familiarity to memory 
accessibility and induced-forgetting? 
Kelley and Kahn (1994) suggested that when individuals are suppressing 
thoughts with which they are familiar, rebound is less problematic. Therefore the 
differentiation between thoughts that are familiar (i.e., participant generated 
thoughts) and those that are experimenter generated (i.e., White Bear) are 
important factors for outcomes of individual effort to suppress. In addition to 
thought familiarity, other thought properties contribute to successful thought 
suppression, including the emotional valence of stimulus material (Parkinson & 
Rachman, 1981), and the perception of how controllable the thoughts were 
(Clark, Purdon & Byers, 2000; Purdon & Clark, 2001). Finally, an individual’s 
perception of how well thoughts can be controlled also affects suppression 
outcome (e.g., Forrester, Wilson, & Salkovskis, 2002; Wilson & Chambless, 1999). 
In the basic paradigm for directed-forgetting, participants are subject to some 
form of instruction to suppress (e.g., “think versus no think”; or “forget versus 
remember”). Could it be that failure to consistently find a differential directed 
forgetting effect for depressed samples is the result of rebound? The answer to 
this question remains elusive; however, we might expect that applying a 
forgetting paradigm to depressed samples that does not require instructions to 
suppress target material (such as a RIF paradigm) would eliminate any question 
of potential rebound influencing performance.  
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The next section begins with a discussion of the importance of the present 
research in terms of its contribution to basic cognitive research and the potential 
impact it may have on the field of clinical psychology, particularly for depressive 
disorders. The cognitive factors that increase vulnerability and risk to depressed 
mood, particularly rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and mental control 
(Clark & Rhyno, 2005) are then presented. The chapter concludes with the 
research questions and hypotheses specific to the current investigation. 
1.6 The Importance of Studying Induced-Forgetting of Negative Memories 
Instances of forgetting are usually conceptualized as unwanted, incidental 
events and thus, involuntary cognitive failures. How is this different from 
induced-forgetting? Groome and Grant (2005) addressed this question by 
assessing the relationship between everyday cognitive failures and RIF. Their 
results suggested an inverse relationship between the magnitude of a RIF effect 
and everyday cognitive failures as measured by the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parks, 1982). Groome and 
Grant compared the RIF scores of 40 normal individuals to their scores on the 
CFQ and found that those who demonstrated a strong RIF effect (forgot 
substantially more words than those in a control condition) reported fewer 
cognitive failures. Induced-forgetting provides us with a means of filtering out 
information that is irrelevant or not needed. It would seem then, that in some 
circumstances, the ability to forget certain material would prove beneficial to an 
individual’s psychological health. Forgetting, as a coping strategy, would allow 
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individuals to rid their minds of distressful or threatening events. This may be 
particularly important for memories that are negative and emotionally laden. For 
the sake of basic research on forgetting, identifying the effects of individual 
differences such as mood state on forgetting may help elucidate the boundary 
conditions under which we might expect to find an induced-forgetting effect. In 
addition, a direct comparison of experimental paradigms will help to identify 
how similarities and differences in procedures affect outcomes, informing future 
research on the underlying mechanisms of forgetting paradigms. 
Findings supporting a bias in depression towards negative memories give 
rise to the idea that negative memories might be the most important target of 
induced-forgetting. However, a consequence of a mood congruent memory bias 
leading to more accessibility to negative memories might be that negative 
memories are more resistant to forgetting, particularly if memories have 
significant relevance to self. This also raises the question of whether one induced-
forgetting paradigm is more effective for negative memories than another or 
whether it depends on the state of mood (e.g., whether or not an individual is 
depressed). 
From an applied perspective in clinical psychology, research on the ability 
to induce the forgetting of negative memories might provide a means by which 
practitioners can facilitate symptom stabilization as a preventative strategy to 
combat negative mood states before they spiral downward to more serious mood 
disorders and may also inform intervention and treatment of depression. 
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Further, understanding the relationships between cognitive vulnerability factors 
for depression as they influence induced-forgetting may also identify the aspects 
of cognition that are the best target of intervention. In addition, other 
psychological disturbances in which unwanted cognitions and negative 
memories have been identified as vulnerability or maintenance factors (e.g., 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder; Salkovskis, 1989) may serve as an appropriate 
target for further investigation of forgetting paradigms. Finally, the results of the 
present research may aid in the development of alternative treatment regimes. 
As previously discussed, high rates of depression also reflect the need to 
evaluate those factors that place individuals at greater risk for developing 
depression. It is to the issue of cognitive factors associated with depression that 
attention is now turned. 
1.7 Cognitive Factors Associated with Depression 
Despite sadness being a normal experience for most individuals, what 
puts people at risk or makes them vulnerable to persistent sadness that may 
ultimately lead to clinical depression? This section begins by delineating 
potential risk factors associated with depression and then moves into a more in-
depth review of specific cognitive factors associated with depressed and 
dysphoric mood states. The possible implication of cognitive vulnerabilities on 
induced-forgetting effects is also discussed. 
Much of the research on vulnerability and risk for depression to date has 
focused on psychosocial and biological factors (Kovacs, 1997). For example, 
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biological factors such as having a first-degree relative with depressive disorder 
are associated with an increase in the likelihood of experiencing depression 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In addition, stressful life events (e.g., 
Kovacs, 1997); low self-esteem (e.g., Goodyer, 1999); and depressotypic 
attribution style (i.e., the tendency to attribute failure to internal sources and 
success to external factors) (Lewinsohn & Essau, 2002) have also been implicated 
as increasing individual vulnerability for depression. Cognitive factors such as a 
tendency towards negative cognitions (e.g., Garber & Hilsman, 1992), poor 
cognitive coping strategies (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Wells & Davies, 1994), and 
poor mental control ability (e.g., negative appraisal of and loss of mental control 
over distressing thoughts (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes, & Scott, 1999; Edwards & 
Dickinson, 1987) have been identified as potential vulnerability factors for the 
development of mood disorders.  Since mood effects memory, then the presence 
of specific vulnerability and risk factors may also predict the efficacy of induced-
forgetting.  
To this author’s knowledge no study has yet, examined whether the 
individual cognitive risk or vulnerability factors associated with depression 
impedes susceptibility to forgetting paradigm effects. These factors may play an 
important role in the application of forgetting paradigms to individuals who are 
susceptible to depression. Further, the contribution of determining the risk 
factors in identifying those who might be successfully induced to forget will aid 
in the future development of prevention strategies and may also provide insight 
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into the specific targets of intervention. What follows then, is a more in-depth 
review of cognitive vulnerability for depression with particular attention given 
to those cognitive factors most likely to affect forgetting. 
1.7.1 Cognitive Risk Factors in Depression 
Several cognitive-based perspectives have been offered as explanations for 
why individuals may be vulnerable to depression. First, the Cognitive 
Vulnerability Model (Beck, 1987; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999) proposes that some 
individuals have increased susceptibility to depression because of enduring 
negative mental content (mental representations) about self, world and future. 
When negative self-referent schemas are triggered by negative life events, 
negative content is readily accessible and thus, increases in number and 
frequency. Consequently negative thoughts become harder to control because 
individuals attach greater meaning to them. Second, in the previous examination 
of the work of Wegner (1994), individuals may be susceptible to depression 
because they use ineffective thought control strategies in a futile effort to 
suppress their negative thoughts – called ironic processing (Wenzlaff, 2005).  
As previously discussed, the literature on thought suppression studies 
reveals that the very act of engaging in intentional suppression of unwanted 
cognitions leads to a paradoxical increase in the very thoughts the person is 
trying not to think (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). A depressed mood persists and 
may develop into clinical depression because ineffective control strategies ensure 
the persistence of negative thoughts. Third, several researchers have suggested 
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that the ways in which people cope with thoughts that make them sad or 
depressed are often ineffective (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Wells & Davies, 
1994). Thought control strategies that involve appraisal of a particular thought or 
punishing the self for having a particular thought (e.g., telling yourself that 
something bad will happen if you continue to have the thought) have been 
strongly associated with emotional vulnerabilities such as those indicated by 
higher depression scores (Reynolds & Wells, 1999; Wells & Davies, 1994). Finally, 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) suggested that individuals are vulnerable 
to depression because when faced with a depressed mood, they use a coping 
style that ensures the perpetuation of a negative mood state. Some people turn 
their attention away from negative thoughts in an attempt to redirect their focus 
to other tasks; a coping style called distraction (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001). Other 
people direct their attention towards their thoughts and feelings during a 
depressed mood; a coping style called rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001). 
Women tend to engage in more rumination and subsequently experience 
depression more often than men (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001). A more 
detailed discussion of suppression and rumination follows. 
These perspectives suggest that a predisposition for negative mental 
content, the propensity for adopting a maladaptive coping strategy, and poor 
efforts to exercise some degree of mental control over distressing thoughts in the 
context of depressed mood may be additional sources of individual differences 
in successful induced-forgetting. The following section begins with a general 
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discussion of the concept of mental control followed by a more detailed look at 
rumination, perceived mental control, and thought suppression in terms of the 
relationship between depression and dysphoria and the possible implications for 
induced-forgetting.  
1.8 Mental Control and Depression 
What is mental control and what is its role in depression? In general, any 
process or strategy used in an attempt to control the activity of one’s own mind is 
mental control. Wegner and Pennebaker (1993) suggested that mental control be 
defined in a number of ways, including: a) as an attentional activity; b) as a 
coping strategy; and c) as a psychological defense. It is possible that the concept 
of mental control as a psychological defense has its conceptual roots in the earlier 
works of Sigmund Freud. With his conceptualisation of defense mechanisms, 
Freud suggested that the drive to relieve psychic distress manifests itself in the 
form of defensive mechanisms – of which the most widely known is repression. 
Defined in terms of psychological defense then, mental control can be viewed as 
less willful and more unconscious.  
While it is true that some attentional processes are more automatic and 
thus, outside our own awareness, mental control as an attentional activity 
suggests that people can voluntarily attend to or ignore what is on their mind. 
Mental control can also be understood as a response to distress (Wegner & 
Pennebaker, 1993). With the onset of a depressed mood state, most people will 
inevitably make some attempt to rid themselves of that mood. That is, 
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individuals may respond to depressed mood with some mental activity they 
believe will alleviate the distress. These attempts represent some effortful mental 
intervention aimed at reducing the negative thoughts, memories, or images that 
exacerbate and prolong negative mood states.  
Attempts to control mental activity may take the form of a behavioural 
action (e.g., engaging in sports, or watching TV); cognitive activities (e.g., 
habituation, replacing current cognitive content with different thoughts); or a 
combination of both behavioural and cognitive action (e.g., speaking to a friend 
about distressing thoughts). For the purposes of the present study, the focus is on 
cognitive-based activities. The literature conceptualizes cognitive activities under 
three global categories of mental control: habituation, dismissal, and distraction. 
Each of these is discussed in turn. 
Habituation. Habituation refers to the desensitization of negative 
cognitions through repeated exposure. Parkinson and Rachman (1980) attempted 
to determine if individuals could habituate to negative cognitions. Rachman 
(1981) hypothesized that normal unwanted intrusive thoughts become clinical 
obsessions as a result of the failure to habituate to the thoughts. Sixty 
participants were asked to form target thoughts and images before and following 
habituation training. The pre-training scores were used as base-line measures. 
They found a significant decrease in discomfort, intensity, stressfulness, 
unacceptability, latency and resistance for the training group compared to a 
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group of controls. They concluded that some people are, in fact, able to habituate 
to normal unwanted thoughts. 
Likierman and Rachman (unpublished but cited in Rachman, 1981) 
extended the study of habituation to determine whether distressing thoughts 
that were subject to habituation would evidence lasting effects. Their results, 
while similar to the Parkinson and Rachman (1980) study, suggested that the 
positive effects of habituation (i.e., decreased distress associated with the 
negative cognitions) might be short-lived. Habituation strategies then may 
provide short–term benefits as a means of mental control. An example of a 
habituation strategy is rumination, however, ruminating on sadness, which is 
further elaborated in a subsequent section, can have specific negative 
consequences.  
From a clinical perspective, the most popular example of a habituation 
intervention is the prolonged exposure therapy (Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs, & Murdoch, 
1991; Falsetti, Monnier, & Resnick, 2005) used to treat PTSD and other trauma-
related difficulties. Prolonged exposure therapy involves the elaboration by 
clients of their traumatic experience while the therapist facilitates the control of 
emotional responses to the memory. Prolonged exposure is currently supported 
by the APA as an evidenced-based intervention. 
Dismissal. A dismissal strategy refers to the ability to ignore or remove at 
will unwanted thoughts from the stream of consciousness. One example of a 
dismissal strategy is the technique called thought stopping. Thought stopping can 
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be accomplished by a variety of techniques. For example, when thinking about 
something that you do not want to be thinking about, you might say to yourself 
“stop.” Thought stopping is a control strategy that is used frequently in the 
general population with some success (Freeston et al., 1991). From a clinical 
perspective, thought stopping strategies are often employed as part of a 
cognitive behavioural intervention plan for clinically depressed patients with 
varying degrees of success. The effectiveness of dismissal as a mental control 
strategy is subject to a number of mitigating factors. In their study of the 
functional properties of unwanted intrusive thoughts, Parkinson and Rachman 
(1981) interviewed 60 participants about their unwanted intrusive thought 
experiences. They asked participants to describe (among other things) how easy 
it was to dismiss their unwanted thoughts. Results indicated that dismissability 
was impaired when the thought intensity was rated as particularly strong. 
Specifically, the more intense an unwanted cognition the more difficult it was to 
dismiss. 
There is also evidence that a dysphoric mood state and the amount of 
distress associated with a thought also contribute to decreases in controllability 
(Rachman, 1981). Several studies have assessed the impact of mood state on the 
dismissability of unwanted thoughts (e.g., Purdon & Clark, 2001; Wenzlaff, 
Wegner, & Klein, 1991). In two experimental paradigms, Parkinson and 
Rachman (1980) induced a happy or sad mood prior to the request to remove a 
target unwanted thought. In the dysphoric mood state, individuals found it 
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harder to dismiss the thought. Clark (1986) proposed that the content of the 
thought or image influences the degree of dismissability. Specifically, thoughts 
highly relevant to self are more difficult to dismiss than other thoughts that are 
self-irrelevant. Clark (1986) also makes a distinction between positive and 
negative self-relevant thoughts and positive and negative self-irrelevant 
thoughts. Negative thoughts generally, and particularly those that are self-
relevant, increase the time it takes to dismiss the thought (Clark, 1986).  
Two explanations exist as to why dismissal is problematic for some people 
and not others. First, Rachman (1981, 1993) suggested that the emotionality that 
the thoughts evoke (intensity of the emotion) impede dismissal ability. That is, 
the intensity of mood evoked by cognitive content affects the ability of an 
individual to forget unpleasant thoughts. Second, it may be that a dysphoric 
mood state makes more pleasant or positive thoughts less accessible (Teasdale & 
Taylor, 1981). This highlights the importance of the self-relevance and emotional 
valence of material for depressive disorders and the role these two factors might 
play in the efficacy of induced-forgetting paradigms.  
Distraction. Any cognitive activity (e.g., positive thought substitution) or 
behavioural activity (e.g., hobbies, music, or reading) that redirects attentional 
resources away from the negative thoughts and onto something else may be 
considered a distraction strategy. Wang, Clark, Markowitz, and Purdon (2000), 
found in their sample of 50 students, that physical and mental distractions were 
the most frequently used control techniques (62% and 78%, respectively). In their 
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sample of 125 students, Freeston et al. (1991) reported that approximately 55 
percent of individuals tried to replace the unwanted thoughts with another and 
30 percent engaged in a distracting activity. As previously noted, one specific 
cognitive distraction strategy that has received significant empirical attention is 
suppression. Worry, defined as replacing one negative thought with another 
negative thought (Wells & Davies, 1994) would be considered a cognitive 
distraction strategy. However, as the preceding review of findings from the 
literature on suppression suggests, trying to suppress a thought by replacing it 
with another thought has a paradoxical effect on mood.  
What is clear from the preceding review on cognitive coping and mental 
control is that mental strategies for dealing with negative cognitions have 
potential consequences for individuals who are depressed. Indeed, the failure of 
mental control strategies to regulate thoughts and mood often comes with 
significant costs to physical and emotional well-being (for a review see Wegner & 
Pennebaker, 1993). There may also be psychological costs associated with 
perceptions about failure to mentally control thoughts and subsequent mood. 
The concepts of perceived mental control and rumination are now reviewed. 
1.8.1 Perceived Mental Control.  
From the preceding discussion we can see the potential importance of 
mental control to a study on retrieving and forgetting of negative memories. 
Both the emotional valence and self-relevance of memories may make them more 
difficult to dismiss. Further, if the paradoxical effect of attempts to mentally 
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control thoughts results in an increase in mood intensity that might also impede 
induced-forgetting attempts. One important aspect of mental control that 
warrants discussion is the degree to which our perceptions about our ability to 
effectively control cognition affect our mood and thus, may also affect induced-
forgetting outcomes. That is, if individuals perceive poor ability to control 
mental content, then perhaps poor perceived ability to control mental content 
will be indicative of less induced-forgetting.  
A full understanding of how the individual appraisal of mental control 
abilities affects cognitive processes is hampered by both a lack of research on 
how poor perceptions of mental control influence depressed mood and by few 
measures designed to assess perceived mental control. The detrimental effects of 
negative appraisal on mood state have been documented in several studies (see 
Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999 for a review). The Control of Unwanted Thoughts 
Scale (CUTS) was developed as a subjective measure of control over unwanted 
cognitions and the appraised consequences of mental control failure (Rhyno, 
Clark, & Purdon, 2003). Initial psychometric assessment suggested that the 
instrument reliably assessed perceived mental control in a sample of 545 
undergraduate students. Although this research is largely based on thoughts, 
images, and memories that are identified by individuals as unwanted, it is 
reasonable to postulate that individuals who believe they have poor mental 
control abilities might have deficits in forgetting. Indeed, in their sample, high 
scores on the CUTS (indicating poor perceived control) were associated with 
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higher scores on a symptom checklist for depression (r = .53; Rhyno et al., 2003). 
In addition, poor perceived mental control accounted for a significant portion of 
the variability in depression scores and was a statistically significant predictor of 
depressive symptoms. Thus, perceived mental control is a plausible individual 
difference factor for retrieval and forgetting success. Since depression and 
negative mental content share a close association, the preceding section provided 
a general overview of the idea that attempts to control negative thought through 
attentional processes often produce the unwanted effects of prolonged or 
intensification of mood states. Next, is a discussion of rumination conceptualized 
as both an attentional process and coping strategy. 
1.8.2 Rumination 
Several theoretical perspectives have advanced our current understanding 
of rumination and its role in depression. Rumination can be conceptualized as a 
symptom of the depressive state itself (Robinson & Alloy, 2003) or as a reaction 
to the onset of a depressed mood state (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). As a symptom 
of depression, research has suggested that rumination in this context precedes 
the onset of a depressed mood. As a coping response, rumination is thought to 
occur in response to the onset of a depressed mood. It is rumination as a 
response to mood that is of interest in the present study.  
Ruminative coping, according to Response Styles Theory (RST; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1987), refers to a particular response strategy. The RST posits that the 
ways in which people respond to a depressed mood may exacerbate the 
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symptoms of depression and prolong the negative mood state. Rumination in 
response to a depressed mood (experimenter induced or naturally occurring) has 
been associated with increased depressive symptoms over time (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999), 
prolonged depressed mood state (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), the onset 
of a future depressive episode (Just & Alloy, 1997; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 
1998), and prediction of further deterioration of the course of a depressive 
disorder (Kuehner & Weber, 1999). These effects have been demonstrated 
through correlational and experimental investigation. However, an important 
caveat is the measurement issues associated with several studies on rumination 
and depression. 
Rumination has typically been assessed using the Ruminative Responses 
Questionnaire (RRS), a self-report subscale of the Response Styles Questionnaire 
(RSQ). The RRS is a 22-item inventory believed to represent those thoughts and 
behaviours indicative of ruminative coping. Some research suggested that 
rumination, as it is defined by and measured with the RRS, embodies a gender 
stereotype indicative of how women and girls are expected to behave (Strauss, 
Muday, McNall, & Wong, 1997). Others have suggested that rumination, as 
measured by the RRS, is actually tapping depressive phenomenology itself 
because of the overlap of items from the RRS and measures of depression (e.g., 
Conway, Csank, Holm, and Blake, 2000; Cox, Enns, & Taylor, 2001). As is often 
the case, studies of rumination and depression have used the Beck Depression 
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Inventory (BDI) to assess depressive symptoms and as a result of large 
correlations between the BDI and RRS, which make findings vulnerable to 
misinterpretation due to multicollinearity. The correlation between RRS and BDI 
items has been reported to be between .48 and .56 (Butler & Nolen–Hoeksema, 
1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).  
The RRS has also undergone extensive psychometric analysis (Bagby & 
Parker, 2001; Cox, Enns, & Taylor, 2001). For example, Bagby and Parker (2001) 
used factor analysis to extract two distinct factors, self-focus and symptom focus, 
suggesting a two-component model of rumination. Further, Bagby, Rector, 
Bachiochi, and McBride (2004) investigated the stability of the RRS two-
component model and found that both the self-focus and symptom-focus aspects 
of the RRS were stable measures of “a reliable individual difference variable that 
prolongs and exacerbates depressed mood” (p. 534). However, the RRS captures 
behavioural aspects of rumination (e.g., sharing one’s feelings with friends) that 
far extend the construct beyond the internal realm central to the concept of 
mental control. 
Conway, Csank, Holm, and Blake (2000) developed the Rumination on 
Sadness Scale (RSS) that seems to fit with the concept of mental control as a 
cognitive rather than behavioural entity. In three studies assessing the 
psychometric properties of the RSS compared to the RRS, Conway et al. provided 
evidence for the reliability and validity of the RSS (see Luminet, 2004 for a 
complete review). Rumination was redefined as “recurrent thoughts concerning 
63 
one’s present distress and the circumstances surrounding the sadness” (Conway 
et al., 2000, p.404).  Subsequent use of the RSS reveals that the tenets of RST of 
depression appear to hold, at least for adult populations (e.g., Conway, 
Mendelson, Giannopoulos, Csank, & Holm, 2004). Before reviewing the literature 
on rumination, it is important to consider the definition of rumination in terms of 
its relationship to other related constructs (e.g., worry). 
Rumination can be distinguished from other cognitive constructs such as 
worry, negative automatic thoughts, and mental problem-solving activities. 
Several features characterize worry and worrisome thoughts: a) worries involve 
thinking about and anticipating pending threat whether real or imagined; b) 
worries are more akin to mental images; c) worries contain more verbal content; 
and d) worries are of shorter duration. In contrast, ruminative thoughts are 
usually focused on the past and are of longer duration (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2004; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004). This suggests that ruminators focus attention 
on events already stored in memory rather than anticipating events to come. 
Nolen-Hoeksema and her colleagues (1993) suggested that worriers tend to take 
action against pending threat, whereas ruminators may think about their 
situation but they fail to act in any way to alter the outcome.  
Nolen-Hoeksema (2004) also distinguished between Beck’s negative 
automatic thoughts and rumination. According to Nolen-Hoeksema (2004), 
negative automatic thoughts are a set of distorted cognitions, whereas 
rumination is a set of behaviours and thoughts representative of a particular 
64 
style or response to mood. Nolen-Hoeksema (2004) referred to rumination as an 
attentional style that focuses on the negative aspects of self. While negative 
automatic thoughts may be the by-product of rumination and other cognitive 
events, they remain distinct phenomena. In addition, rumination is a passive 
process. That is to say that there is no active thought or behaviour on the part of 
the ruminator to change his or her current situation. In contrast, the problem-
solving process is viewed as an active process in which a person engages with 
the intent to resolve a given problem or situation.  
Papageorgiou and Wells (2004) suggested that rumination, while sharing 
a number of features with worry and negative automatic thoughts, is different 
from other constructs on a number of dimensions (e.g., duration, content, and 
time frame focus). As well, normal ruminative thinking can be differentiated 
from the more pathological forms of rumination such as depressive rumination 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004). This is evidenced in the research findings of 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993), who found that rumination in the absence 
of depressed mood state has virtually no negative impact on aspects of mood 
(i.e., no exacerbation of mood). Would the same be true of the effect that 
rumination has on an individual’s ability to forget? To answer this question, 
attention is now drawn to the literature on rumination and memory. 
1.9 Rumination and Memory 
The RST of depression suggests that there are several ways in which 
rumination exacerbates the symptoms associated with a depressed mood state 
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(for a detailed review see Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Of particular importance is 
the relationship between rumination and memory. Based on the evidence from 
various studies on memory and information processing, Nolen–Hoeksema (1991) 
suggested that rumination interferes with one’s ability to process thoughts 
effectively, particularly if those thoughts are emotionally laden and self-focused. 
Rumination heightens the accessibility of negative memories, making them more 
salient and thus readily available, which may reduce the efficacy with which an 
individual is able to inhibit them or shift to more positive or external thoughts in 
an effort to improve mood state.  
One experimental study, which provides some indirect evidence that 
rumination activates more negative memories and therefore might negatively 
influence the ability to shift attention to something else, comes from 
Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, and Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1998) study on executive 
functioning and mood. These researchers induced a depressed mood on half of a 
sample of undergraduate students. Dysphoric ruminators recalled more negative 
memories during both a free and cued recall task. In addition, dysphoric groups 
who ruminated reported that negative memories occurred at a higher frequency 
than positive memories and generated more spontaneous negative memories 
when engaged in rumination (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). These findings provide 
experimental evidence for a causal effect for the increase in activated negative 
self-relevant memories.  
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In addition to the activation of negative memories is the question of the 
effects of rumination on the cognitive capacity to control such memories. 
Neuropsychological systems, of which memory is one, play an important role in 
the ability to process information. While neuropsychological deficits such as 
impaired attentional processes share a relationship with depression, only a 
handful of studies has investigated neuropsychological deficits associated with 
depression in the context of rumination (e.g., Teasdale, Green, & Hilary, 2004; 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). One study was not specific to neuropsychological 
function but rather used general concentration on school-related tasks as its 
dependent measure (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003). Findings suggested 
that rumination does impair one’s ability to concentrate on academic tasks. In 
this context then, impairment in concentration, a feature of depressive disorders, 
is affected by the response style employed. Poor concentration or inability to 
attend may impede the ability of individuals to follow instructions to forget. 
In a more direct examination of neuropsychological functioning, Davis 
and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) asked dysphoric and non-dysphoric ruminators to 
complete a number of tasks designed to assess working memory (Digit Span), 
general intellectual ability (Vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale), and cognitive flexibility (WCST). Notably, the measures selected by Davis 
and Nolen-Hoeksema are recognized as appropriate measures of the constructs. 
Results indicated that dysphoric ruminators experienced significantly more 
difficulty in tasks requiring cognitive flexibility than their non-dysphoric 
67 
ruminator counterparts (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). While this study 
assessed a limited sample of attentional and executive functions, it provides 
initial support for the relationship between maladaptive cognitive responses to 
depression (rumination) and neuropsychological deficits in the context of 
depressed mood. Further, it demonstrates that rumination may be strongly 
associated with poor inhibitory control, a mechanism believed to underlie 
induced-forgetting.  
The remaining studies assessed the effect of both adaptive and 
maladaptive response styles on specific deficits in random number generation 
(e.g., Watkins & Brown, 2002) and autobiographical memories (e.g., 
Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 
2004; Teasdale, Green, & Hilary, 2004). For example, Watkins and Brown (2002) 
compared non-depressed and depressed adults on their performance of random 
number generation on experimentally induced rumination and distraction. 
Results suggested that when ruminating, depressed individuals showed marked 
impairment in a number generation task. Watkins and Brown suggested that 
rumination may better account for specific deficits in the executive system than 
the depressive symptoms themselves. It is argued here that random number 
generation is not an adequate reflection of executive function. However, Watkins 
and Brown raised an interesting hypothesis regarding the role of response style 
in relation to depression and neuropsychological deficits.  
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The finding that experimentally induced ruminating in response to a 
depressed mood impairs the ability to retrieve positive memories is quite robust. 
In addition, evidence suggesting neuropsychological deficits are possible 
outcomes of depressed mood and ruminative coping may help to predict what 
might happen for individuals participating in induced-forgetting paradigms. 
Indeed, rumination appears to be a critical factor in the maintenance of 
depressive disorders. The evidence reviewed in the preceding paragraphs 
suggests that rumination has deleterious effects on mood states, particularly for 
women and starting at adolescence. Underlying rumination is cognitive 
inflexibility that may involve poor inhibitory control and perseveration. This 
raises the question of whether a ruminative coping style predicts deficits in 
induced-forgetting or whether a wide variety of coping responses make 
individuals more vulnerable to the inability to suppress negative memories.  
1.10 Rationale for the Present Study 
The primary goals of the present study were three fold. First, the present 
study aimed to investigate how mood state affects the ability of individuals to 
both retrieve and then forget self-relevant negative emotional memories. Second, 
this study explored whether one forgetting paradigm worked more effectively 
than another for dysphoric versus non-dysphoric individuals by directly 
comparing forgetting paradigms in terms of their relative efficacy in achieving 
forgetting effects for negative memories. A third goal was to expand current 
knowledge of induced-forgetting by examining which cognitive factors (e.g., 
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perceived mental control, mental control strategies, and rumination) were more 
strongly associated with, and best predict, the ease of retrieval of autobiographic 
memories and individual susceptibility to induced-forgetting of the same. 
What is clear from the preceding evaluation of the relationship between 
mood and memory contextualized in Beck’s (1987) cognitive model of depression 
is the opportunity to re-evaluate the schema activation hypothesis by addressing 
some of the methodological concerns (e.g., a more ecological operationalisation 
of accessibility and controlling for specificity versus generality of memories) 
from the existing body of literature. In addition, this study sought to determine if 
the very act of generating negative memories is in and of itself detrimental to 
mood and thus a plausible explanation for a lack of difference in generation time. 
Therefore, the present study is in part a replication of past research. In addition, 
the results of this study provide further evidence in general of the tenet of 
schema activation and cognitive theory by adopting a more ecologically valid 
method of assessing memory accessibility. The Cognitive Theory of Depression 
predicts that dysphoric mood will increase the accessibility of negative memories 
and thus, the time to generate these memories should be quicker for individuals 
who score high on a measure of depressive symptoms. 
The preceding review of the literature also revealed several gaps in the 
current knowledge about induced-forgetting, mood, and mental control. First, 
while autobiographic content of an emotional nature has recently been used in 
both the RIF (Barnier, et al., 2004) and DF (Joslyn & Oaks, 2005) paradigms with 
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success, a comparison of efficacy of one paradigm over another is not possible at 
an empirical level. In his review of the literature on forgetting, Anderson (2005) 
compared DF and RIF at the theoretical level in terms of procedural differences, 
underlying causes of forgetting effects, and the relationship between these two 
paradigms. Thus, this study makes an important contribution to current 
knowledge about efficacy of forgetting paradigms using autobiographic material 
by making a direct empirical comparison of methods.  
Second, although previous research has suggested deficits in forgetting 
emotional material for depressed and dysphoric individuals ( e.g., Hertel & 
Gerstle, 2003), other studies have found no such effect (e.g., Dumont, 2000). A 
predicted deficit in forgetting is consistent with the Cognitive Theory of 
Depression (Beck, 1967, 1987) and the schema activation hypothesis. The present 
study contributes to the understanding of how mood state might affect the 
efficacy of individual forgetting paradigms. In addition the aforementioned 
studies used emotionally valenced words and thus, a further contribution lies in 
the use of self-relevant autobiographic content. 
Third, previous research on the forgetting of autobiographic content has 
typically included content that is both positive and negative. Since depression 
and dysphoria are hallmarked by a mood-congruent propensity for increased 
accessibility of negative mental content, an assessment of forgetting in the 
context of all negative content may be particularly important for intervention. 
For example, if a depressed client struggles to access positive information, it 
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might be important to know that induced-forgetting of some negative mental 
content can occur at the expense of other negative content in the absence of any 
available positive content, at least until clients have had the opportunity to 
alleviate their dysphoria. Thus, the present study eliminated the use of positive 
or neutral material. 
Finally, as forgetting is a cognitive process, it is possible that mental 
control and cognitive coping strategies share a relationship with memory 
processes such as forgetting paradigms. However, the extent of these 
relationships has not yet been examined. Thus, the results of the present study 
potentially expand on the cognitive products offered by Beck’s (1987) Cognitive 
Theory of Depression and may offer insight into viable areas of further research 
into faulty cognitive processing that may ultimately lead to the onset or 
maintenance of depressive symptoms. 
Addressing the gaps in our current understanding of autobiographic 
retrieval, induced-forgetting, depression, and cognitive risk factors are 
particularly important for several reasons. First, the findings from the studies of 
dysphoria may provide valuable insight into the phenomenon of depression and 
the onset, maintenance, and treatment of the clinical disorder itself. In addition, 
support for predictions about schema activation, the efficacy of forgetting 
paradigms in the context of mood, and individual differences in forgetting 
promises to inform preventative strategies for reducing the likelihood that 
repeated episodes of dysphoric mood will lead to the onset of full-blown clinical 
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depression. Finally, a study that combines the elements of self-relevance as is the 
case with mood-congruent memories, mood, and negative emotional valence will 
elucidate more clearly how these constructs, the very constructs believed so 
essential to the maintenance of dysphoric mood, facilitate or impede induced-
forgetting.  
1.10.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Question 1: What is the nature of the mood-memory relationship in terms of 
accessibility of negative memories? 
Hypothesis 1: Non-dysphoric individuals will be slower than the 
dysphoric group in terms of the time it takes to recall a set of negative 
autobiographic events. 
Question 2: Is RIF a superior paradigm to induce the forgetting effect even when 
participants are dysphoric? 
 Hypothesis 2: There will be a significant 3-way interaction among 
instruction, mood, and paradigm in which RIF will produce the largest 
forgetting effect for individuals who are dysphoric. The forgetting effect of 
DF will depend on whether participants are dysphoric. 
Question 3: Does mood state differentially affect forgetting or does it depend on 
the specific forgetting paradigm employed?  
Hypothesis 3: There will be a 2-way interaction between mood state and 
forgetting paradigm. That is, the effect of mood state on the amount of 
forgetting will depend on the paradigm used. It is expected that the 
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amount of forgetting will be highest for non-dysphoric individuals in the 
RIF paradigm compared to both non-dysphorics in the DF paradigm and 
dysphorics in the RIF and DF paradigms. It is also predicted that a DF 
effect will not be demonstrated for the dysphoric group compared to their 
non-dysphoric counterparts but that RIF will produce a significant 
forgetting effect for the dysphoric group. 
Question 4: Does the affect of mood state on the amount of negative memories 
forgotten depend on the instructions given?  
Hypothesis 4: There will be a 2-way interaction between mood and 
instruction condition. The within-subjects scores for amount of forgetting 
for the non-dysphoric group will be higher in the remember condition (RR 
and NRP) than in the forget condition (RF and Rp-) compared to the 
dysphoric group. 
Question 5: Will the forgetting paradigms evidence a forgetting effect with RIF 
yielding a forgetting effect greater than DF?  
Hypothesis 5: There will be a 2-way interaction between forgetting 
paradigm and instruction condition. That is, the amount forgetting 
produced by each paradigm will depend on the instruction condition. The 
percentage of memories recalled will be highest in the remember 
instruction condition (RR and NRP) compared to the forget instruction 
condition (RF and Rp-) and will be greater for RIF than either DF method. 
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Question 6: Are negative autobiographic events subject to induced-forgetting 
effects? Similar to the findings of Barnier et al. (2004) and Joslyn and Oakes (in 
press) that autobiographic memories are subject to both DF and RIF the 
following prediction is made: 
Hypothesis 6: There will be a main effect for instruction. The amount of 
memories recalled from the to-be remembered category will be higher 
than the amount of memories recalled from the to-be-forgotten category. 
Question 7: Does mood state affect the efficacy of induced-forgetting of negative 
memories? 
Hypothesis 7: Mood state will affect the amount of forgetting that occurs. 
The amount of forgetting will be higher for the non-dysphoric group than 
the dysphoric group. 
Question 8: Given the rebound effect commonly found in dysphoria and 
depression, does the forgetting paradigm affect the amount of forgetting that will 
occur?  
Hypothesis 8: There will be a main effect for forgetting paradigm. The 
forgetting paradigm used will affect the amount of forgetting that occurs. 
The RIF paradigm will produce the greatest amount of forgetting 
compared to either DF-item or DF-list, which should produce similar 
amounts of forgetting.  
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Question 9: Will the same results comparing DF and RIF be found when the 
practice effect components (NRP and Rp+) of RIF are used in analyses instead of 
the forgetting effect components? 
 
Question 10: What is the relationship between cognitive vulnerability factors in 
depression and an individual’s ability to generate and then to forget negative 
memories using induced-forgetting?  
Hypothesis 9: Higher scores indicating poor perceived mental control over 
cognitions will be associated with faster memory generation time. 
Hypothesis 10: High scores on self-report rumination will be associated 
with faster memory generation time. 
Hypothesis 11: There will be a significant relationship between the mental 
control strategies and the amount of time to generate a set of memories. 
No specific predictions are made as to which strategies are correlated with 
generation time or the direction of the association between strategy and 
generation time. 
Hypothesis 12: Lower scores indicating poor perceived mental control 
over cognitions will be associated with lower forgetting rates. 
Hypothesis 13: High scores on self-report rumination will be associated 
with lower rates of forgetting. 
Hypothesis 14: There will be a significant relationship between the mental 
control strategies and the amount of forgetting. No specific predictions are 
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made as to which strategies are correlated with forgetting or the direction 
of the association between strategy and forgetting. 
Hypothesis 15: Low scores indicating poor perceived mental control over 
cognitions will not benefit from retrieval practice in RIF. 
Hypothesis 16: High scores on self-report rumination will be associated 
with no benefit of retrieval practice in RIF. 
Hypothesis 17: There will be a significant relationship between the mental 
control strategies and the RIF practice effect. No specific predictions are 
made as to which strategies are correlated with practice or the direction of 
the association between strategy and the RIF practice effect. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from several sources. First, 111 participants 
were recruited from the psychology participant pool during fall and winter 
terms, and they received one bonus mark for each half hour of research 
participation. The total participation time was 2 hours. The study was posted on 
a secure web page (http://usask.sona-systems.com/). Participants signed-up to 
participate after reading a description of the study (several studies are posted 
simultaneously) and then selected from a number of pre-scheduled appointment 
times. 
Second, 4 students from an introductory-level spring and summer 
psychology class participated in exchange for course credit with the permission 
and agreement between the instructor and the researcher. Research participation 
by students enrolled in summer classes is often encouraged to permit a broader 
understanding of the research enterprise. In addition, it provides students 
enrolled in summer classes with the opportunity to earn 1 bonus mark for each 
half-hour of participation that they would not otherwise earn because they are 
taking classes outside the regular school terms.  
Finally, 3 participants were recruited from the community through word 
of mouth about the study. They expressed an interest in participating and ethics 
approval was obtained. However, these participants were deemed inappropriate 
to include in analyses because of the potential distinction of a community-based 
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sample from that of a university sample and the fact that these participants were 
over the age of 60 years. Given the potential confounding effects of aged-based 
changes in memory, it was decided that participant data from these individuals 
should not be included in final analyses. 
The resulting group of participants was a convenience sample of 115 
undergraduate students enrolled in a mid-western Canadian University. 
Following informed consent (see Appendix A), several participants were 
excluded from the study as follows: one participant was excluded because s/he 
was not fluent in English and failed to comprehend the instructions; 1 additional 
participant indicated that s/he was currently under the care of a mental health 
professional, and thus s/he was excused from further participation without 
penalty in order to avoid the potential harm to these individuals regarding the 
processing of negative memories; 7 participants opted to discontinue the study 
after 30 minutes because they only needed 1 additional bonus point to meet the 
required 5 for their introductory psychology course; an additional 3 participants 
evidenced significant psychological distress during the initial phase of the study 
and thus, were excused from the study. The researcher secured immediate 
psychological services for these 3 individuals. An additional 40 appointments 
were posted for student participation sign-up. However, no students 
volunteered over the remainder of the summer session in exchange for course 
credit. As the primary researcher would be unavailable for the fall and winter 
terms, and a degree of clinical skill was needed during the memory generation 
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phase of this study, participant recruitment was halted until preliminary results 
were evaluated to determine the need to proceed with recruitment. 
The resulting sample size for analysis was 103 participants. Ninety-two 
participants continued through to complete the second phase of the study 
(representing 89 percent of the phase 1 participants). Of the 103 participants used 
in analyses associated with phase 1, 74 percent were female and the mean age 
was 20.4 years (SD = 3.22). Ninety percent of participants indicated that English 
was their first language and the remaining 10 percent reported fluency in 
English. Fifteen percent of participants reported that they had been previously 
treated for a mental health problem with 7.8 percent reporting current treatment 
for school related difficulties. Of the 103 participants, 6.8 percent reported that 
they had participated in a study about remembering word pairs. Participant 
demographics from the first phase of this study were comparable to 
demographics in the second phase. 
2.2 Design 
The study took place in two phases: a memory generation phase (phase 1), 
and an induced-forgetting phase (phase 2), each of which is described in the 
procedure section. In the memory generation phase, a quasi-experimental 
between-subjects design in which the between-subject variable was mood with 2 
levels (non-dysphoric and dysphoric) was used to examine group differences on 
several variables. First, dysphoria was measured and subsequent scores used to 
categorize individuals as either dysphoric or non-dysphoric. Three variables 
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measuring mood state were examined (sadness, positive, and negative affect). 
Sadness, positive, and negative affect were measured before memory generation 
and after memory generation to determine the effect of the memory generation 
task on aspects of mood state. Generation time (the time to generate a 
predetermined set of 32 negative memories) was also measured.  
Finally, 3 variables were measured to ensure that groups did not differ in 
terms of how negative, clear, and old their memories were. These same variables 
were then used to provide a means of methodological control over memory 
characteristics among each induced-forgetting paradigm. That is, for the DF 
paradigm all memories were distributed among designated to-be-forgotten or to-
be-remembered categories such that clarity, negativity, and age ratings were 
equal between the two categories. For the RIF paradigm, the same procedure was 
used to distribute memories equally according to negativity, clarity, and age 
among the Rp+, Rp-, and NRP categories of the paradigm. This was designed to 
ensure that differences in paradigm efficacy could be attributed to paradigmatic 
differences and not differences in memory characteristics. 
The induced-forgetting phase of the present study was designed as a 2 
(condition) by 2 (mood) by 3 (forgetting paradigm) mixed factorial design (see 
Table 1 below). Using prior research as a guide (e.g., Barnier et al. 2004; Joslyn et 
al., 2005), it was decided that a sample of 20 participants per cell should be 
adequate to demonstrate the forgetting of autobiographic events. Given the 
moderate to large size of the effects obtain in previous studies, and typical cell 
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sizes of 15 to 25 participants, 20 participants per cell was deemed adequate to 
demonstrate an effect if one existed. Using a mixed factorial design in which 
there was one within-subjects variable, a total sample of 120 participants were 
required.  
Table 1. Diagrammatic representation of the research design for Phase 2. 
   Paradigm  
Mood Instruction 
DF-Item    DF-List      RIF 
Non Dysphoric Exp. Condition 
Baseline Condition 
S1 
S1 
S2 
S2 
S3 
S3 
        Dysphoric Exp. Condition 
Baseline Condition 
S4 
S4 
S5 
S5 
S6 
S6 
N = 120; n = 20. 
For the purpose of demonstrating a forgetting effect, there was 1 within-
subject variable (Instruction) in which participants served as their own controls 
with 2 levels: experimental (E) and baseline (B) condition. The baseline condition 
was the proportion of words remembered when told to remember (RR) for DF or 
the unpracticed unrelated list of memories in RIF (denoted as NRP). The 
experimental condition was the number of words remembered when told to 
forget (RF) or the related but unpracticed list of memories in RIF (denoted by Rp- 
for RIF). There were also two between-subjects independent variables: mood 
state with 2 levels: non-dysphoric and dysphoric. These groups were formed 
using a second CES-D scale administered during this second phase following 
cut-off scores of lower than 16 to indicate non-dysphoric and 16 or higher to 
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define the dysphoric group; and forgetting paradigm with 3 levels: directed 
forgetting–item (DF-item) method, directed forgetting–list (DF-List) method, and 
retrieval induced-forgetting (RIF) method. The dependent variable was the total 
number of memories remembered. 
Additional variables measuring various aspects of mental control 
including: perceived mental control, different mental control strategies (e.g., 
distraction, punishment, worry, social control, and appraisal), and rumination on 
sadness, were examined in terms of the relationship among these aspects of 
mental control and memory, including, accessibility (operationalised as the time 
to generate), directed-forgetting effect (RR-FF) in the case of DF, and degree of 
impairment (NRP minus Rp-) in the case of RIF. 
2.2.1 Analytic Strategy 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), a meaningful regression 
solution can only be achieved with an adequate sample size. The authors suggest 
that in order to test the multiple correlations, a sample size > 50 + 8m (where m is 
the number of predictors) is required. Further, to test the individual predictors, 
Tabachnik and Fidell also indicate that the sample size should be >104 + m. For 
the present study, there were 10 predictor variables. In order to test the multiple 
correlations, sample size of more than 130 would be deemed sufficient to provide 
meaningful correlations and a sample size of 114 is adequate to test the 
individual predictors. The authors also advise that a more stringent sample size 
calculation be used when anticipating anything other than large effects. 
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Therefore, the present study utilized the mixed factorial ANOVA, t-tests with a 
Bonferoni correction, and Pearson correlations to evaluate hypotheses. Although 
an ANOVA approach is not without its constraints, one of which is using 
continuous variables in a dichotomous fashion, the ANOVA adequately 
addresses the questions of group differences and is deemed an appropriate 
analytic strategy for this study.  
Finally, while not the best methodological strategy, it is common practice 
within research in medicine, psychology, and other behavioural sciences 
(Altman, 2006) to construct groups based on a single continuous measure of 
demographic and psychological construct (i.e., age, anxiety). This is often done at 
the expense of power and the present study acknowledges this cost. 
2.3 Materials 
Demographics. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire (see 
Appendix B) providing information to questions about age, gender, and 
exclusion criteria (e.g., “Are you currently under the care of a mental health 
professional?”) as a way of describing the sample. In addition, participants 
answered questions about personal preferences (e.g., TV show that made them 
laugh and whether or not they would watch it again). These items were then 
used with other demographic information to generate 4 filler items at the 
beginning and 4 at the end of each list of personal memories in order to control 
for primacy and recency effects on a recall task in phase 2 (Ashcraft, 2006). The 
demographic questionnaire also included a place for participants to provide a 
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personalized code in order to match data collected in phase 1 to data for phase 2 
without being able to identify participant names with data. 
2.3.1 Mood State 
2.3.1.1 Dysphoria. To classify participants as dysphoric and non-
dysphoric, the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; 
Radloff, 1977) was used. The CES-D is frequently used to assess the existence and 
severity of symptoms of depression as listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders-4th - Text Revision (DSM-IV TR; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) in non-clinical samples (e.g., the general 
population). The CES-D consists of 20 self-report statements with scores on each 
item ranging from 0 (rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the time). 
Participants are asked to consider each statement as it relates to the way they 
have felt for the past week. Scores can range from 0 to 60. Administration time is 
approximately 5 minutes. Cut-off guidelines suggest that total scores of 16 or 
more evidence clinically significant depressive symptoms (Radloff, 1977). For the 
present study, participants with scores of 16 or higher were categorized as 
dysphoric while scores less than 16 were scored as non-dysphoric.  
The CES-D is appropriate for adult and adolescent populations (Radloff, 
1991). The CES-D has also been used with undiagnosed samples and is 
acknowledged as a good research tool for studies assessing dysphoria as 
analogous to sub-clinical depressed mood states (Hann, Winter, & Jacobsen, 
1999; Radloff, 1991). The CES-D is a reliable instrument with coefficient alphas 
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ranging from .89 for patients and .90 for healthy individuals (Hann, Winter, & 
Jacobsen, 1999). Satisfactory test–retest reliability over a 2- to 8-week period 
ranged from .51 to .67. For the current sample the coefficient alpha was .88.  
2.3.1.2 Sadness. Mood state was also examined using a single item 
question (e.g., How sad do you feel right now?, see Appendix F) designed to 
identify a simple emotional state. Participants responded to the question on a 5 
point Likert scale (1 = not sad at all and 5 = extremely sad). This measure was 
generated by the researcher. 
2.3.1.3 Positive and negative affect. Positive and negative affect was 
assessed using the PANAS (see Appendix G). This measure was included as an 
additional means to assess mood inducing effects of the memory retrieval task 
and induced forgetting on negative or positive mood states. The PANAS is a self-
report measure of the degree to which one experiences a number of mood state 
descriptors (Watson & Clark, 1988). The scale contains 20 adjectives to which 
participants assign a rating (based on a 5 point Likert scale where 1 = very 
slightly or not at all and 5 = extremely). The scale consists of ten positively 
valenced (PA) words and 10 negatively valenced (NA) words. Thus, two 
orthogonal subscales are scored independently and represent a minimum score 
of 10 and maximum score of 50 for PA and NA, respectively. Higher scores 
indicate the presence of the respective positive and the negative affective 
experience indicative of the words. The PANAS has reported acceptable 
reliability (e.g., Crawford; & Henry, 2004; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and 
86 
the coefficient alphas for pre and post assessment for the present sample was .78 
and .80, for phase 1 and .79 and .80 for phase 2, respectively.  
2.3.2 Memory Generation Cues 
A list of 30 common negative words served as the source for finding 8 cue 
words for each participant, which were subsequently used to elicit negative 
memories (see Appendix H). The 30 words were drawn from a larger list of 
words with known negative valence from previous research on emotion and 
memory (see Barnier, Conway, Speyer, Mayoh, & Avizmil (in press); Cloitre, 
1998; Myers, Brewin, & Powers, 1998). The decision to select from 30 possible 
cues was made to ensure that cues could be individualized to each participant. 
That is, while the cue word “failure” may elicit memories for some participants, 
it may not for others. Thus, the experimenter could select different words when 
participants reported that no memory had been evoked by a given cue word. The 
memory cues were presented verbally in random order and responses from 
participants in the form of a 5 to 15-word description were recorded on a 
memory record form (see Appendix I).  
The decision to have participants generate 32 memories was based on 
several factors. First, previous research in DF indicted that 20 to 48 items (see 
MacLeod, 1998 for a review), which could then be divided equally among 
instruction conditions, would be sufficient to avoid floor and ceiling effects. 
Similar to DF research, the only 3 studies of RIF using autobiographic memories 
utilized a memory set of 20 (Joslyn & Oakes, 2005) to 30 (Barnier et al., 2004). 
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Subsequent pilot work prior to conducting the present study suggested that 32 
memories would yield optimal results in terms of avoiding possible floor and 
ceiling effects.  
2.3.3 Memory and Cue-word Characteristics  
Participants rated each memory generated by a memory cue for emotional 
valence (to ensure that participants judged each memory to be at least somewhat 
negative) using a 2-item self-report scale (see Appendix J). In addition 
participants provided their age (in years) at the time the memory occurred. The 
measure of clarity and negativity was researcher generated based on the 
previous work of Barnier et al. (2004). The cue-words used to generate memories 
were also rated by participants in terms of how negative each cue word was 
using the same negativity scale (see Appendix K).  
2.3.4 Memory Generation Time  
The time to generate a total of 32 memories was tracked using a standard 
stop watch with hours, minutes, and seconds. Time was rounded to the nearest 
second. Generation time began after the first memory elicitation cue was 
presented and included the time it took for the researcher to prompt participants 
to be specific in their memories (e.g., If participants said, “I felt like a failure for 6 
months,” the experimenter responded with, “provide a specific time and place 
when you felt like a failure”). The total time to generate the set of 32 memories 
was recorded. 
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2.3.5 Mental Control 
2.3.5.1 Perceived mental control. To assess the degree to which 
individuals perceive they have good mental control over cognitive content, the 
Control of Unwanted Thoughts Scale (CUTS; Rhyno, Clark, & Purdon, 2003) was 
used (see Appendix C). The CUTS is a 40–item self-report scale designed as an 
indicator of poor mental control by assessing individual beliefs about mental 
control abilities. Participants respond to each item by circling the appropriate 
Likert value representing the extent to which they agree or disagree with each 
self-statement (4 = strongly agree and 0 = disagree/not applicable). Higher 
scores indicate poorer perception of mental control. The CUTS is a newly 
developed measure with a reported reliability alpha of .97 for college samples 
(Rhyno, Clark, & Purdon, 2003; 2004; 2005). The alpha coefficient for this study 
was .95. 
2.3.5.2 Mental control strategy. To assess the specific mental control strategies 
individuals in the present study tended to adopt, the Thought Control 
Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994; see Appendix D) was used. The TCQ 
is a 30-item self-report measure of mental control strategies in which participants 
respond to each item on a Likert scale (1 = never, and 4 = almost always) as to the 
frequency they use each technique described in each item (see Appendix D). The 
CUTS and TCQ are highly correlated instruments (Rhyno, Clark, & Purdon, 
2003). The TCQ measures strategies that can be used to control unpleasant and 
unwanted thoughts. The TCQ consists of 30 items which yield 5 subscales: 
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distraction (e.g. “I do something that I enjoy”; alpha = 0.82), social control (e.g. “I 
ask my friends if they have similar thoughts”; alpha = 0.81), worry (e.g. “I focus 
on different negative thoughts”; alpha = 0.78), punishment (e.g. “I punish myself 
for thinking the thought”; alpha = 0.69), and re-appraisal (e.g. “I try to reinterpret 
the thought”; alpha =0.67). The distraction subscale reflects both cognitive and 
behavioral distraction, while the social control subscale reflects seeking social 
validation about the thought by speaking with others. The Worry subscale is 
indicative of invoking alternative cognitions to worry about as a means to cope 
with negative thoughts. Items on the Punishment subscale reflect the use of self-
criticism as a coping strategy. Last, the Reappraisal subscale contains items 
describing adaptive methods for coping with distress produced by unwanted 
thoughts. The internal consistency appears good, with alphas ranging from .64 to 
.79 across the five subscales (Reynolds & Wells, 1999; Wells & Davies, 1994). 
Subscale scores range from 6 to 24 with higher scores indicating the more 
preferred mental control strategy. No full-scale score is used. The TCQ 
demonstrated good reliability with individuals aged 18 to 75 years from a 
normative sample (Reynolds & Wells, 1999). The coefficient alpha for the present 
study ranged from .67 to .81 (see sub-scale coefficients noted above). 
2.3.5.3 Rumination. To assess the extent to which participants ruminate in 
response to a sad mood, the Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS; Conway, et al. 
2000) was used (see Appendix E). The RSS is a 13-item self report measure of the 
tendency to ruminate on sadness. Participants are asked to respond to each item 
90 
in terms of the degree to which each statement applies to them. Each item is 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 = not at all and 5 = very much. Higher 
scores indicate the tendency to ruminate. Alpha coefficients for previous samples 
of healthy adults and college samples were .90 and .91, respectively (Conway, et 
al., 2000). The reliability for the present sample was .89. 
2.4 Procedure 
2.4.1 Memory Generation Phase 
  All participants were provided with a document outlining the purpose of 
the study, expectations of participants, and participant rights (see Appendix A). 
Participants indicated informed consent by signing the consent form and were 
also provided with their own copy. Participants then completed the 
demographic questionnaire. Participants were thanked for their participation, 
debriefed, and compensated accordingly if they indicated they were currently 
seeing a mental health professional and did not wish to continue. This 
exclusionary criterion was in place to minimize the potential risk that 
participating in a study on negative memories might somehow interfere with 
ongoing treatment. Next participants completed the CES-D, the single item mood 
check, and the PANAS.  Once the self-report measures were completed, 
participants engaged in a memory retrieval procedure using the cue-word free 
association method (Crivitz & Schiffman, 1974). Instructions were given as 
follows: 
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“I am going to say out loud some cue words one at a time from this list. After I 
say each word, I would like you to try to think of a specific memory that somehow 
relates to the cue word I have said. By specific memory, I mean a specific event or 
experience that happened to you on a given date or time in a specific place. It can 
be as recent as yesterday or as far back in your childhood as you can remember. 
Once you have the memory in your mind, I want you to tell me about it in a 
sentence. I am not interested in how your memory relates to the cue word. The 
cue words are there to help you generate specific memories. Please tell me if you 
are unable to think of a specific memory for any word and we will try the next 
word. For example, I might say the word ‘failure’ to you. After I say failure, you 
might think for a second and say,’ picking up my geology paper and seeing the ‘F’ 
marked in red.’ I am going to repeat the words several times and each time I do I 
would like a different memory for the same word. For example, the next time I say 
failure, you might say,’ trying out for the football team and not making the cut.’ 
Any questions? Okay, the first cue word is ____” 
  A timer was set after the delivery of instructions, questions from the 
participant, and delivery of the first cue word. The memory exemplar description 
was recorded on the memory record sheet by the researcher and re-read to the 
participant to confirm accurate reflection of the memory. Once the memory was 
recorded participants were asked to select one word (a personal word – e.g., 
“exam”) that would help them remember the event. This word was also recorded 
on the record sheet. Following each specific memory generated, participants 
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were asked how old they were when the memory happened. In addition, 
participants were given a self-report 5-point Likert scale with instructions to rate 
their memory for its degree of negative affect (“how negative was this 
memory?”; 1 = extremely negative, 5 = not very negative at all) and the clarity of 
the memory (“How clear in your mind is this memory?”; 1 = not very clear, 5 = 
extremely clear) (Barnier et al., 2004). 
  The process of cue word, memory exemplar generation, rating for 
negativity and clarity of each specific memory, and providing an approximate 
age continued until participants had generated 4 specific memories to 8 words on 
the cue word list. The timer continued to track time until all 32 specific memories 
were generated and rated. Participants were not told that memories were to be 
negative nor that they must generate a certain number of memories to control for 
any affect that knowing how many memories they would have to generate or 
prior knowledge of valence (negative tone of memories) might have on their 
mood or on performance. At the end of this process, participants completed 
another single-item mood check and the PANAS. Finally, the cue words used to 
generate memories were rated by participants for the degree of negativity (e.g., 
“How negative was the word ________?” 1 = very negative, to 5 = not very 
negative at all). 
 If participants were unable to generate an initial memory to a cue word 
presented for the first time, a subsequent cue word was used. To control for the 
possibility that memories may not be specific enough across all groups, 
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participants were prompted to provide details if the initial reporting of a 
memory was deemed too vague or non-specific by the researcher (e.g., when 
participants did not provide a memory from a specific time or place in their 
lives). Participants were reminded of their scheduled appointment for phase 2, 
which was to occur within 3 to 7 days of participation in phase 1. This delay was 
based on the minimum requirement of 3 days to reproduce memory sets into a 
power point presentation (see description below) and based-on participants own 
schedule of availability. 
2.4.2 Induced-forgetting Phase 
 Individual sets of memories were then prepared according to DF-item, 
DF-list, or RIF procedures using a power point presentation format in 24 or 28 
font so that the presentation of memories fit the width of the screen on no more 
than two lines. Participants provided the researcher with their individualized 
code from Phase 1 and then, the corresponding power point presentation was 
presented. Prior to presentation of the induced-forgetting paradigm, informed 
consent from Phase 1 of the present study was reviewed. Participants then 
completed a measure of depressive symptoms (CES-D) at the beginning of the 
second phase followed by measures of sadness and general negative and positive 
mood (PANAS). Participants were then engaged in one of three induced-
forgetting procedures.  
 In all conditions participants were told that they would be shown 
combinations of the cue word – personal word – and memory exemplar on a 
94 
computer screen (e.g., “illness”- “food” – “I got food poisoning”). These 
combinations were an individualized list of the personal negative memories 
elicited by the same participants from phase 1.  An additional 8 non-memory 
combinations were added as filler items designed to control for the primacy and 
recency effects that typically occur in recall tasks (Ashcroft, 2006). Filler items 
were taken from the demographic questionnaire.  
 Combinations (e.g., “illness”- “food” – “I got food poisoning”) were 
presented on a 19-inch flat screen computer monitor in a quiet laboratory. The 
following instructions were provided to each participant in the RIF paradigm:  
You will now be presented with the cue – personal word – memory exemplar 
pairings elicited during the previous phase of the study. The pairings will appear 
and remain on screen for 10 seconds, followed by a blank screen for 2 seconds. 
Your task is to study these pairings and attempt to form a connection between the 
cue, personal word and memory exemplar. Any Questions? As each pairing 
appears on the screen, I will read it out loud. Try to form a connection in your 
mind.   
 After completion of the presented list of combinations for study, 
participants in the RIF paradigm condition engaged in retrieval-practice. 
Individuals were told that they would be presented with some of the memory 
cue-personal exemplar pairs and would be asked to retrieve (say out loud) the 
correct personal memory example (e.g., “illness” – “food” – “????”). This 
retrieval practice process continued for three consecutive trials (all participants 
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demonstrated 100 percent accuracy in retrieval on the first trial and on all 
subsequent trials).  
 The portion of the list selected for retrieval practice for RIF was generated 
based on previous ratings of negativity obtained during phase 1 to ensure even 
distribution of negativity, clarity, and age of memory across Rp+, RP-, and NRP 
categories. Participants were given 12 seconds from the time each item appeared 
on the screen to report the correct memory before the next category cue-personal 
exemplar pair appeared. The participant indicated that the correct exemplar had 
been retrieved by saying “yes” at which time the experimenter asked for the 
memory phrase. Participants continued for three retrieval-practice trials. After 
completing the RIF retrieval practice, participants were given the distractor task 
(see Appendix L) in which they were asked to spend the next three minutes 
crossing out all of the vowels in a visual search task. Finally, the cue words were 
presented on screen, randomly one at a time, and participants were asked to 
recall (write down) all the personal words and memory exemplars associated 
with each cue. Primacy and recency were also controlled by presenting 4 filler 
cues at the beginning of the recall task followed by the target cue words, 
followed again by 4 filler cues. Each word was presented on the screen and 
remained for 60 seconds at which time a bell sounded indicating that the next 
cue word had appeared.  
 For participants in the DF-item paradigm, the following instructions were 
given: 
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You will now be presented with the cue – personal word – memory exemplar 
pairings elicited during your last visit. The pairings will appear and remain on 
screen for 10 seconds. After each pairing you will be instructed to either 
REMEMBER or FORGET the pairings you just saw. The word REMEMBER 
or FORGET will appear on the screen following each pairing presentation. If a 
FORGET cue appears then you should forget those pairings but if a 
REMEMBER cue appears you will need to remember the pairings for a test of 
recall at the end of the experiment. Any Questions? As each pairing appears on 
the screen, I will read it out loud. 
 Each DF-item combination (e.g., “illness”- “food” – “I got food poisoning) 
appeared for 10 seconds and was then followed by a cue to either “forget” or 
“remember.” The “forget” or “remember” instruction remained on the screen for 
2 seconds before the next combination appeared. Participants were then given a 
filler task (visual letter search; see Appendix L) for three minutes. Upon 
completion of the filler task, participants were then given a sheet of paper and 
told that the cue words would now be presented on the screen one at a time and 
they were to provide all of the personal word-memory exemplar pairs associated 
with each cue word that they could remember regardless of whether they were 
previously told to remember or forget. The cued recall task was the same as for 
the RIF procedure outlined previously. 
 The procedure for the DF-list method was similar to the DF-item method 
with one exception. The initial instructions were as follows: 
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You will now be presented with the cue–personal word–memory pairings that were 
elicited during your last visit. Your task is to study the pairings so that you can 
remember as many as possible. The pairings will appear and remain on screen for 10 
seconds, followed by a blank screen for 2 seconds. Any Questions? As each pairing 
appears on the screen, I will read it out loud. 
After a block of 16 pairings were presented the researcher was prompted to give 
the following instruction when a blank screen appeared with a small x in the 
bottom right hand corner of the screen: 
I am sorry but I just realized that I gave you the wrong list of pairings to study! 
Forget that list. I’ll start a new list that is the one you are suppose to remember. I’m 
so sorry for all your work. Forget what you saw and try now to remember this next 
list of pairings. 
The cued-recall procedure was the same as for the DF-item method. For 
all induced-forgetting paradigms, each cue word was presented one at a time on 
the computer screen for 60 seconds. Participants were asked to write down all 
personal words and memories that they could regardless of any previous 
instructions to remember or forget (in the case of DF paradigms). A chime 
sounded to indicate that the next cue word appeared. Participants were 
instructed to take their best guess if unsure that a specific person word-memory 
matched a given cue word. Participants then completed post measures of 
positive and negative affect (PANAS) and the single item mood measure for 
sadness.  
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Further, all participants completed the self-report measures of mental 
control (CUTS, TCQ, RSS). All self-report measures were presented in a packet in 
which the order of presentation was randomized to control for possible order 
effects. In addition, half of the participants completed the measures before the 
induced-forgetting task and half completed the measures after the induced-
forgetting task and all post mood measures. Finally, when participants had 
completed the study, they were thanked for their participation, debriefed 
verbally and given a written debriefing form (see Appendix M) to take with 
them. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
3.1 Data Preparation 
Prior to analysis, the data were screened for missing values. Any cases with 
more than 10% of their total data missing were excluded from further analysis. 
Two cases met this criterion reducing the sample for analysis to 103 participants. 
For cases with less than 10% missing data, of which there were 6, mean 
substitution was used (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). Next, data were screened for 
outliers using the procedures recommended by Tabachnik and Fidell (2007). A 
score was considered a univariate outlier if the z-score was more than 3 standard 
deviations from the mean and it was discontinuous from other scores as depicted 
in a histogram. No univariate outliers were present in the data. Normality was 
evaluated through examination of the skewness and kurtosis of each variable, and 
all variables met the criteria for this assumption. 
3.2 Preliminary Analyses 
Before conducting analyses to evaluate the hypotheses stated in Chapter 1, 
preliminary analyses were conducted on gender and memory characteristics (age, 
negative valence, and clarity) for the purposes of determining group differences 
that may result in alternative explanations for predicted results. Although not a 
specific prediction of the present study, it is well established in the literature that 
women experience depression twice as frequently as their male counterparts (e.g., 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001). While there is utility in investigating gender differences 
in depression at the symptom level, Clark and Beck (1999) argued that 
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vulnerability and risk of depression may be different for men and women and 
therefore, they suggest that gender differences should be evaluated in studies of 
depression and dysphoria. Where gender differences are found, Clark and Beck 
(1999) advise the use of separate analyses by gender. To determine if differences 
on any of the variables under investigation in the present study were influenced 
by gender, independent sample t-tests with unequal N assumed comparing males 
and females were performed on each measure of mood state. Alpha was adjusted 
using a Bonferroni correction to .004 for 12 comparisons to control for the 
possibility of making a Type I Error.
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Table 2. Gender difference in measures of mood state variables. 
 Sex Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
t-value 
PA pre Time 1 Male 26.18 4.23 -2.15 
  Female 28.67 5.45  
PA post Time1 Male 25.59 4.67 -0.96 
  Female 27.25 8.50  
NA pre Time 1 Male 14.03 2.00 -1.05 
  Female 15.01 4.47  
NA post Time 1 Male 15.22 4.46 -0.43 
  Female 15.68 5.04  
PA pre Time 2 Male 23.67 5.19 -1.29 
  Female 25.47 6.55  
PA post Time 2 Male 22.04 5.36 -1.69 
  Female 24.57 7.03  
NA pre Time 2 Male 14.37 6.49 0.30 
 Female 14.03 4.31  
NA post Time 2 Male 14.41 5.40 0.31 
 Female 14.07 4.65  
CESD Time 1 Male 13.45 6.34 0.38 
 Female 16.70 8.99  
CESD Time2 Male 13.18 5.86 0.53 
  Female 14.96 6.95  
Sad (Time 1 pre) Male 1.11 .32 -2.68 
  Female 1.49 .70  
Sad (Time 1 post) Male 1.96 .77 -0.74 
  Female 2.09 .79  
Sad (Time 2 pre) Male 1.22 .43 -0.95 
  Female 1.36 .62  
Sad (Time 2 post) Male 1.52 .67 0.05 
  Female 1.51 .68  
N = 27 for males and 76 for females. 
Analyses revealed no statistically significant gender differences on any of 
the measures of mood state. Thus for subsequent analyses, the sample was 
collapsed across gender. In addition to assessing for gender differences in mood 
state, a series of independent-sample t-tests were used to examine possible group 
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differences for dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals on each of the measures 
of memory characteristics. This was an important feature of methodological 
control to ensure that memory characteristics were similar across forgetting 
paradigms (see Chapter 2). Using a Bonferroni correction, alpha was set at .02 for 3 
comparisons to control for the possibility of making a Type I Error. Results are 
displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Group differences on memory characteristics. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Means (SD) 
for Non-
dysphorics 
Means (SDs) 
for Dysphorics 
t-test 
1-tailed 
Age of memories (in years) 4.00 (1.89)   3.53 (1.82)                1.18 
Negativity of Memories 3.39 (.44)     3.58 (.45) -1.91 
Clarity of memories 3.63 (.52)     3.66 (.52)               -0.22 
Note: N=103; *p< .02* *p<.05. 
 
 There were no statistically significant differences in the average age, 
negative valence, or clarity of memories for the dysphoric group compared to the 
non-dysphoric group. Since participants were not explicitly told to produce only 
negative memories, each memory was evaluated in terms of the rating of 
negativity given by the participant. A review of frequency data showed that all 
memories were rated as 2 (somewhat negative) or higher on the 5-point scale (1 = 
not negative at all and 5 = extremely negative). The average valence of the set of 32 
memories was assessed to ensure that all participants were in fact, generating 
negative memories. For the entire sample, the mean valance rating was M = 3.47, 
SD = .45, (1 = not negative at all and 5 = extremely negative). Thus, all memories 
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used were deemed to have met the criterion of being negative in emotional 
valence. 
To determine the extent to which the two mood groups (i.e., dysphoric 
versus non-dysphoric) may have differed on any of the individual difference 
factors, a series of independent sample t-tests were conducted using a Bonferroni 
adjustment of alpha to .007 for the phase 1 variables and .004 for the phase 2 
variables. Table 4 represents the means, standard deviations, and t-values by 
mood group. 
Table 4. Group differences in study variables. 
 Non-dysphoric Dysphoric  
 Mean SD Mean SD t-value 
PA pre Time 1 28.32 5.27 27.69 5.37 0.59 
PA post Time1 27.65 9.18 25.92 5.94 1.12 
NA pre Time 1 13.57 2.48 16.00 5.19 -3.02* 
NA post Time 1 15.37 4.49 15.77 5.39 -0.43 
Sad (Time 1 pre) 1.17 0.43 1.63 0.76 -3.79** 
Sad (Time 1 post) 1.94 0.75 2.18 0.81 -1.56 
CESD Time 1 9.54 3.46 22.58 6.91 -12.90** 
PA pre Time 2 25.18 6.05 24.68 6.65 0.39 
PA post Time 2 24.88 6.59 22.24 6.67 1.95 
NA pre Time 2 13.38 4.14 15.40 5.94 -2.02 
NA post Time 2 13.06 3.70 16.03 5.92 -3.13* 
Sad (Time 2 pre) 1.19 0.44 1.53 0.69 -2.85 
Sad (Time 2 post) 1.36 0.62 1.74 0.69 -2.73 
CESD Time2 10.49 3.79 21.40 4.66 -12.95** 
CUTS 45.33 19.42 63.29 24.12 -4.13** 
TCQ-Social 16.71 3.18 17.03 4.67 -0.42 
TCQ- Punish 9.10 2.18 9.56 2.69 -0.95 
TCQ-Worry 9.96 2.41 11.47 3.19 -2.72 
TCQ-Distract 15.71 2.90 14.42 2.30 2.34 
TCQ-Appraisal 13.29 2.55 15.11 3.49 -3.02 
RSS 30.64 7.67 39.00 8.64 -5.09** 
n = 52 for non-dysphoric and 49 for dysphoric. *p < .01; **p<.00
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 As expected, those in the dysphoric group evidenced a higher degree of 
sadness at Phase 1 prior to beginning memory generation. This difference 
disappeared upon completion of the memory generations phase. The two groups 
were similar in affect (sadness, NA, and PA) through Phase 2 of the study. In 
addition, the two groups differed on the level of perceived mental control and 
ruminative coping in response to sadness during the second phase of the study. 
Thus, participants in the dysphoric group perceived themselves as poor at 
controlling mental activity and were more likely to ruminate on their sadness, 
than the non-dysphoric group. Finally, CES-D scores used to categories the two 
mood groups for both phases of the study statistically differentiated the dysphoric 
from non-dysphoric groups. Therefore, having evaluated the differences related to 
gender, memory characteristics, and mood state, the primary analyses is now 
reported. 
3.3 Memory Generation 
 It was predicted that individuals who were dysphoric would be faster at 
generating a set of negative autobiographic memories (Hypothesis 1). To test this 
hypothesis, an independent-sample t-test was used in which mood served as the 
independent variable with 2 levels (non-dysphoric or those whose CES-D scores 
were less than 16, and dysphoric or those whose CES-D scores were 16 or greater 
for Phase 1) and total time to generate 32 autobiographic memories served as the 
dependent variable. Mean scores on the average time to generate a set of 32 
memories between the two groups are reported in Table 5. Although individuals 
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in the dysphoric group were faster at generating the set of memories, there was no 
statistically significant support for this proposition, t (99) = .989, p = .16 with the 
chance of detecting differences (power = 1 - error probability) at .80. Individuals 
who were dysphoric took a similar amount of time to produce 32 memories as 
individuals who were non-dysphoric.  
Table 5. Means and standard deviations for total time to generate a negative 
memory set. 
Group Mean (seconds) Standard Deviation    N 
Non-dysphoric 2697.21 441.05 54 
Dysphoric 2611.34 430.61 49 
 
3.3.1 The Mood Inducing Effect of the Memory Generation Task 
 Several researchers have suggested that the act of generating negative 
thoughts and memories may be in and of itself a mood inducing activity (see 
Clark, Beck, & Ashford, 1999 for a review). Although not a specific hypothesis of 
this study, it is possible that the lack of support for the predicted difference in 
memory generation time may relate to the fact that mood induction took place as a 
result of the task. Therefore, three post-hoc paired-sample t-tests were conducted 
using a Bonferroni correction setting alpha at .02, to determine if there were 
differences on the pre and post measures of mood, including an increase in 
sadness as indicated by the single-item sadness measure, a decrease in positive 
affect (PA), and an increase in negative affect (NA), which would then suggest 
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that negative autobiographic memory generation had the unintentional affect of 
inducing a negative mood state. 
On the single-item measure of sadness, there was a statistically significant 
difference between self-report ratings of sadness for pre-test (M = 1.39, SD = .65) 
and post-test, (M = 2.10, SD = .79), t(102) = -7.52, p = .001, suggesting that for all 
participants, self-report sadness increased after completing the memory 
generation task. In terms of general negative affect (NA), the difference between 
the pre-test of the PANAS Negative Affect (NA) subscale (M = 14.76, SD = 4.15) 
and post-test (M = 15.57, SD = 4.88), t(102) = -1.76, p = .04, power (1 -  = .99, 
approached statistical significance suggesting that participants experienced an 
increase in general negative mood state after completing the memory generation 
task. Mean scores on the PANAS Positive Affect subscale showed a significant 
drop from pre-test (M = 28.02, SD = 5.25) to post-test (M = 26. 81, SD = 7.69), and 
this difference was statistically significant t(102) = 1.81, p = .02, 1 -  = .99. This 
suggests that all participants experienced a decrease in the degree of positive 
affect after completing the memory generation task.  
3.4 Evaluating the Effect of Mood on Paradigm Efficacy 
As stated in the introductory chapter of the present study, there are several 
differences between DF and RIF in terms of the forgetting components. For 
example, DF and RIF differ in that DF comprises a to-be-remembered component 
(RR) and a to-be forgotten component (RF), the difference of which represents the 
directed-forgetting effect. In contrast, RIF is comprised of three components, Rp+, 
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Rp-, and NRP in which the difference between Rp- and NRP component scores 
represents forgetting, and the difference between Rp+ and NRP represent the 
effect of practice. The primary analysis used to assess forgetting in each paradigm 
was the R component of DF as synonymous with NRP and the F component of DF 
as synonymous with Rp-.  
To test hypotheses 2 through 8 (see Chapter 1), a 2 (mood) by 3 (paradigm) 
by 2 (instruction) mixed factorial ANOVAs was used. There was 1 within-subject 
variable (instruction) in which participants served as their own controls with 2 
levels: experimental (E) and baseline (B) condition. The baseline condition was the 
proportion of words remembered when told to remember (RR) for DF or the 
unpracticed unrelated list of memories in RIF (denoted as NRP). The experimental 
condition was the number of words remembered when told to forget (RF) for DF 
or the related but unpracticed list of memories in RIF (denoted by Rp- for RIF). 
There were also 2 between-subjects independent variables: mood state with 2 
levels: non-dysphoric and dysphoric; and forgetting paradigm with 3 levels: 
directed forgetting–item (DF-item) method, directed forgetting–list (DF-List) 
method, and retrieval induced-forgetting (RIF) method. The dependent variable 
was the number of memories remembered at recall. 
 Table 6 shows the means and standard deviations for each group. Effect 
sizes were also reported for these analyses because of the importance to future 
studies aimed at evaluating the clinical utility of forgetting as an intervention. 
Previous effect sizes in the literature indicate a moderate effect for forgetting 
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paradigm efficacy (see Barnier, et al., 2004; Joslyn & Oakes, 2005). All effect sizes 
are reported using partial eta-squared (ηp2) because a partial eta is not influenced 
by the number and significance of other independent variables in the research 
design (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Finally, of the participants who completed the 
initial CES-D for the purposes of grouping, the second administration revealed 
that 17 participants (19 percent) who were dysphoric at phase 1 were non-
dysphoric at phase 2 and 7 participants (8 percent) who were non-dysphoric at 
phase 1 were dysphoric at phase 2. An evaluation of differences in measures of 
sadness, negative, and positive affect prior to and following the induced-
forgetting paradigm procedure were not statistically significant suggesting that 
induced-forgetting did not alter mood-state. 
Table 6. Means and standard deviations for the 2 by 3 by 2 ANOVA. 
   Paradigm  
Mood Instruction  
DF-Item DF-List RIF 
Non 
Dysphoric 
Control Condition 
 
Exp. Condition 
61.01 (15.30) 
N=21 
57.14 (16.57) 
58.92 (13.13) 
N=14 
55. 35 (21.77) 
59.21 (22.57) 
N=19 
48.03 (24.74) 
 
Dysphoric 
Control Condition 
 
Exp. Condition 
57.95 (18.34) 
N=11 
60.79 (16.79) 
56.25 (22.82) 
N=13 
63.46 (17.27) 
59.37 (17.46) 
N=14 
58.39 (19.25) 
SD or standard deviations are in brackets 
 It was predicted that there would be a significant 3-way interaction among 
instruction, mood, and paradigm in which RIF would produce the largest 
forgetting effect even for individuals who are dysphoric (Hypothesis 2). That is, 
the forgetting effect for each paradigm would depend on whether participants are 
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dysphoric. The 3-way interaction among paradigm, mood, and condition was not 
significant, F (2, 86) = .109, p = .897, ηp2 =.003. The observed power was .07. A 
sample size of more than 1152 participants would be required to detect the small 
effect found for this 3-way interaction.  
 It was predicted that the effect of mood state on the amount of forgetting 
will depend on the paradigm used (Hypothesis 3). It was expected that the 
amount of forgetting would be highest for non-dysphoric individuals in the RIF 
paradigm compared to both non-dysphorics in the DF paradigm and dysphorics 
in the RIF and DF paradigms. The DF effect would not be demonstrated for the 
dysphoric group compared to their non-dysphoric counterparts but that RIF 
would produce a significant forgetting effect for the dysphoric group. The 2-way 
interaction between mood and paradigm was not statistically significant, F (2, 86) 
= 1.26, p = .288, ηp2 =.03. The observed power was .73. That is, the efficacy of the 
paradigm used did not depend on whether individuals were dysphoric. 
Forgetting paradigms were no more effective for non-dysphoric individuals than 
for dysphoric individuals. 
 It was also predicted that the effect of mood on memory would depend on 
whether individuals were told to remember (RR and NRP) or forget (RF and Rp-) 
(Hypothesis 4). The interaction of instruction by mood was significant, F (2, 86) = 
5.32, p = .024, ηp2 =.06, power = .96. The within-subjects scores for amount of 
forgetting for the non-dysphoric group were higher in the remember condition 
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(RR and NRP) than in the forget condition (RF and Rp-) compared to the 
dysphoric group. 
 To determine which groups accounted for the difference, a post hoc 
analysis was conducted. To control for a possibly inflated Type I error rate, the 
alpha levels were set at .01 for 4 comparisons. Using independent sample t-tests, 
comparisons were made to contrast the two mood groups on how much was 
remembered in the baseline condition (RR or NRP), M = 59.83, SD = 17.45, for the 
non-dysphoric group and, M = 57.89, SD = 19.21, for dysphoric group. The groups 
did not differ significantly, t(90) = .496, p = .307. Similarly, no statistically 
significant difference was found between the non-dysphoric group, M = 59.83, SD 
= 17.45, and the non-dysphoric group, M = 57.89, SD = 19.21, on amount 
remembered in the experimental condition, t(90) =-1.87, p = .03. To determine if 
differences exist between baseline, M = 53.47, SD = 21.08, and experimental 
conditions, M = 59.84, SD = 17.45, for non-dysphoric group, a paired sample t-test 
was used. The difference was significant, t(54) = -2.57, p = .007. In addition, a 
comparison was made between baseline, M = 61.02, SD = 17.52, and experimental 
conditions, M = 57.89, SD = 19.20, for the dysphoric mood group. There was no 
significant difference in scores, t(38) = .96, p = .171. As Figure 2 represents, 
individuals who were dysphoric recalled more memories in the experimental 
condition, M = 59.46, SD = 2.71, than individuals who were not dysphoric, M = 
56.61, SD = 2.35. The observed power was .27.  
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Figure 2. The mood by instruction interaction. 
 
 It was also predicted that the effect of paradigm on the amount 
remembered would depend on the instruction given (Hypothesis 5). Table 7 
shows the means and standard deviations for each condition. No statistically 
significant 2-way interaction was found for instruction by paradigm, F (2, 86) = 
1.26, p = .288, effect size, ηp2 =.183. The observed power was .27.  
Table 7. Means and standard deviations for each paradigm by instruction 
condition. 
  Paradigm  
Condition 
DF-Item DF-List RIF 
Baseline Condition 
  
 Exp. Condition 
59.96 (16.18) 
   N=32 
58.38 (16.47) 
57.63 (18.12) 
     N=27 
59. 25 (19.79) 
59.28 (18.11) 
      N=33 
56.58 (19.95) 
Standard Deviation in brackets 
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 It was predicted that the amount of memories recalled from the to-be 
remembered category would be higher than the amount of memories recalled 
from the to-be-forgotten category (Hypothesis 6). The 2 (mood) by 3 (paradigm) 
by 2 (instruction) mixed factorial ANOVA yielded no significant main effect for 
instruction, F (1, 86) = .543, p = .46, effect size, ηp2 =.06, and the observed power 
was .11. Thus, participants recalled similar amounts of memories regardless of 
whether they were to-be-remembered versus to-be-forgotten. The number of 
participants needed to achieve sufficient power to detect this small effect would be 
318.  
 It was also predicted that the amount of forgetting would be higher for the 
non-dysphoric group than the dysphoric group (Hypothesis 7) and that the 
forgetting paradigm used would affect the amount of forgetting that occurs 
(Hypothesis 8). The RIF paradigm was predicted to produce the greatest amount 
of forgetting compared to either DF-item or DF-list. Contrary to these predictions, 
the main effects of mood state and forgetting paradigm were not statistically 
significant, F (1, 86) = .241, p = .786, and F (1, 86) = .638, p = .427, respectively. That 
is, the dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants were similar in terms of the 
amount remembered, and the paradigm they were asked to use did not affect how 
much was remembered. The observed power was also low (.09 for mood and .12 
for paradigm, respectively) suggesting a significantly larger sample (510 
participants) would be required in order to increase the chances of detecting these 
small effects.  
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3.4.1 Exploratory Analysis of Mood and Individual Paradigms 
To determine if the lack of power to detect differences in the previous 
analyses hinder the ability to demonstrate the robust forgetting effects, Directed 
Forgetting was analyzed separately from RIF using a 2 (mood) by 2 (instruction) 
mixed factorial ANOVA. The between-subjects variable, mood state, was defined 
in the same way as the previous ANOVA, at two levels (dysphoric and non-
dysphoric). The within-subjects variable, instruction, also had two levels (R for to-
be-remembered memories and F for to-be-forgotten memories). Analysis failed to 
find a main effect for mood, F (1, 57) =.15, p = .689, effect size, ηp2 =.01, and 
observed power = .07. There was no significant main effect for instruction, F (1, 57) 
=.13, p = .719, effect size, ηp2 =.01, and observed power =.07. The interaction 
between mood and instruction approached significance, F (1, 57) = 2.93, p = .09, for 
a moderate effect size, ηp2 =.05. The observed power was .93. The amount of 
forgetting that could be induced using a directed-forgetting paradigm would 
likely depend on whether individuals were dysphoric or not. 
Retrieval-induced Forgetting (RIF) was analyzed using a 2 (mood) by 3 
(instruction) mixed factorial ANOVA. The between-subjects variable, mood was 
defined in the same way as the previous ANOVA at two levels (dysphoric and 
non-dysphoric). The within-subjects variable instruction had three levels (Rp+, 
Rp-, and NRP). There was a significant main effect for instruction, F (1, 31) = 10.71, 
p = .003, effect size, ηp2 =.26, and observed power = .89. There was no significant 
effect of mood, F (1, 31) =.58, p = .452, effect size, ηp2 =.02, and observed power = 
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.39. There was no significant interaction between mood and instruction, F (1, 31) 
=.01, p = .933, effect size, ηp2 =.01, and observed power was .05. Given the 
moderate effect size reported in previous studies, a sample size of 66 participants 
would be needed to detect differences. 
Since the main effect of instruction was significant, 2 paired-sample one-
tailed t-tests (one t-test comparing Rp+ to NRP, the practice effect; and one t-test 
comparing NRP to Rp-, the forgetting effect) were conducted to determine which 
pair accounted for the difference. A Bonferroni correction was used to set alpha at 
.03 for 2 comparisons. The Rp+/NRP difference was significant, t(32) = 4.66, p = 
.000. Participants recalled significantly more memories from the retrieval practice 
list (Rp+; M =72.75, SD = 15.11) than from the unrelated and unpractised (NRP) 
list of memories (NRP; M = 59.82, SD = 20.52). The NRP/Rp- difference 
approached significance, t(32) = -1.92, p = .03. Participants recalled more memories 
from the unrelated and unpractised list of memories (NRP; M = 59.82, SD = 20.52) 
than from a related but unpractised list of memories (Rp-; M = 52.65, SD = 22.91). 
Power for these analyses was .87. 
3.5 Examining the RIF Practice Effect 
As previously stated, there are several differences between DF and RIF in 
terms of the forgetting components. The third component of RIF is used in 
comparison with the other two to demonstrate a practice effect. To determine if 
the same results comparing DF and RIF would be found when the practice effect 
components (NRP and Rp+) of RIF are used in analyses instead of the forgetting 
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effect components, a second 2 (mood) by 3 (paradigm) by 2 (instruction) mixed 
factorial ANOVA in which the practice effect of RIF was examined in comparison 
to DF-list and DF-item forgetting effects. For this second ANOVA, there were two 
between-subjects independent variables: mood state with 2 levels: non-dysphoric 
and dysphoric; and forgetting paradigm with 3 levels: directed forgetting – item 
method (DF-item), directed forgetting – list method (DF-List), and retrieval 
induced-forgetting (RIF) method. The dependent variable was the number of 
memories remembered at recall. For the within-subjects variable (instruction), the 
baseline condition was the proportion of words remembered when told to 
remember (RR) for DF or the list of memories designated for retrieval practice in 
RIF (denoted as Rp+). The experimental condition was the number of words 
remembered when told to forget (RF) for DF or the related but unpracticed list of 
memories in RIF (denoted by Rp- for RIF). 
 A 3-way interaction among paradigm, mood, and condition was not 
significant. The observed power was .056 and a sample size of more than 1000 
participants would be required to provide the power necessary to detect a small 
effect size (.01). A statistically significant 2-way interaction was found for 
instruction by paradigm, F (2, 86) = 4.86, p = .01, effect size, ηp2 =.10. The observed 
power was .79. Table 8 shows the means and standard deviations for each group.  
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Table 8. Means and standard deviations for the each paradigm using the practice 
effect component of RIF. 
  Paradigm  
Condition 
DF-Item DF-List RIF 
Baseline Condition 
  
 Exp. Condition 
59.57 (16.18) 
   N=32 
58.38 (16.47) 
57.64 (18.13) 
     N=27 
58. 39 (19.79) 
72.73 (15.11) 
      N=33 
59.28 (20.25) 
Standard Deviations in brackets 
 Post hoc analysis revealed that the difference between the Rp+ and NRP 
components (the practice effect) in RIF accounted for this significant interaction, 
t(32) = 3.35, p = .002. No other predicted 2-way interactions were significant. 
 A main effect that approached significance was found for the instruction F 
(1, 86) = 3.17, p = .078, effect size, ηp2 =.04, and the observed power was (.42). That 
is, more to-be-remembered memories (RR and Rp+) were remembered at recall 
than to-be-forgotten memories (RF and NRP). The main effect of mood state was 
not statistically significant, F (1, 86) = .169, p = .682 with no power (.002) to detect 
the effect (.002). A sample size of 250 participants would provide the power (.80) 
needed to demonstrate this small effect. The effect of forgetting paradigm on the 
amount remembered approached significance, F (1, 86) = 2.56, p = .083. That is, 
participants differed on amount remembered at recall as a result of the paradigm 
they were asked to use. The observed power was moderate (.50) for a small effect 
size (.06). 
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3.6 Relations between Mental Control Variables and Forgetting 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggested that regression analysis requires a 
sample size of N equal to or greater than 50 plus 8 times the number of predictors, 
in order to test multiple predictions. In addition, testing individual IVs requires an 
N equal to or greater than 104 plus the number of predictors. The sample size for 
the current study failed to meet these recommendations. Thus, Pearson 
correlations were used to evaluate Hypotheses 9 through 17 (see Chapter 1). A 
summary of descriptive data for the mental control factors, perceived mental 
control, rumination, and mental control strategy (i.e., distraction, social control, re-
appraisal, worry, punishment) are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9. Descriptive data for mental control variables. 
 
 DISTRACT PUNISH 
RE- 
APPRAISE WORRY SOCIAL RSS CUTS 
Mean 15.26 9.31 13.96 10.47 16.80 33.69 51.95 
Std. D 2.96 2.56 3.28 3.01 3.97 9.65 24.63 
Min 9.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 9.00 15.00 6.00 
Max 23.00 19.00 23.00 18.00 27.00 59.00 130.00 
N=92 
To evaluate the relationship among mental control variables and memory 
generation time, Pearson correlations were calculated (see Table 10). It was 
predicted that higher scores indicating poor perceived mental control over 
cognitions and higher scores on self-report rumination would be associated with 
faster memory generation time (Hypotheses 9 and 10, respectively). Contrary to 
these predictions, there was no significant correlation among these mental control 
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variables and generation time. Similarly, there was no significant relationship 
between any specific strategy and generation time (Hypothesis 11). 
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Table 10. Correlations among mental control variables and generation time. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Generation Time 
2. Dysphoria 
3. Mental Control 
4. Distraction 
5. Punishment 
6. Reappraisal 
7. Worry 
8. Social 
9. Rumination 
 
-.09 
 .11 
-.02 
-.01 
 .02 
-.13 
 .14 
-.06 
 
  
 .447** 
-.188* 
 .051 
 .093  
.323** 
 .011 
.320** 
 
 
 
-.062 
.473** 
.437** 
.522** 
.200*  
.638** 
 
 
 
 
.014 
.036 
.010 
.010 
-.133 
 
 
 
 
 
.261* 
.436** 
.040 
.294* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.221* 
.391** 
.456** 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
.024 
.598** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.086 
Note: N= 92; * = p < .05; ** = p < .001 
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To evaluate the direction and strength of the relationship between the 
individual mental control variables and degree of forgetting (Hypotheses 12 
through 14) Pearson Product Moment correlations were used. The degree of 
forgetting was analyzed separately for the DF and RIF paradigms to determine if 
the same mental control variables that were associated with one paradigm would 
also be associated with the other. Degree of forgetting was operationalised as the 
R minus F difference for the DF method of induced-forgetting (see Table 11 for 
correlations). 
Table 11. Correlations among mental control variables and degree of forgetting 
in the DF Paradigm. 
 Degree of 
Forgetting 
1. Dysphoria 
2. Mental Control 
3. Distraction 
4. Punishment 
5. Reappraisal 
6. Worry 
7. Social 
8. Rumination 
-.20* 
  -.25** 
 .14 
 .05 
 .01 
 .03 
-.03 
    -.22** 
Note: N= 59; * = approaching sig. ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01.  
  
Level of depressive symptoms (dysphoria) was approaching a significant 
negative correlation with degree of forgetting. Individuals who were more 
dysphoric tended to forget less. As predicted, there was a statistically significant 
negative correlation between perceived mental control and degree of forgetting. 
Individuals with poor perceived mental control tended to forget less (Hypothesis 
12). In addition, rumination was significantly negatively related to the degree of 
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forgetting (Hypothesis 13). That is, individuals who ruminate tended to also 
exhibit less forgetting. No significant relationships were found between any of 
the specific mental control strategies and degree of forgetting (Hypothesis 14).  
Table 12 shows the direction and strength of relationships among the 
mental control variables and degree of forgetting for the RIF method 
(operationalised as the NRP/Rp- difference) of induced-forgetting.   
Table 12. Correlations among mental control variables and degree of forgetting 
for RIF. 
 Degree of 
Forgetting 
1. Dysphoria 
2. Mental Control 
3. Distraction 
4. Punishment 
5. Reappraisal 
6. Worry 
7. Social 
8. Rumination 
-.19 
-.21 
-.14 
 .05 
-.14 
 .07 
-.13 
-.08 
Note: N= 33 * = approaching sig. ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01.  
 It was also predicted that there would be a significant negative correlation 
between perceived mental control and degree of forgetting in RIF. Individuals 
with poor perceived mental control would forget less (Hypothesis 12). In 
addition, rumination would also be significantly negatively related to the degree 
of forgetting (Hypothesis 13). That is, individuals who ruminate would also 
exhibit less forgetting. No significant relationships were found between any of 
the specific mental control strategies and degree of forgetting (Hypothesis 14). 
Contrary to the predictions (Hypotheses 12, 13, and 14), there were no significant 
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relationships among any of the mental control variables and degree of forgetting 
in the RIF paradigm. This was also true when mental control variables were 
correlated with the practice effect of RIF (operationalised as the Rp+/NRP 
difference) as shown in Table 13 (Hypotheses 15, 16, and 17). 
Table 13. Correlations among mental control variables and RIF practice effect. 
 Practice Effect 
1. Dysphoria 
2. Mental Control 
3. Distraction 
4. Punishment 
5. Reappraisal 
6. Worry 
7. Social 
8. Rumination 
-.05 
 .12 
-.07 
 .06 
-.18 
-.13 
 .14 
 -.08 
Note: N= 33; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
The overall goals of the present study were threefold. First, the schema-
activation hypothesis (Beck, 1987) was re-evaluated in terms of expected 
differences in memory accessibility for negative autobiographic events among 
individuals who were dysphoric versus non-dysphoric.  Second, the present 
study is the first to examine the effect of mood on induced-forgetting using a 
quasi-experimental design in which 2 different induced-forgetting paradigms 
were directly compared. Third, this study explored the relationship among 
individual differences in aspects of mental control in terms of the relationship 
with memory accessibility and memory impairment. This chapter explicates the 
findings in terms of the support for specific hypotheses and implications for 
theory. Limitations are then discussed and evaluated with suggestions for 
improvements. The implications of the results of the present study are then 
discussed followed by suggestions for directions for future research in this area. 
4.1 Mood and Memory Accessibility 
 Do individuals who are dysphoric have increased access to negative 
autobiographic events? Primarily, the results of the present study indicate that 
dysphoria does not increase accessibility of negative memories. Contrary to the 
schema-activation hypothesis (Beck, 1967, 1987), which predicts a difference in 
generation time for depression, individuals who were dysphoric were not faster 
at generating a set of 32 negative memories compared to a group of non-
dysphoric counterparts. What might explain the failure to detect this difference? 
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With an aim towards improving upon previous methodology, the present 
study was designed to replicate and extend previous research by 
methodologically controlling for a number of factors that have been raised as 
important research paradigm issues (Clark et al., 1999). First, Williams (1997) 
reported that individuals who are depressed tend to report overly general 
examples of past experiences. Thus, if specificity is not controlled within the 
research paradigm, results demonstrating speedier memory retrieval times for a 
dysphoric group compared to a non-dysphoric group could simply be the result 
of the specificity versus generality difference.  
Two methodological changes were made in the present study to control 
for the tendency of depressed individuals to be less concrete. First, the 
instructions used in the present study during the memory generation task were 
designed to force participants to respond to the memory cue word with a 
memory for an event in their past from a specific date and time. Second, the 
experimenter intervened with further prompts to be specific when participants 
failed to meet this standard. This procedure differs from much of past research in 
which objective ratings of specificity followed after the completion of the 
memory generation task. That is, specificity was evaluated by the experimenter 
in the moment and participants were directed immediately to meet the criteria of 
providing a memory from a specific time and place in their lives. 
Each time a more general event was given, the experimenter prompted the 
participants to be more specific. In addition, participants in this study rated the 
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clarity of each specific memory in the memory set and no differences were found 
for clarity ratings between the two groups (dysphoric versus non-dysphoric). 
The two groups did not differ on the specificity with which they reported events 
nor how clear these events were in their own minds. If those who are dysphoric 
tend to be less concrete in providing clear descriptions of past events (e.g., 
Kuyken & Brewin, 1995), then undoubtedly when forced to be specific, dysphoric 
individuals may likely evidence longer generation time.  
The control for specificity then, while making methodological sense, may 
be a likely explanation for the failure in the present study to find differences in 
memory generation time. However, several studies have suggested that the 
phenomenon of specificity versus generality is more likely to be evidenced to a 
greater degree in the retrieval of positive memories than the retrieval of negative 
memories (e.g., Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Moore, Watts, & 
Williams, 1988). The present study did not include a category of positive 
memories and thus, no conclusions can be drawn regarding whether or not 
controlling for specificity explains the findings in the present study. 
An alternative explanation for the lack of findings in support of the 
schema-activation hypothesis (Beck, 1987) in the present study (i.e., differences in 
memory generation time due to dysphoria) may be that autobiographic memory 
generation tasks, like the word-cue method used in the present study, are in and 
of themselves mood inducing. Indeed, several studies have used autobiographic 
recollection as a mood induction technique with success (e.g., Abele & Gendolla, 
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1999; Gendolla & Krusken, 2002). Given the null findings for group differences in 
memory generation time, the present study undertook to examine this potential 
explanation in post hoc fashion. Results of the present study support the 
hypothesis that negative autobiographic memory generation is mood inducing. 
Participants in the present study evidenced increases in self-report measures of 
negative affect and sadness, as well as, self-reported decreases in positive affect 
after memory generation compared to pre-memory generation measures. This 
finding was true regardless of initial levels of self-reported depressive 
symptoms. However, one caveat to the preceding discussion warrants mention 
here. Specifically, the differences across pre and post measures of mood included 
a single-item, self-report measure of sadness. It is important to note that a single-
item scale tends to be a less sensitive and therefore not as reliable a measure. In 
addition, a single item does not necessarily capture the complexity or multi-
dimensionality of the construct of sadness. Further, such scales are open to a 
number of response biases that cannot be controlled. Thus, increases in sadness 
that may be evidence of a mood-inducing effect of negative memory generation 
should be interpreted with caution. Thus, that the present study found an 
increase in the level of sadness as reported on the single-tem scale used here is 
not necessarily indicative of an increase in a sad mood state.  
The PANAS (Watson & Clark, 1988), however, has a substantial history of 
reliability and validity (e.g., Crawford; & Henry, 2004; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) on which group differences can be based. Since the findings of 
   
127 
the present study suggest an increase in negative affect and a decrease in positive 
affect after the memory generation task, as measured by the PANAS, it is 
reasonable that the memory generation task used in the present study did affect 
mood.  
Before reviewing the remaining results of the present study a final point of 
the mood-inducing effects of negative memory generation is worth noting. In the 
present study, the focus was on the generation and forgetting of negative 
autobiographic memories, the first study of its kind. That is, no study to date has 
combined the elements of negative autobiographic memories, mood state, and 
memory to assess differences, in support of the Cognitive Theory of Depression. 
In addition, the present study is the first of its kind to examine these elements in 
the absence of positive and/or neutral memories. The decision to exclude neutral 
and positive memories is based on the literature, which suggests that the 
available cognitive content for individuals who are dysphoric is most likely, 
negative (e.g., Joorman, Hertel, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005; Renaud & McConnell, 
2002). In addition, Wessel and Hauer (in press) argue that the resulting 
comparison of negative to positive memories is not an appropriate baseline. 
Thus, it is unknown whether the finding that the memory generation task in the 
present study was mood-inducing could be a direct result of all memories 
elicited being “negative” in affective tone. Previous research in this area has 
typically included the generation of positive memories and sometimes, neutral 
memories (see Wenzel, 2005 for a review). It is possible that an inclusion of 
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positive memory retrieval category helps to negate any mood-inducing effect 
that generating negative memories might have. However, this has not been 
evaluated in previous studies. Thus, any increase in negative mood may have 
been eliminated or reduced by the production of positive memory generation, 
which might have countered the mood-inducing effects of the negative memory 
generation task. 
Finally, Dalgleish and Yiend (2006) found that under conditions of 
suppression effort (how much effort was invested in trying not to think about 
something), dysphoric individuals do evidence speedier retrieval of negative 
autobiographic memories compared to non-dysphoric controls. Since the present 
study did not actively assess for degree of suppression efforts of participants, it is 
a possible explanation for the lack of statistically significant findings.  
Blaney (1986) also theorized that differences in negative autobiographic 
memories generation may only be evidenced at the more severe end of the 
dysphoria-depression continuum.  Thus, in order to evidence a difference 
between groups on accessibility of negative memories (as defined by generation 
time), the comparison group may need to be a sample of individuals diagnosed 
with clinical depression.  
From the results of the present study a number of recommendations can 
be made with regard to future research. Future investigations into memory 
generation times should consider the nature of the memory generation task as 
potentially mood inducing. To this author’s knowledge, a sound methodological 
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approach to overcoming this potential problem does not appear to exist 
currently. However, researchers need to be aware of and plan to test for the 
presence of a mood induction when eliciting negative memories accordingly. It 
would also seem important to assess whether the inclusion of positive and/or 
neutral memory generation categories will act as a sufficient means to control (or 
wash out) the mood-inducing effects of generating only negative memories, and 
if so, researchers are encouraged to use this methodology.  
4.1.1 Limitations of the Memory Generation Task 
Is the way in which the present study operationalised memory 
accessibility (i.e., time to generate a set of memories) an adequate proxy for 
memory accessibility, particularly for individuals who are dysphoric? Past 
research has measured response latency in a cue-word memory generation task 
by timing the latency to retrieve the first specific memory generated (e.g., 
Kuyken & Brewin, 1995). Along similar lines, the average latency to retrieve 
specific memories has been calculated across multiple trials (e.g., Wenzel, 
Jackson, Brendle, & Pinna, 2003) to obtain an average time to generate a specific 
memory. However, while these studies maintained a high degree of internal 
validity, they can be criticized for failure to reflect the continuous uninterrupted 
flow of conscious thought processes that typify our cognitive reality (James, 
1950). That is, we do not think in word lists, nor do we have a single thought that 
just stops or is not connected to or evocative of other thoughts. Therefore, the 
present study argues that an average generation time of multiple trials or single 
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memory generation time does not reflect how cognitive processes and content of 
the mind actually work.  
In addition, many studies on response latency for autobiographic memory 
generation deal differently with omissions. Omissions are instances in memory 
retrieval tasks in which participants fail to generate a memory in a specific time 
period. Thus, in some cases, this time is included in the calculation of averages 
(Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1997), whereas in other studies, omissions are 
excluded from analysis (Leung & Bryant, 2000). The inclusion of omissions in 
generation time calculated in the present study are reflected in the fact that if 
participants were unable to generate a specific memory to a given cue word, the 
experimenter simply went to a different word. The relevance of cue-word 
meaning may be an important factor for participants (i.e., that the cue-word 
“guilt” may be of relatively less importance to a participant and thus would not 
trigger memories). Indeed, Rubin and Schulkind (1997) demonstrated that cue-
words that were rated as more meaningful produced faster generation times. 
While it seems that the lack of findings in support of a generation time difference 
between dysphoric and non-dyphoric groups is inconsistent with previous 
studies finding this difference (Clark & Teasdale, 1985; Teasdale & Russell, 1983; 
Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogerty, 1980; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981), it is important to 
note that these studies did not explicitly report on how they defined and handled 
omissions in data analysis. However, for studies that did report how omissions 
were handled, the results depended on whether omissions were included or not. 
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Burke and Matthews (1992) did not find a difference in response latency for 
anxious versus non-anxious individuals. However, when they controlled for 
omissions, the difference emerged. It is argued here that the exclusion of 
omissions, however they are defined, comes at a cost to external validity.  
Previous research has not always reported the degree to which they 
controlled for the affective tone and age of the memories being generated. In the 
present study, non-dysphoric individuals were similar to those in the dysphoric 
group on their ratings of the degree of negativity, clarity, and average age of the 
memories they generated. Differences in affective tone (i.e., positive versus 
negative memories) have been found to differentiate individuals with pathology 
from those without pathology (e.g., Croll & Bryant, 2002; Wenzel, 2000). Thus, 
the finding of no difference in ratings of negativity eliminates the likelihood that 
failure to find this difference in generation time may be due to disparity of 
ratings of affective tone between the dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups. These 
findings also reflect results from past research indicating that ratings of 
pleasantness and the age of memory tend not to affect retrieval time (see Rubin, 
2005), which are contrary to studies suggesting that rating the affective tone of 
memories could potentially confound results (see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Matthews, 1988 for a discussion of this issue).  
With the preceding discussion in mind then, it is possible that the 
definition used in the present study of memory accessibility can be criticized for 
failure to exert more stringent control over issues such as specificity versus 
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generalisability. Perhaps it is towards a balanced methodological approach, 
which considers equally internal control and real world context that future 
research should strive. 
4.1.2 General Limitations of Phase 1 
Additional limitations specific to the methodology used in phase 1 of the 
present study warrant discussion. First, the 3 to 7 day time delay between phase 
1 and phase 2 may confound the results on the study. Although this delay was 
driven by the need for paradigm preparation time and participant availability, 
there may have been an inadvertent affect on mood group and paradigm. Since 
this time delay was not recorded for each participant, there is no way to know 
whether individuals in the dysphoric group were more or less likely to return for 
phase 2 after a longer delay than their non-dysphoric counterparts, or whether 
longer delay was more common for those who engaged in RIF versus DF. The 
issue of time delay needs to be addressed in future studies to ensure that 
differences in remembering and forgetting are not associated with time delay 
differences.  
Second, the correlational nature of phase 1 of this study and lack of non-
random assignment to groups prohibits the interpretation of results as causal. As 
is the case with correlational research, results can be accounted for by a third 
variable. For example, the lack of difference in memory generation time could be 
the result of participants in the dysphoric group being hindered by psycho-
motor retardation (a symptom of the depressed mood state). Memories may have 
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indeed been more accessible but participant response may have been slower due 
to somatic symptoms or low motivation, which tends to typify dysphoria. It is 
impossible to control for every possible alternative explanation unless a true 
experiment can be conducted. One way to examine this possibility would be to 
use a mood induction of non-dyphoric individuals. Such a design alternative, 
while preserving internal validity will come at the expense of external validity 
and generalisability. 
An additional limitation to the present study is the degree of difference 
among the two mood groups. That is, there is a possibility of restricted range 
when using a continuous measure to then categorize individuals into groups. It 
is not uncommon within the literature to dichotomize a continuous variable for 
the purpose of evaluating group differences. However this strategy is not 
without costs (e.g., loss of power, less variability between groups). One way to 
overcome this potential limitation is to take the top (high scores) and bottom 
(low scores) as the primary sample. However, the small sample size in the 
present study prohibited using such a technique to ensure groups would differ 
enough to evidence the expected results. Future research should consider this 
issue and plan accordingly using extreme scores or by using a mood induction 
procedure.  
In the present study the categorization of participants as either dysphoric 
or non-dysphoric was based on whether their CES-D scores fell above or below a 
cut-off of 16. The decision to use the CES-D over alternative and more sensitive 
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measures (e.g., BDI-II) was based in part on the advantage of cost (e.g., the CES-
D is in the public domain and the BDI-II is a protected test) as well as its ability 
to discriminate the severity of symptoms. However, not all items on the CES-D 
tap the specific symptoms of depression identified in the DSM-IV TR. It is 
possible that the CES-D items assess the broader construct of dysphoria 
(including anxiety) rather than the more specific depressive symptoms 
associated with MDD. Santor, Zuroff, Ramsey, Cervantes, and Palacios (1995) 
evaluated the ability of the CES-D to discriminate symptom severity. They 
concluded that while the CES-D discriminates symptom severity better than the 
BDI, it is likely to overestimate the prevalence of depressive symptoms in a 
university sample. The BDI appears to be a more sensitive measure for 
identifying clinical depression (Santor et al., 1993). The implication for the 
present study then is that the severity of dysphoria may be over represented and 
a higher cut-off score should be a consideration for future research. In addition, 
there can be no direct generalization of findings to a clinical population. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the use of a university student 
sample as a limitation. University is a time of changes and challenges. Students 
face the challenge of adjusting to new classes, professors, drastically different 
academic responsibilities compared to high-school, extra-curricular activities, 
studying, and relationships (Clark, 2005). Many students experience significant 
amounts of stress including dysphoria (Dyson & Renk, 2006) as they learn to 
adjust to these stressors. Thus, the university population is a milieu rich with 
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psychological distress of which dysphoria may be disproportionately over 
represented compared to community samples. It can also be argued that 
university is also a unique experience and studies that adopt the use of this 
population are limited in terms of the ability to generalize findings. Because 
many studies on memory utilize a college population, and mood affects aspects 
of memory, researchers must consider the impact of this unique sample on study 
results. Therefore, it is particularly important that researchers examine 
generation time differences across a wide range of sample demographics, 
including young versus old; dysphoric versus clinically depressed; and 
university and non-university matched-aged groups. This is the only way to 
ensure generalisability of results. 
4.1.3 Summary of Findings for Phase 1: Memory Generation 
The present study is the first to evaluate generation time within the cue-
word method of memory generation using the total time to generate 32 
memories. This procedure was intended to allow for a more continuous flow of 
thought (i.e., that participants would be generating multiple memories to the 
same cue word) that reflects the network analogy of cognitive activation 
(Anderson & Bower, 1973). Despite the efforts to improve methodology, the 
present study failed to support findings from previous studies, which have 
evidenced shorter response latencies for dysphoric participants compared to 
non-dysphoric controls (e.g., Fitzgerald, Slade, & Lawrence, 1988; Parrott, 1991; 
Teasdale & Taylor, 1982; Strauman, 1992). However, the results are consistent 
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with a more recent study that also failed to find this time difference when 
dysphoric individuals were encouraged to actively suppress (not think about) a 
target negative memory (e.g., Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006). It may be that Dalgleish 
and Yiend’s use of a “stream of consciousness” task in which participants wrote 
down their thoughts while monitoring for the presence of target negative 
memories contributed to this finding. This stream of consciousness technique 
used by Dalgliesh and Yiend may be a viable methodology to adapt as a 
technique for autobiographic memory generation if researchers can control for 
the specificity issues discussed above. 
Did the present study fail to support the schema-activation hypothesis 
(Beck, 1987)? Clark et al. (1999) argued that autobiographic memory studies 
provide the best evaluation of schema activation but based on current 
knowledge, methodological constraints continue to pose a challenge. Indeed, 
Clark et al. (1999) stated, “autobiographic memory recall provides a more direct 
assessment of enduring negative self-schema…and it assesses more general, 
personal memories and experiences that are likely to have greater ecological 
validity” (p. 226). They encourage researchers to continue to develop 
methodologies with greater ecological validity. Thus, the current findings do not 
necessarily contradict schema activation but rather highlight the need for the 
search for a more novel approach and perhaps a balancing act between internal 
and external validity. 
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Research suggests that autobiographic memory tasks are among the most 
important in terms of the contributions to be made to theory (see Clark, Beck, & 
Alford, 1999 for a review) and applied clinical psychology (e.g., Wenzel, 2005; 
Williams, 1996). However, the rich source of knowledge about cognitive 
processes provided by autobiographic memory tasks is sometimes at the expense 
of experimental control. In the present study, attempts were made to adhere 
more closely to real-world experiences of cognition at the expense of rigorous 
experimental control. Thus, finding that there was no difference in memory 
generation time, may reflect the more loosely defined and less tightly controlled 
definition of memory accessibility used in Phase 1 of the present study than the 
more experimentally controlled studies conducted in the past. Clearly a 
methodological approach that can better balance internal control and external 
validity needs to be created (Clark, et al., 1999). Individual difference factors that 
constitute the third variable explanation (i.e., that dysphoric individuals may be 
generally slower in cognitive processing and response latency as a result of the 
nature of somatic symptoms) must be controlled. Previous research has also 
suggested alternatives to measuring speed of recall, by demonstrating 
differences between dysphoric and non-dyphoric groups using probability of 
recall (e.g., Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Fogarty & Hemsley, 1983). Whether this 
operationalisation would lead to group differences in the context of the 
methodology used in this study is a subject for future investigation. 
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4.2 Induced-forgetting and Mood 
 As Chapter 1 outlined, the Cognitive Theory of Depression (Beck, 1967) 
suggests that the dysphoric individual is predisposed to the access of negative 
schemas that distort information-processing. Depressed mood is maintained or 
even exacerbated as the cycle of negative thinking about the self continues. As a 
result, negative memories are more accessible and may lead to the mood-
congruent memory bias (MCMB). Indeed, Tafarodi, Marshall, and Milne (2003) 
compared several theoretical explanations for the MCMB and demonstrated 
support for Beck’s Cognitive Theory of Depression over others (e.g., associated 
network theory, Bowers, 1981). This highlights the importance of self-relevance 
in producing the MCMB. Although the present study failed to find differences in 
memory generation time, the schema-activation hypothesis implies that 
individuals who are dysphoric should evidence deficits in forgetting. 
4.2.1 Dysphoria and Induced-forgetting Effects 
The ability to forget emotionally valenced memories has only recently 
been the subject of investigation using both DF and RIF paradigms (see Chapter 
1). As suggested by studies examining suppression efforts during dysphoria, 
negative cognitive content is difficult to suppress without the cost of rebound 
effects. However, these two lines of research have evolved quite separately from 
one another and no study to date has undertaken to examine the forgetting of 
negative memories in the context of dysphoria. Further, the present study is the 
first to experimentally compare the efficacy of different induced-forgetting 
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paradigms using a quasi-experimental design in which a direct comparison of 
paradigmatic efficacy could be made. Several significant findings were found 
and are now discussed.  
In the evaluation of forgetting effects, the effect of mood state on the total 
amount of memories recalled depended on whether participants received 
instructions to remember (or practiced retrieving a subset of memories) or to 
forget (or did not practice an unrelated subset of memories).  Individuals who 
were not dysphoric remembered more of the to-be-remembered memories than 
the to-be-forgotten memories. The experience of dysphoria negated any 
difference due to instruction. This demonstrates that induced-forgetting of self-
relevant material, specifically autobiographic memories, is possible (e.g., Barnier 
et al., 2004; Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006; Joorman et al., 2005). However, evoking a 
highly emotional response in participants does not always lead to successful 
forgetting (Payne & Corrigan, 2006; Wong & Moulds, 2008). 
That dysphoric participants remembered similar amounts of memories 
when instructed to do so (or when they engaged in retrieval-practice) as they did 
when instructed to forget is consistent with past research (Bulevich, Roediger III, 
& Balota, 2003; Conway & Barnier, 2003; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). Much of the 
difference between these studies that may account for findings lies in stimuli 
differences (i.e., autobiographic memories versus self-relevant words), and 
instructions (i.e., to forget versus to not think about). From these contradictory 
results, the best conclusion may be that perhaps induced-forgetting of self-
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relevant material is a fragile phenomenon where mood state is concerned and 
may greatly depend on the stimuli used in the respective forgetting paradigms as 
well as the type of explicit instructions used in a given methodology. One 
advantage to the present study is that induced-forgetting paradigm comparisons 
were made using the same stimuli and thus make it considerably less difficult to 
interpret findings. 
 McNally (2005) suggested that in order to understand forgetting in a 
clinical context, the kind of stimuli necessary to understand the cognitive 
functions of forgetting is in part, inter-dependent on the clinical phenomenon of 
interest. That is, the stimuli must match the disorder. Further, McNally 
suggested that in order to ascertain effects due to negativity, and thus ensure the 
results are not due to emotionality, categories containing positive emotional 
material should be used. Similarly, Badsen and Badsen (1996) concluded that the 
efficacy of induced-forgetting may largely depend on the material subjected to 
induced-forget after finding no DF effect for judgments based on assured 
knowledge. It is possible that the “knowing” that comes as a result of the self-
relevance of autobiographic memories, leads to a reduction in DF efficacy 
(Gardiner, Gawlik, & Richardson-Klavhen, 1994). In addition, DF effects tend to 
be weakest for sentences and personally meaningful material (Golding & 
Keenan, 1985). That is, perhaps the forgetting effect is weak because only 
negative stimuli were used and findings indicate that depressed people have a 
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heightened sensitivity to negative stimuli, thus negative material would be 
harder to forget.  
 In addition, DF data represents memory recall in response to a forget cue. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, instruction to forget, trigger the suppression effort 
process. Individuals who are depressed are more likely to engage in chronic 
thought suppression efforts (Wenzlaff, 2005), the result of which is the rebound 
effect. The rebound effect could be influencing DF, thus weakening the overall 
forgetting effect. 
4.2.2 Limitations 
As discussed in a previous section the use of the university sample and 
the use of a dimensional scale to generate two groups for comparison limit both 
the extent to which results can be generalized and the variability among 
participants that may have been needed to demonstrate group differences. An 
additional limitation in the present study was the limited power to detect many 
of the hypothesized differences and the small effects. This limitation is important 
in terms of the contributions of this study to theory and practice and is therefore, 
discussed in more detail. 
In terms of the examination of paradigmatic differences in induced-
forgetting, the prediction of main effects and several interactions were not 
statistically significant, with one exception. The predicted 2-way interaction of 
mood and instruction was significant, and the effect size moderate. Specifically, 
the effect of mood on amount recalled depended on the instruction given. Post 
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hoc analysis revealed that for the non-dysphoric group more was remembered in 
the to-be-remembered category than the to-be-forgotten category and it was this 
comparison that accounted for the significant interaction. For the most part the 
results of this study yielded small effect sizes. As a result, the size of the sample 
in the present study was not sufficient to provide the power to detect many of 
the predicted differences.  
Prior to beginning the present study, the literature was surveyed to 
determine by rule of thumb, an estimate of the number of participants needed. 
The initial consideration of power was based on previous literature in which 
results yielded moderate to large effects based on sample sizes of between 15 and 
20 in a given cell within the statistical design. Therefore, 20 participants per cell 
should have been adequate to detect differences if they were there. However, 
such small effects for many of the hypothesized differences were unexpected. 
The sample size estimate was hampered by the absence of any study as complex 
as the analytic strategy used in the present study. Based on the limited previous 
research available, it was estimated that 20 participants per cell would be 
adequate to detect the moderate to large effects found in previous studies, 
particularly given the choice to use a within-subjects variable to compare to-be-
remembered and to-be-forgotten material. However, it appears that the 
complexity of the study required a significantly larger sample size to 
demonstrate small effects. Based on the mathematical computation of the 
components of power analyses (alpha level, effect size, and power at .80), an 
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estimated 1152 participants to demonstrate group differences in the 3-way 
interaction between mood, paradigm, and instruction would be needed.  
The practical (e.g., time and money) implications associated with a 
decision to proceed with further data collection warrant some consideration, as 
does the ethical implications to participants in proceeding to subject individuals 
to the memory generation process. Specifically, it is important to question the 
practical costs of continuing to collect data when the small effect sizes found 
raise the question of theoretical and practical importance of induced-forgetting 
during dysphoria. Coupled with the risk of psychological harm (as evidenced by 
3 participants in the present study who needed immediate mental health 
intervention after engaging in the memory generation task) it was determined 
that to proceed with further data collection as the present study stands was both 
impractical and potentially unethical given the small effects.  
While previous studies report a moderate to large forgetting effect size in 
RIF (e.g., Barnier et al., 2004), the use of meaningful material in DF has yielded 
smaller effect sizes (Geiselman, 1974; Golding & Keenan, 1985) because they are 
much more difficult to forget (Golding, Long, & MacLeod, 1994). Thus, exploring 
forgetting effects through the separate analysis of individual paradigms was 
important. These analyses showed that the forgetting effect demonstrated by the 
DF paradigm was more likely to depend on whether individuals were dysphoric 
or not. Subsequently, the presence of dysphoria may have negated the DF effect. 
In the analysis of RIF, both forgetting and a practice effect occurred and it made 
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no difference what mood participants were in. These results strongly suggest 
that RIF is likely a better paradigm to use to induce forgetting when individuals 
are dysphoric. Thus, as the separate evaluation of RIF and DF suggest, power 
issues were substantially reduced but unfortunately, not eliminated. However, it 
begs the question of why DF did not work for dysphoric individuals? 
Some research suggests that the clinical phenomenon of interest itself may 
influence results and will dictate methodological considerations. For example, if 
the clinical phenomenon of interest is PTSD then stimuli must contain both 
positive and negative emotional valence in order to examine specificity. Perhaps 
the same is true for dysphoria (depression).  
Finally, several studies suggest that to-be-forgotten information is not 
necessarily treated that way by participants when instructed to forget (e.g., 
Fleming, Wegner, & Petty, 1999; Kassin & Sommers, 1997). This is particularly 
true when information targeted as to-be-forgotten is relevant to the individual 
(Golding, 2005). When participants are told in the experimental paradigm to 
“forget it, it was the wrong list” perhaps they do not necessarily buy the 
instructions in anticipation that the to-be-forgotten list will be requested at recall. 
Participants then must be made to believe that information to be forgotten is of 
no importance to them in the situation. It is possible that in the present study, 
participants were less convinced of the forget instruction than expected. These 
plausible explanations for the lack of a forgetting effect, as well as those 
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explanations mentioned above, offer important avenues to advance future 
research in this area. 
4.2 3 Summary of Induced-forgetting Findings 
Past research has suggested that suppression efforts (e.g., instructions to 
“not think about” or “forget”) often lead to failure (rebound effects), particularly 
for individuals who are depressed (e.g., Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; Wegner & 
Gold, 1995; Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988; Wegner & Smart, 1997; Wenzlaff & 
Wegner, 2000). So it would seem then that when it comes to negative cognitive 
content, efforts to gain mental control using suppression will become 
increasingly more difficult as the degree of depressed mood increases (Wenzlaff 
& Wegner, 2000). If instruction to not think about something can ironically make 
those thoughts more accessible and intrusive, then it seems reasonable to expect 
DF effects to be less evident. Subsequently, a RIF paradigm may be potentially 
therapeutic in reducing depressed mood and actively countering the tendency to 
engage in thought suppression.  
Nevertheless, subsequent studies have failed to replicate the rebound 
effect (for a review see Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
2000). The results of Abramowitz et al.’s (2001) meta-analysis of 28 controlled 
studies on rebound effect yielded only a small to moderate rebound effect size. 
Despite studies that have found the rebound effect (e.g., Davies & Clark, 1998; 
Harvey & Bryant, 1998; McNally & Ricciardi, 1996), others have demonstrated a 
short–term effect (e.g. Markowitz, & Borton, 2002; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; 
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Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994), and still others have found no rebound effect at all 
(e.g. Borton, 2002; Kelly & Kahn, 1994; Roemer & Borkovec, 1994). If power had 
not been a substantial limitation, the small effects found for many of the 
hypothesized difference calls into question the clinical utility of induced-
forgetting for psychological problems. With such small effects, it is likely that 
induced-forgetting would be of minimal therapeutic value in producing positive 
change. However, the finding that RIF (a strategy that does not require 
instruction to remember or forget in any form) was not affected by mood state 
offers a degree of hope that through retrieval practice methods (versus 
instruction to forget) depressed individuals may have a viable means by which 
they can inhibit negative mental content and thus reduce or eliminate the effects 
of negative cognitions on mood. 
Finally, Macrae and Roseveare (2002) demonstrated that when material is 
highly self-relevant, it may be more resistant to forgetting. The results of the 
present study support this notion when mood is considered, specifically for the 
DF paradigm. Although, Macrae and Roseveare concluded that self-relevance 
then, may hinder forgetting, the results of the present study suggest that it may 
be paradigm specific. That is, RIF appears to be unaffected by the highly self-
relevant nature of autobiographic memories (e.g., Barnier, et al., 2004). 
 Another limitation to the present study warrants discussion. First, amount 
remembered after instruction to remember was used as a within-subjects control 
condition to compare with the amount remembered when instructed to forget. 
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While within-subject comparisons afford greater chance of detecting differences, 
and have become the preferred method for DF, Anderson (2005) suggested that 
the elimination of a between-subjects control condition for DF-list procedures 
potentially confounds results. For example, by comparing List 1 to List 2, as was 
done with DF-list in the present study, results are potentially confounded with 
things such as learning to learn (Postman, 1971), retroactive interference, or the 
development of better strategies to aid in encoding simply as a result of the 
passage of time (Anderson, 2005). Other than the fact that within-subjects 
comparison are now a standard practice in DF deigns (MacLeod, 1998), it also 
enabled us to reduce the statistical complexity and need for a much larger 
sample size when a separate control group is needed.  
4.3 Mental Control Factors as a Source of Individual Differences in Remembering 
and Forgetting 
To this author’s knowledge no studies currently exist that have examined 
whether the individual cognitive risk or vulnerability factors associated with 
depression impede one’s susceptibility to forgetting paradigm effects. Thus, the 
present examination of mental control factors as predictors of successful memory 
generation and forgetting was novel.  
In the present study several cognitive factors were evaluated in terms of 
the relationship they would share to memory impairment (i.e., generation time 
and induced-forgetting). Contrary to predictions there was no relationship of any 
of the mental control variables and memory generation. As predicted, however, 
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poor perceived mental control and higher levels of rumination were related to 
lower levels of forgetting as evidenced in a DF task. These two findings are 
consistent with the literature (see Chapter 1).  Given the positive correlation of 
perceived mental control and suppression (Rhyno et al., 2003), it makes sense 
that the amount forgotten in a paradigm such as DF that relies on the explicit 
instruction to forget would produce a significant relationship. Similarly, the 
tendency to ruminate, a correlate of adverse emotional states, should evidence a 
strong link to memory impairment as defined by the “remember-forget” 
difference. This should be especially true when thoughts, images, and memories 
are triggered and focused on. 
Also contrary to predictions, neither perceived mental control nor 
rumination was associated with induced-forgetting or the practice effect in the 
RIF paradigm. This may be good news given that mental control factors predict 
depression (see Clark, 2005 for discussion).  Surprisingly, no significant 
relationships between individual mental control strategies and induced-
forgetting for either DF or RIF were found.  
Although there was no existing literature on which to base specific 
hypotheses about what could be expected, several studies suggested that these 
mental control strategies should share a relationship with aspects of memory. For 
example, Luciano and Gonzalez (2007) reported the results of three recent 
studies examining the short and long-term effects of using focused distraction 
(e.g., intentional mental concentration on a target thought, image, or memory) in 
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reducing the resurgence of unwanted thoughts. Their results highlight the 
benefits of distraction as a mental control strategy. Thus, since there was 
sufficient power to detect this relationship, it is surprising that it was 
unsupported.  
Additional research also provided evidence for the effectiveness of 
distraction for individuals with sleep problems (Harvey & Payne, 2002), treating 
obsessions and compulsions (Abramowitz, Whiteside, Kalsy, & Tolin, 2003; 
Amir, Cashman, & Foa, 1997), and reducing anxiety (Coles & Heimberg, 2005). 
Therefore, distraction as a highly constructive mental control strategy for 
managing unpleasant thoughts and memories seemed a plausible individual 
difference factor to consider. That it was not correlated with forgetting may be 
the result of measurement. 
4.3.1 Limitations and Implications 
Several possible limitations regarding the aspect of mental control are 
worth noting. First, it is important to acknowledge the substantial overlap among 
measures used in this study to examine aspects of mental control. As noted in the 
results section, the CES-D shares a substantial portion of variance with the 
measures of mental control and rumination. It is possible then that these 
measures are not orthogonal and may be measuring the same thing. If this is 
indeed the case, then the lack of significant findings could be the result of this 
overlap. However, on examination of correlations, the moderate level of 
association would imply that while constructs overlap moderately, there is 
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distinctiveness among constructs. Low correlational values would indicate that 
constructs are unrelated. Moderate correlations suggest some overlap in 
construct definition (as is the case in the present study). High correlations that 
approach the maximum range of plus or minus one, would suggest that the same 
construct is being measured.  For example, rumination has been conceptualized 
as a response style (see Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987 for a review). However, some 
researchers argue that it is a symptom of depressed mood (see Luminet, 2004 for 
review of rumination as a response style). Therefore, we could expect a moderate 
association between mood and rumination. Unfortunately research is hampered 
by the lack of self-report instruments to assess mental control constructs like 
coping response that are not highly correlated with depression measures. The 
implications of the moderate associations among mood and mental control 
variables in the present study are that these constructs are distinct enough to 
serve as possible individual difference factors in induced-forgetting and should 
be given consideration by those who do research in this area. 
As with all self-report measures, there is the assumption that individuals 
have a direct access to their own internal responses, and that they are willing to 
give an accurate report of them. However, several studies suggest that these 
assumptions are often violated (e.g., Brewer, 1986; Conway et al., 2000). Future 
research can attempt to overcome these potential limitations by using 
performance-based measures of psycho-physiological or neuro-anatomical 
correlates of rumination (see Luminet, 2004 for a review of these procedures). 
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Alternatively, researchers can opt for a rumination manipulation as part of the 
research design. However, adding such a manipulation may only serve to 
complicate methodology. 
It is also important to point out that the development of the measures of 
perceived mental control and mental control strategies used in the present study 
was done in the context of unwanted intrusive thoughts (e.g., Rhyno, Clark, & 
Purdon, 2003; Wells & Davies, 1994). The present study did not address the issue 
of whether the negative memories being generated were indeed, unwanted. 
Rhyno and Clark (2005) delineated some of the important properties that define 
unwanted thoughts. When thoughts unintentionally enter our flow of mental 
activity, grabbing attentional resource, are a source of discomfort, become 
chronic, and are so difficult to control that they interfere with life, we have 
experienced a cognitive intrusion. Whether or not the negative memories 
generated in this study meet the criteria for this type of cognitive intrusion was 
not assessed. Thus, measures such as the CUTS (originally developed to assess 
unwanted cognitive thoughts) may have been inadequate or less valid measures 
for evaluating the relationship between mental control factors and the induced-
forgetting of negative memories.  
Future research may need to focus on intrusive thoughts as the stimuli of 
interest for depression. Clark and Rhyno (2005) suggested that in the general 
population, 80 to 90 percent of nonclinical samples report this phenomenon (and 
18 percent of cognitive intrusions are experienced as unacceptable). The most 
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frequently cited intrusive thoughts are related to sadness, worry, and anger 
(Clark & Rhyno, 2005), and 96 percent of these intrusive thoughts relate to 
current daily experiences (not past experiences as would be the case with 
memories). Thus, intrusive thoughts appear to be stimuli of interest for future 
research on forgetting. 
Rumination has been shown to impact memory in that instruction to 
ruminate tends to contribute to an increase in a MCMB (Lyubormirsky et al. 
1998). Rumination and depression are positively correlated and since dysphoria 
was unrelated to and did not evidence differences among groups on aspects of 
memory for RIF, then it seems reasonable to conclude that rumination would 
evidence similar findings. In the only known study of depressive rumination and 
directed forgetting, highly dysphoric individuals who ruminated intentionally 
demonstrated the standard directed-forgetting effect for emotionally valenced 
words (Wong & Moulds, 2008). This recent finding contradicts the idea that those 
who ruminate in response to a depressed mood would be more likely to have 
difficulty forgetting when instructed to do so (Payne & Corrigan, 2006) – at least 
for emotional words. It may be important then to analyze the induced-forgetting 
effects for the cue words used in this study in the same way that the negative 
memories were analyzed to evaluate if differences exist among forgetting effects 
for words versus memories. This is a possible next step for the present study. 
In conclusion, the present study found that perceived mental control and 
rumination share a significant relationship with the degree of forgetting for DF 
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but not RIF. The implication of this finding is that it supports the robust findings 
from the suppression literature that explicit instructions to forget may be more 
challenging to individuals who ruminate in response to sadness as well as for 
those whose perceptions about their ability to control mental content is poor.  
The ironic processes believed to plague depressed individuals may be due to 
these individual differences in mental control, which may moderate the 
relationship between depressed mood and chronic thought suppression efforts. 
The associations among mental control and Degree of forgetting in DF may 
unduly affect the results of experimental research, as well as, indicate to 
practitioners, that efforts to suppress may be hampered by such individual 
differences, which may need to be evaluated in order to determine whether 
intervention length and effectiveness of therapy is appropriate. Finally, 
researchers investigating forgetting may want to consider the use of paradigms 
such as RIF, which appear to be uninfluenced by mental control differences.  
4.4 Gender Differences in Dysphoria 
 One interesting finding was the results of preliminary analysis in which 
there was no gender difference in among men and women in the level depressive 
symptoms. A specific hypothesis about gender differences in dysphoria was not 
specified. Considering the robustness of the gender difference in depressive 
symptoms that is also typically evidenced in college samples in which 25 to 30 
percent of individuals will show moderate to severe depressive symptoms (e.g., 
Rhyno, Clark, and Purdon, 2003, 2004, 2005; Wang, Clark, & Purdon, 2003), it is 
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possible that the current sample may not reflect the gender difference that is 
typically found in the general population. Other studies using a college sample 
also failed to find this difference (e.g., Wong & Whitaker, 1993). Thus, the present 
study may be limited in its ability to generalise results to the general population. 
4.5 Implications and Future Directions 
There are several key points that can be highlighted in light of the present 
study results. First, generating negative autobiographic memories is likely to 
lead to an increased negative mood state. Researchers who use this technique, 
particularly where mood is of quintessential importance, are advised to evaluate 
the degree to which methodology introduces this potential confound. Second, the 
type of instruction given during experimental evaluation of induced-forgetting 
appears to matter when individuals are dysphoric. This will become problematic 
for studies that select from a university population in which dysphoria is 
particularly common unless the dysphoric mood is of interest in the study. Third, 
individual differences in perceived mental control and ruminative coping may 
impact results of studies designed to examine the forgetting aspects of memory 
particularly where instructions to forget are used and therefore, these factors 
should be taken into consideration in future studies.  
That mood state, as defined in the present study, did not substantially 
affect induced-forgetting efficacy, at least for RIF, may actually be viewed in a 
positive light. A paradigm that does not depend on mood state may prove to be a 
valuable strategy to combat negative mood states from spiraling into more 
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severe and prolonged depressed mood. In addition, that mental control factors 
were not associated with degree of forgetting in RIF is also promising given that 
mental control factors are highly predictive of depression. Conversely, that DF 
may only be effective for non-dysphoric individuals is consistent with the 
suppression literature indicating that explicit instructions to forget hinders 
forgetting (see Chapter 1 for review). Future research should continue in this 
area with an aim towards increasing the sample size and ascertaining the effect 
size when power is not a limitation. The implication for small effects in 
determining behaviour is an interesting theoretical issue. Finding small effect 
sizes that do not distinguish one theory from another are likely of little 
theoretical importance. The same may be true of a large effect that would have 
been predicted from any given theory. However, a small effect size that does 
differentiate one theoretical perspective from another by design is important to 
theory. 
In the present study, the majority of effects were small. However, 
insufficient power prohibits any meaningful interpretation as to the implications 
of these small effects for Beck’s (1987) Cognitive Theory of Depression, the Ironic 
Process Theory (Wegner, 1994), and the theoretical mechanisms believed to 
underlie different induced-forgetting paradigms (e.g., inhibition versus practice 
effects; see chapter 1 for definitions). This is an avenue for further exploration in 
terms of whether small effects further elucidate any distinction among forgetting 
paradigms.  Small effects for induced-forgetting also raise the issue of whether 
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practically and therefore, clinically, induced-forgetting is worth exploring as a 
potential intervention. However, there is much to be explored before the clinical 
utility of forgetting paradigms can be evaluated. 
From a theoretical perspective, inducing the forgetting of unwanted, 
distressing, and negative cognitive content appears to make sense. If the ironic 
effect of mental control failure over negative mental content is the exacerbation 
of a negative psychological state, then surely efforts to reduce the content will 
serve to repair negative psychological impact to the self. What does a forgetting 
paradigm actually do? Are memories really forgotten and should this be the goal 
of clinical intervention? 
The prevailing thought in the current literature on induced-forgetting is 
that forgetting occurs as a result of inhibition (see Neath & Surprenant, 2003 for a 
review of several theoretical perspectives). It may be concluded then that despite 
the terminology used in naming these paradigms as “forgetting” that negative 
autobiographic memories are not really forgotten but rather are inhibited from 
coming to mind (at least during the paradigm protocol). For how long this lasts is 
not known. If it is that memoires are not truly forgotten but simply inhibited for 
a period of time, it begs the question as to whether or not this is an appropriate 
strategy of clinical value. Cognitive interventions grounded in Beck’s (1987) 
Cognitive Theory of Depression are designed to encourage the reappraisal of 
distorted thinking and the attributions and judgments that result from faulty 
cognitive processes (Clark et al., 1999). This idea is consistent with other 
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therapeutic models based on exposure to or acceptance of distressing memories, 
thoughts, or images. So how exactly could induced-forgetting be construed as an 
effective coping strategy? Briere (1996) offered an illustrative example with his 
concept of the therapeutic window during exposure therapy. 
Exposure therapy (Foa, Rothbaum, & Steketee, 1993) is predicated on the 
idea that helping a client to habituate to disturbing memories, via a process of re-
experiencing while learning to deal with the unpleasant emotions attached to the 
experience, reduces the distress caused by the memory. While exposure therapy 
has been deemed an evidenced-based intervention for many mental health issues 
(e.g., anxiety, PTSD, and phobias), Briere (2002) suggested that to be most 
effective exposure therapy should take place within a therapeutic window. The 
window refers to “the psychological location between overwhelming exposure 
and excessive avoidance wherein therapy is most effective” (p.10).  
Briere (2002) suggested that autobiographic memories become a source of 
distress because they activate associated implicit cognitive content (e.g., feelings, 
schema, and sensory impressions). He further advocated for clinicians to attend 
to aspects of therapy that include pace, intensity, and correct focus on content 
during exposure therapy. At any one point in a session then, an individual’s 
ability to exert some control over the level of activation of negative memories 
becomes important for treatment efficacy. Induced-forgetting may be a viable 
strategy in which a therapist can engage clients to manage memory activation 
simply by the elaborate rehearsal (e.g., mentally or verbally) of associated 
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memories that are of less intensity (and thus inhibiting the more intense 
memories) long enough to ensure that the therapeutic window is neither under 
nor over shot. This conceptualization of the possible clinical application of 
induced-forgetting (e.g., RIF) to a clinical setting notwithstanding, we are a long 
way from the present study results and a therapeutically useful tool. The 
example used here was specific to interventions for trauma. Arguably, 
autobiographic content is more representative of the schema deemed to hallmark 
depression and dysphoria more so than word lists or sentence stems. However, 
there is little evidence to suggest that negative memories are themselves a key 
cognitive disturbance in depression or dysphoria. This is exactly the opposite for 
PTSD in which negative memories are of central importance. This exemplifies the 
importance of matching the cognitive phenomenon with the psychological 
disorder of interest (i.e., the negative memories central to PTSD versus the 
unwanted negative thoughts central to depression, anxiety, or OCD). 
The results of the present study do generate a platform to first address 
limitations and then perhaps extend the study of induced-forgetting of 
autobiographic content to other populations (e.g., memories associated with 
PTSD). Further, individual difference factors such as age, personality trait factors 
(e.g., neuroticism), and state factors (e.g., anxiety) remain largely unexplored. In 
addition, younger and older populations for whom inhibitory processes may be 
underdeveloped (as in children) or in decline (as with some geriatric groups) 
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may also be of interest in future research given the assumptions of inhibition in 
forgetting and suppression. 
While an extension of induced-forgetting to other populations such as 
children has not been the subject of substantial investigation, initial application 
of RIF to children suggests that RIF works despite the fact that children are still 
developing inhibitory abilities. Although the majority of studies investigating 
aspects of forgetting have used adult populations, Ford, Keating, and Patel (2004) 
were the first to generalise RIF to children. The practical application of RIF for 
childhood disorders in which forgetting certain aspects of experience may be 
beneficial (i.e., children’s memory for painful medical procedures) may also 
prove therapeutic. 
The idea that children can forget through retrieval induction is an 
intriguing one, given that children’s ability to inhibit information is linked to 
frontal lobe development (Dempster, 1993). Children then are generally 
considered to be less successful at inhibition tasks because frontal lobe 
development is believed to be incomplete until early adulthood (Bjorklund & 
Harnishfeger, 1995). Thus, future studies might expect differences in forgetting 
abilities between different age groups. 
Further, the examination of disorders such as PTSD, and anxiety 
disorders, in which negative cognitive content is a clear symptom and its 
reduction is critical to ameliorating the disorder, are also avenues worth 
exploring in terms of the effect of induced-forgetting of negative thoughts and 
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memories on alleviating symptoms. With the emergence of new therapeutic 
interventions such as mindfulness therapy and acceptance and commitment 
therapies, comes a refocus on changing the goal from suppression of unpleasant 
thoughts and emotional memories to fully experiencing them (e.g., Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). In a recent study, Marcks and Woods (2005) 
experimentally demonstrated that an acceptance-based approach is more 
recommended over thought suppression to deal with intrusive thoughts. 
Acceptance showed a strong negative relationship with intrusive thought 
frequency, discomfort, depressive symptoms, obsessive-compulsive complaints 
and trait anxiety (Marcks & Woods, 2005).  
Finding support for the some of the specific hypotheses in this study has 
implications for research in both cognitive psychology and applied clinical 
psychology. For researchers in the field of cognitive psychology where forgetting 
is of particular interest, this study elucidated a number of individual differences 
factors that need to be taken into account when using induced-forgetting 
paradigms. Specifically, the typical use of university students for basic research 
purposes poses a number of considerations given the high rate of depressive 
symptoms reported in college samples. In addition, ruminative coping, and poor 
perceived mental control may affect the results of memory tasks in general, and 
induced-forgetting specifically. Further, this study elucidates the importance of 
considering which forgetting paradigm may be most effective depending on the 
goals of the study. That is, findings may be hindered or facilitated by individual 
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characteristics such as mood, perceived mental control abilities, and coping 
strategies such as rumination. In addition, extension of findings to the general 
population in younger and older adults may also require consideration of mood 
state and other cognitive variables that account for differences in one’s ability to 
forget using experimental paradigms, particularly DF. Finally, results support 
the extension of forgetting paradigms to more complex material such as that 
represented by self-relevant negative memories and provide preliminary support 
to the schema-activation hypothesis and subsequently, Beck’s (1987) Cognitive 
Theory of Depression. 
 For clinical researchers, enhancing an understanding of the effects of 
mood on forgetting has provided an avenue of substantial investigation into 
alternative cognitive-based treatment and preventative strategies for depressed 
individuals. Although the results of the present study are far from representing a 
test of induced-forgetting paradigms as possible treatments, preliminary results 
from this study may facilitate the development of forgetting strategies as part of 
the existing cognitive treatment models for mood disturbance. Assume that 
under normal conditions (e.g., no psychological distress), most individuals can 
be induced to forget. This is similar to an assumption that in normal populations, 
individuals engage in self-cognitive therapy to alleviate a depressed mood when 
need be. For others, where the assistance of a therapist in initiating the process of 
cognitive therapy (e.g., challenging assumptions, or reconstructing irrational 
thoughts and beliefs) is required, the same may be true of induced forgetting 
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methodology. That is, perhaps for most of us, it is something that is self-initiated 
but for others, it may be a viable therapeutic intervention requiring the assistance 
of a trained intervener. Whether this line of inquiry develops in future research 
remains to be seen. 
 While this study promised to advance our understanding of paradigmatic 
and individual difference in forgetting of self-relevant negative memories, 
several limitations were noted. First, the size of the expected effects was limited 
by sample size. In their recent study, Wessel and Hauer (in press) have suggested 
that the application of forgetting paradigms to autobiographical memories in 
which the goal is to construct a more externally valid representation of real 
world cognitions, at the cost of rigorous experimental control, will likely yield 
much smaller effects. In addition, the sample was limited to a non-clinical 
population so it will be impossible to state, with any degree of certainty, the 
generalisability of findings to clinically depressed individuals. Despite this 
limitation though, the dimensional conceptualisation of depression allows 
speculation as to the generalisability to samples of clinically depressed persons 
because the depressed mood state is more intense.  
Finally, dysphoria as defined in this study does not necessarily prohibit 
the generalisability of findings to other forms of mood disorders and other mood 
states (e.g., Bipolar Depression and anxiety), particularly if they are 
conceptualized as more severe disturbances of mood along the dysphoria- 
depression continuum. In addition, psychological disorders in which negative 
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emotional memories are particularly problematic (e.g., PTSD) should be 
investigated. Where the cognition of interest is intrusive thoughts, (i.e., the 
cognitions associated with Anxiety Disorders and Schizophrenia), distinctions 
should be made between intrusive thoughts and memories. Thus, the choice of 
stimuli should reflect the corresponding psychological dysfunction. Further 
study in which these constructs are measured would help elucidate other 
plausible individual difference factors worthy of consideration for both clinicians 
and researchers. 
This study has laid the foundation for future research to focus on the 
potential therapeutic value of induced-forgetting, particularly using the RIF 
paradigm. As research in this area continues to evolve, attention needs to be paid 
to the extent to which RIF might ameliorate symptoms, how long RIF effects last, 
and to what extent such a procedure has on improving mood. These areas 
constitute a substantial line of inquiry on which to continue to build our 
knowledge and understanding of forgetting. As this research moves forward 
perhaps new preventative strategies or even treatments for depression or other 
psychological issues will surface. This study sheds light on a number of future 
directions in which researchers can proceed in order to tease apart the statistical 
and applied significance for the practical application of forgetting paradigms to 
psychological problems.  
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APPENDIX A 
Consent to Participate in Research (Participant Pool) 
 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled The Effects of Mood on Remembering 
Negative Memories (E1). Please read this form carefully, and feel free to ask any 
questions you may have.  
 
 
Researcher:     Research Supervisor: 
Shelley Rhyno    Dr. Tammy Marche 
Ph: 966-8314     Ph: 966-8919 
E-mail: rhyno@sasktel.net   E-mail: tmarche@stmcollege.ca 
 
 
Purpose and Procedure: The main purpose of the current study is to find out whether an 
individual’s mood state influences the ability to accurately remember information. It will 
also examine whether other factors linked to one’s cognition style of remembering events 
(such as how you control unwanted thoughts and how you respond to a sad mood) may 
also influence memory accuracy. Finally, it will investigate whether there are certain 
types of memory strategies that are better than others, depending on their mood state and 
other individual differences (such as age and gender). This study was reviewed and 
approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan Advisory Committee on 
Ethics in Behavioural Science Research on May 23, 2006. Before you agree to 
participate, it is important to understand the following: 
 
 In this study (which contains 2 phases and will take approximately 2 hours of 
your time to complete both phases over a 1-week period) you will first be given some 
words and asked to recall specific memories from your past experiences that might relate 
to these words. This first phase will take 45 minutes to 1 hour of your time. You will 
receive 2 participation credits to use towards your introductory psychology course. In the 
second phase of the study you will be asked to complete a number of questionnaires 
asking you about aspects of your memory and mood (e.g., how you control unwanted 
thoughts, respond to sad mood, and how you are feeling lately). You will also be shown 
some words and asked to remember specific aspects of your memories. This second 
phase will take approximately 45 minutes to an hour of your time and you will receive an 
additional 2 participation credits for a total of 4 credits for completing both phases of the 
study. 
 
 
Potential Risks: There are no known risks associated with participation in this study. 
However, you will be asked to answer questions about your mood and experiences that 
may possibility make you more aware of particular difficulties you could be 
experiencing. Specifically, you will be asked recall memories about negative events from 
your life that you may not have thought about recently, which may also make you more 
aware of particular difficulties of which you were not fully aware. Finally, you will be 
asked to rate your current mood and this may also make you more aware of how you are 
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feeling. Such questions and activities may prove to be an addition source of distress once 
you become more aware. If this is the case, it is important to know that counselling 
services are available (free of charge) for university students at the Student Counselling 
Centre. The Student Counselling Centre is located on campus, next door to the main 
entrance of Upper Place Riel. 
 
 
Potential Benefits: Potential benefits of participation in this study are that you will learn 
more about individual differences in mood and experiences that may influence how 
accurately a person remembers information. In addition, your participation may help to 
enhance your current understanding of the research process from a participant 
perspective. 
 
 
Confidentiality: Although the results of this study may be presented in a conference 
setting and may become part of published research, it will be reported in aggregate form 
so that it will not be possible to identify individuals. Furthermore, the consent form that 
you have signed will be stored separately from all other materials used to ensure that your 
personal information cannot be linked to your actual performance. Please do not put your 
name on any other the materials used other than this consent form. A personal 
identification code may be requested to ensure that information gathered in each phase of 
this study can be linked together for accuracy, but this will not include your name.  
 
 
Storage of Data: All data and results will be stored safely and securely by the research 
supervisor in a locked filing cabinet located in the supervisor’s laboratory at the 
University of Saskatchewan for a minimum of five years following the completion of the 
study. 
 
 
Right to Withdraw: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may 
withdraw from the study for any reason, at any time, without penalty of any sort and 
without loss of research credit for this session. If you withdraw from the study, any 
information collection will immediately stop and any information that you have 
contributed will be destroyed.  
 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to ask at any 
point; you are also free to contact the researchers at the numbers provided above if you 
have questions at a later time. This study has been approved on ethical grounds by the 
University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Sciences Research Ethics Board on May 23, 
2006. Any questions regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to that 
committee through the Office of Research Services (966-2084). Out of town participants 
may call collect. Should you wish to receive a paper copy of the final results, please feel 
free to contact either of the researchers named above.  
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Consent to Participate: I have read and understand the description provided above; I 
have been provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been 
answered satisfactorily. I consent to participate in the study described above 
understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any time. A copy of this consent form 
has been given to me for my records.  
 
____________________________________      ______________________ 
(Signature of Participant)                 (Date) 
 
 
____________________________________ 
(Signature of Researcher) 
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APPENDIX B 
Demographic Information Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the questions below. 
How old are you? __________ 5 
What is your gender? Male / Female 
What is your ethnicity? __________ 
Is English your first language? Yes / No 
 If no, how many years have you spoken English? __________ 
Name the title of a movie or TV show you have watched recently that has made you feel 10 
happy or laugh? _________________________ 
Would you watch this movie or TV show again? Yes No 
Briefly describe what about it made you feel happy? 
 
Have you ever been treated for a mental health problem? Yes/No 15 
Are you currently seeking counselling or psychological services? Yes/No 
Have you ever participated in a related-word list study before? Yes / No 
If yes, what did you have to do? 
 
Please record the first three letters of your mother’s first name and your month and 20 
day of your birth in the space below? 
 
_e.g., JAN1206   __________________________ 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Control of Unwanted Thoughts Scale (CUTS-40) 
 
Instructions:  
 
Please recall some recent experiences you have had with unwanted thoughts. ‘Unwanted 
thoughts’ can include worries:  
 Worries or unpleasant thoughts that occur against your will  
 Thoughts that, in and of themselves, might not be unpleasant but are ones you 
don’t want to have at a particular time or in a particular place.  
 
Listed below are a series of statements that refer to the general experience of unwanted 
thoughts and one’s attempt to gain control over them. Please indicate how much you 
agree with each statement by circling the number that best reflects your experience with 
unwanted thoughts and your control of them. 
 
 
Statements 
Disagree/Not 
Applicable 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Agree 
Moderately 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. My unwanted thoughts tend to be 
persistent. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. Persistent negative unwanted thoughts 
usually indicate that something bad is 
about to happen to me. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. My unwanted thoughts can interfere with 
what I am doing. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. The more often I have a particular 
unwanted thought, the greater the chances 
it will come true. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. I use repetitive phrases or rituals to cancel 
out the negative effects of unwanted 
thoughts. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. I have unwanted thoughts much of the 
time. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. I find it difficult to tell when I’ve achieved 
good control over an unwanted thought. 
(MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. My mind tends to race with unwanted 
thoughts. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. I am on the look-out for unwanted 
thoughts that might enter my mind. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
Participant Code: 
_____________ 
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Statements 
Disagree/Not 
Applicable 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Agree 
Moderately 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
10. My unwanted thoughts tend to involve 
situation(s) or problem(s) that require my 
attention. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. I often try to remove or suppress 
unwanted thoughts that have entered my 
mind. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I have difficulty exerting enough control 
over my unwanted thoughts so that they 
no longer bother me. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. Many of my unwanted thoughts are 
distressing to me. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. When I have “nasty” unwanted thoughts, 
I think I must be a terrible person. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. It is easy to lose my desired level of 
control over unwanted thoughts. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. I tend to have the same unwanted 
thought over and over. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I will look for evidence that an unwanted 
thought is not important in order to stop 
myself from thinking about it. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. I am concerned that failure to control 
certain unwanted thoughts could lead to 
dire consequences for others or myself. 
(MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. It doesn’t take much to trigger my 
unwanted thoughts. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
20. If left unattended, some of my unwanted 
thoughts could lead to serious 
consequences. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
21. I try to rationalize or think through an 
unwanted thought until it no longer 
bothers me. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
22. I tend to have unwanted thoughts. (UTS) 0 1 2 3 4 
23. Once an unwanted thought enters my 
mind, it usually interferes with my 
concentration despite my best efforts. 
(MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Statements 
Disagree/Not 
Applicable 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Agree 
Moderately 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
24. It is important that I maintain control 
over my thoughts. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
25. I tend to spend a lot of time searching my 
mind for unwanted thoughts. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
26. I should try harder to prevent or remove 
unwanted thoughts from my mind. 
(MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
27. It is important for me to maintain strict 
control over unwanted thinking. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
28. I look to close friends or family to help 
me deal with unwanted thoughts. (MCS) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
29. Having frequent unwanted thoughts 
about something bad happening increases 
the risk that it will actually happen. 
(UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
30. When my unwanted thoughts occur, they 
really stand out in my mind (UTS). 
0 1 2 3 4 
31. It’s important for me to ‘think through’ 
my unwanted thoughts. (UTS). 
0 1 2 3 4 
32. Sometimes I think there must be 
something wrong with me because I have 
so many unwanted thoughts. (UTS). 
0 1 2 3 4 
33. If I just ignore an unwanted thought, I 
feel even more responsible for any 
negative consequences that might 
happen. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
34. I wonder if some of my unwanted 
intrusive thoughts are due to unresolved 
issues. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
35. If I don’t control my thoughts, I could 
end up doing something embarrassing or 
hurtful toward others. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
36. If I have a thought that something bad 
could happen, then I have a 
responsibility to make sure it doesn’t 
happen. (UTS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Statements 
Disagree/Not 
Applicable 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Agree 
Moderately 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
37. I am quite successful at controlling my 
unwanted thoughts. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
38. I think I have a problem with unwanted 
thoughts. (UTS). 
0 1 2 3 4 
39. I haven’t really found any strategies that 
work well at getting ride of my unwanted 
thoughts. (MCS) 
0 1 2 3 4 
40. My unwanted thoughts must have 
importance, or they wouldn’t keep 
coming back. (UTS). 
0 1 2 3 4 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) 
 
Most people experience unpleasant and/or unwanted thoughts (in verbal and/or picture 
form), which can be difficult to control. We are interested in the techniques that you 
generally 
use to control such thoughts. 
Below are a number of things that people do to control these thoughts. Please read 
each statement carefully, and indicate how often you use each technique by circling the 
appropriate number. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time 
thinking about each one. 
 
When I experience an unpleasant / unwanted thought: 
 
Never    Sometimes          Often Almost                      
                                                                 always 
1 I call to mind positive images instead  1   2   3     4 
2 I tell myself not to be so stupid   1   2   3     4 
3 I focus on the thought    1   2  3    4 
4 I replace the thought with a more  
trivial bad thought   1   2   3     4 
5 I don’t talk about the thought to anyone  1   2   3     4 
6 I punish myself for thinking the thought  1   2   3     4 
7 I dwell on other worries    1   2   3    4 
8 I keep the thought to myself   1   2   3     4 
9 I occupy myself with work instead   1   2   3     4 
10 I challenge the thought’s validity   1   2   3     4 
11 I get angry at myself for  
having the thought     1   2   3     4 
12 I avoid discussing the thought   1   2   3     4 
13 I shout at myself for having the thought  1   2   3     4 
14 I analyse the thought rationally   1   2   3     4 
15 I slap or pinch myself to stop the thought  1   2   3     4 
16 I think pleasant thoughts instead   1   2   3     4 
17 I find out how my friends deal with these  
thoughts  1   2   3     4 
18 I worry about more minor things instead  1   2   3     4 
19 I do something that I enjoy   1   2   3     4 
20 I try to reinterpret the thought   1   2   3     4 
21 I think about something else   1   2   3     4 
22 I think more about the more minor  
problems I have    1   2   3     4 
23 I try a different way of thinking about it  1   2   3     4 
24 I think about past worries instead  1   2   3     4 
25 I ask my friends if they have 
similar thoughts   1   2   3     4 
26 I focus on different negative thoughts  1   2   3     4 
Participant Code: 
_____________ 
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27 I question the reasons for  
having the thought  1   2   3     4 
28 I tell myself that something bad will happen  
if I think the thought    1   2   3     4 
29 I talk to a friend about the thought 1   2   3     4 
30 I keep myself busy    1   2   3     4 
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APPENDIX E 
Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS) 
 
The statements below describe some thoughts that people may have when they are 
feeling sad or down. Please read each statement and decide how much you do what the 
statement describes when you are feeling sad. Indicate the degree to which you do what is 
described by circling the appropriate number on the scale. 
 
WHEN I AM SAD, DOWN OR FEEL BLUE . . . . . . 
 
A. I have difficulty getting myself to stop thinking about how sad I am. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
B. I repeatedly analyze and keep thinking about the reasons for my sadness. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
C. I search my mind many times to try and figure out if there is anything about my 
personality that may have led me to feel this way.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
D. I get absorbed in thinking about why I am sad and find it difficult to think about other 
things. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
E. I search my mind repeatedly for events or experiences in my childhood that may help me
 understand my sad feelings. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
F. I keep wondering about how I was able to be happy at other points in my life. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
Participant Code: 
_____________ 
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WHEN I AM SAD, DOWN OR FEEL BLUE . . . . . . 
 
G. I lie in bed and keep thinking about my lack of motivation and wonder about whether it 
will ever return. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
H. If people try to talk to me or ask me questions it feels as though they are interrupting an
 ongoing silent conversation I am having with myself about my sadness. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
I. I question and keep wondering about the meaning of life to find clues that may help me
 understand my sadness. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
J. I repeatedly think about what sadness really is by concentrating on my feelings and trying 
to understand them. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
K. I get the feeling that if I think long enough about my sadness I will find that it has some 
deeper meaning and that I will be able to understand myself better because of it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
L. I keep thinking about my problems to try and examine where things went wrong. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
 
M. I exhaust myself by thinking so much about myself and the reasons for my sadness. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NOT 
AT ALL 
RARELY SOMETIMES QUITE 
A BIT 
VERY  
MUCH 
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 APPENDIX F 
Single Item Self-Report Mood - Sadness 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how sad you feel right now? 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|   
1             2                                 3                                  4                               5   
Not Sad                 Somewhat          Moderately                  Very Sad              Extremely 
At All                       Sad                    Sad                                                      Sad 
 
 
Participant Code: 
_____________ 
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APPENDIX G 
Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. 
Indicate to what extent [INSERT APPROPRIATE TIME INSTRUCTIONS HERE]. Use 
the following scale to record your answers. 
 
          1                       2                 3                   4                  5 
    very slightly        a little    moderately     quite a bit    extremely 
     or not at all 
 
 
___ interested   ___ distressed  ___ excited  ___ upset  
 
___ strong   ___ guilty   ___ scared  ___ hostile 
 
___ enthusiastic ___ proud  ___ irritable  ___ alert 
 
___ ashamed   ___ inspired   ___ nervous  ___ determined  
 
___ attentive  ___ jittery   ___ active   ___ afraid 
 
 
We have used PANAS with the following time instructions: 
(you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment) 
(you have felt this way today) 
(you have felt this way during the past few days) 
(you have felt this way during the past week) 
(you have felt this way during the past few weeks) 
(you have felt this way during the past year) 
(you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on the average) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant Code: 
_____________ 
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APPENDIX H 
Negative Cue-Word List 
 
Cue words to elicit negative memories: 
 
 
Empty  
 
Fear 
 
Ugly 
 
Weak 
 
Hopeless 
 
Loser 
 
Failure 
 
Temper 
 
Death 
 
Sickness 
 
Accident 
 
Rejection 
 
Stupid 
 
Blaming 
 
Horrified 
 
Doubt 
 
Tragedy 
 
Loss 
 
Suspicious 
 
Defeat 
 
Ordeal 
 
Impossible 
 
Sad 
 
Shame 
 
Guilt 
 
Punishment 
 
Pain 
 
Harmful 
 
Angry 
 
Mournful 
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 APPENDIX I 
Memory Record Form 
Elicitation word: _____________ 
 
Memory 1 (M1). 
____________________________________________________  
Exemplar: ____________ 
 
[Now turn to the memory rating sheet and ask the participant to 
verbally rate the clarity, valance, and age of memory] 
 
 
Memory 2 (M2). 
___________________________________________________  
Exemplar: _____________ 
 
[Now turn to the memory rating sheet and ask the 
 participant to rate the clarity, valance, and age of memory] 
 
 
Memory 3 (M3). 
____________________________________________________  
Exemplar: ____________ 
 
[Now turn to the memory rating sheet and ask the  
participant to rate the clarity, valance, and age of memory] 
 
 
Memory 4 (M4). 
___________________________________________________  
Exemplar: _____________ 
 
[Now turn to the memory rating sheet and ask the participant 
 to rate the clarity, valance, and age of memory] 
 
 
Participant Code: 
_____________ 
Memory Negativity ______ 
Memory Clarity _______ 
Memory Age ________ 
Memory Negativity ______ 
Memory Clarity _______ 
Memory Age ________ 
Memory Negativity ______ 
Memory Clarity _______ 
Memory Age ________ 
Memory Negativity ______ 
Memory Clarity _______ 
Memory Age ________ 
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APPENDIX J 
Subjective Ratings of Valance, Clarity and Age of Memory 
 
Subjective Rating Scale for Memory Negativity 
 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how negative this memory is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
  1                         2                                 3                                  4                                 5 
Not Negative       Somewhat                   Moderately                Very Negative      Extremely  
  At All                 Negative                       Negative                                                Negative 
 
 
Subjective Rating Scale for Memory Clarity 
 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how clear in your mind this memory is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
      1                                  2                                  3                                 4                                 
5       Not Clear              Somewhat                  Moderately                  Very Clear                
Extremely 
At All                           Clear                           Clear                                                               
Clear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant’s Age When Memory Occurred  
 
How old were you when this memory/event took place? __________ 
 
 
Participant Code: 
_____________ 
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APPENDIX K 
Cue Word Rating 
Subjective Rating Scale for Negative Valence of Cue-words 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how negative the word ___________ is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
  1              2                                  3                                 4                                 5   
Not Negative        Somewhat                   Moderately              Very Negative       Extremely 
   At All                  Negative                      Negative                                               Negative 
 
Subjective Rating Scale for Negative Valence of Cue-words 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how negative the word ___________ is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
  1                         2                                 3                                 4                                 5   
Not Negative        Somewhat                Moderately              Very Negative          Extremely      
    At All                 Negative                  Negative                                                  Negative 
 
Subjective Rating Scale for Negative Valence of Cue-words 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how negative the word ___________ is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
 1              2                                  3                                 4                                 5   
Not Negative         Somewhat                Moderately              Very Negative         Extremely      
   At All                  Negative                   Negative                                                  Negative 
 
Subjective Rating Scale for Negative Valence of Cue-words 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how negative the word ___________ is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
  1              2                                  3                                 4                                 5   
Not Negative        Somewhat                 Moderately              Very Negative         Extremely      
   At All                  Negative                   Negative                                                  Negative 
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Subjective Rating Scale for Negative Valence of Cue-words 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how negative the word ___________ is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
  1              2                                  3                                 4                                 5   
Not Negative        Somewhat                   Moderately              Very Negative       Extremely 
    At All                Negative                       Negative                                               Negative 
 A Subjective Rating Scale for Negative Valence of Cue-words 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how negative the word ___________ is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
      1              2                                  3                                 4                                 5   
Not Negative        Somewhat                   Moderately              Very Negative       Extremely      
At All                     Negative                       Negative                                             Negative 
 
A Subjective Rating Scale for Negative Valence of Cue-words 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how negative the word ___________ is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
      1              2                                  3                                 4                                 5   
  Not Negative      Somewhat                   Moderately              Very Negative       Extremely      
   At All                  Negative                     Negative                                                Negative 
 
A Subjective Rating Scale for Negative Valence of Cue-words 
On the five-point scale below, please indicate how negative the word ___________ is: 
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------| 
      1              2                                  3                                 4                                 5   
  Not Negative      Somewhat                   Moderately              Very Negative       Extremely      
      At All               Negative                     Negative                                                Negative 
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APPENDIX L 
Visual Search Task 
 
Please go through each line below slowly and strike out each vowel you see. 
 
LDXQBGSPCEYSGUMMJKKFDTPHSCLNLIXFTVRKIISCELULQCSSDJBZYJ 
VSQNMZELZRQRAFSRMVYJKOSEMQLFSMQOZRABPSTXSCOXPOUOCZT
CLDQUNHLYKNQEVHOFQGXUYHYGTKJBUYBTLBRLNNPXSFIKOLFYGF
MGKDFQUHOJFXLNFUUIVXNCUMBOABWECKNUCUAEJGVRYQSTRBQT
AGOVMYFCRQTFRTCJRFUJKDZKJVHKDMSSRZGGNNIRWHJOHRMFPDT
KSLVTOUEMUETYYXMBYLGKWUTTOOXDGRSBYZMGMWGGDUYYUER
VBIZWVSZAMTIYJKMPRZTHOXJGBQYLUSGKLQJYJZRRTKLFKFYHDEA
DRJHCYBJVDNNOFCJKHMFGGZXBTZZULPDATAAYUGJFUTQBSSEDEDT
JSRDULYDEBVRUNSMSHBQHAIVUDXCDUYUHGRYUZXTNPJCQPFGFGPY
CSZDVWHKQSWMGCVJUJBSHLZXXEOYZXUQFXJWJZXLBLJSRRKVELK
HZTCCVHYFREMKUTTWJDIPXRWTYSQSECJCVYRJGPLZZZVXWMLMBH
ZYAHRFKNTZHXQRJACNUZSKUPRWYJDXOIBGBIIWBPGLOXAGIJJRPM
XVNRLKVZIYYITNZLSTCEXFOKOXYOPDHIFHJEGHYGSVETKCZBCDRSQ
JJIAVEVVEONFQCFKTQBAQNGJXRLXAUTBCEIIBSJZIGYWQRHDYFBYK
YHREPHZRTVRSOTWZOHYOQSOWSPJLORPHDMNHYSMBDIPEASNJKIY
XKWNYZKQJUYJUKJWHCWIITLRAGHLLCCDCUVYKFEUDBHZOAVKGE
WELICGKDGDYJUAWJIESMDOJJNWPWQAZTPNAGVAKSKZOVAIQYBXP
YAMVTEICOQBQLICTRLZJFBLDIWQTZPPMDVSWMPBPSLOVWPPAGNO
NZFGGIUQYXKKKAYXCCTOQZOASJXRVRPVANEJFFTQSKAQGWPOAFC
PRLAHQOXEPBDGZXIJCVYRJGPLZZZVXWMLMSEDEDTJSRDULYDEBJF 
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APPENDIX M 
Debriefing Form 
 
The Effects of Mood on Remembering Negative Memories 
 
Researcher:     Research Supervisor: 
Shelley Rhyno     Tammy Marche 
Ph: 966-8185      Ph: 966-8919 
E-mail: rhyno@sasktel.net   E-mail: tmarche@stmcollege.ca 
 
Thank you for participating in this study, I hope you found it interesting and perhaps 
gained some insight from your experience as well. 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether certain methods of forgetting are 
better at helping individuals forget negative memories than others or if this depends on 
how sad a person is at the time. For individuals who experience a depressed mood, a 
major aspect of their experience during is the constant recurrence or intrusion of negative 
memories/experiences that are difficult to forget. This may make your mood worse or 
prolong the effects of feeling badly. By applying specific methods of forgetting in applied 
clinical settings, some useful treatment methods may be developed in the future. For 
example, retrieval of partial information from a set of memories acts to inhibit related 
information. In other words, aspects from an event that one retrieves from memory 
(perhaps repeatedly) acts to inhibit the recollection of the non-retrieved information in the 
same memory set. If this paradigm can be applied to negative memories, individuals who 
suffer from recurrent intrusions of such memories may be able to inhibit them through 
recall of related, but more neutral or positive, information and perhaps stop the onset of 
more serious mood problems. 
 
If you are interested in receiving a paper copy of the final results or have any further 
questions, please feel free to contact me or my research supervisor. Thank you again for 
your participation! 
 
